CASES ON NON-FATAL OFFENCES
1. COMMON LAW ASSAULT AND BATTERY
Logdon v DPP [1976] Crim LR 121.
The defendant, as a joke, pointed a gun at the victim who was terrified until she was told that it was in fact a replica. The court held that the victim had apprehended immediate physical violence, and the defendant had been at least reckless as to whether this would occur.
Smith v Superintendent of Woking Police Station [1983] Crim LR 323.
The defendant had terrified a woman occupying a ground floor flat by staring in through the windows at her. The Divisional Court was satisfied that even though the defendant was outside the building there was evidence to suggest that the victim was terrified by the prospect of some immediate violence. It was not necessary for the prosecution to establish precisely what the victim feared would happen; a general apprehension of violence was sufficient.
Tuberville v Savage (1669) 2 Keb 545.
The defendant placed his hand on his sword hilt and told the victim, "If it were not assize-time, I would not take such language from you." This was held not to be an assault. The words accompanying the action (of placing the hand on the sword) clearly demonstrated that because the assize judge was in town, the defendant was not going to use his sword. There could thus be no apprehension of immediate force.
2. ASSAULT OCCASIONING ACTUAL BODILY HARM
R v Roberts (1971) 56 Cr App R 95.
The defendant gave a lift in his car, late at night to a girl. He made unwanted advances of a sexual nature to her which alarmed her. She feared he intended to rape her and as the car was moving, she opened the door and jumped out suffering grazing and concussion. The defendant was convicted under s47 and Stephenson LJ stated that the test for causation in law was to ask whether the result was the reasonably foreseeable consequence of what the defendant was saying or doing.
R v Chan-Fook [1994] 2 All ER 552.
The Court of Appeal held that 'harm' is a synonym for 'injury' (so that it would not be enough that the victim's health or comfort had been interfered with, if no injury had been caused), and that 'actual' indicates that the injury should not be so trivial as to be wholly insignificant. The Court also held that 'bodily harm' is not limited to harm to the skin, flesh and bones of the victim. It includes the organs, nervous system and brain. Accordingly, it can include psychiatric injury but it does not include mere emotions or states of mind which are not themselves evidence of an identifiable clinical condition. Where there is expert evidence of psychiatric injury the jury should be directed that the injury is capable of being actual bodily harm. Juries should not be directed that an assault which causes a hysterical or nervous condition is an assault occasioning actual bodily harm.
R v Ireland [1997] 4 All ER 225
The defendant made repeated silent telephone calls, mostly at night, to three women, as a result of which they suffered psychiatric illness. He was charged with three counts of assault occasioning actual bodily harm under s47 of the 1861 Act. The House of Lords held:
(1) In the light of the best current scientific appreciation of the link between the body and psychiatric injury, the words 'bodily harm' in ss20 and 47 of the 1861 Act were capable of covering recognised psychiatric illnesses, such as an anxiety disorder or a depressive order, which affected the central nervous system of the body. However, those neuroses had to be distinguished from simple states of fear, or problems in coping with everyday life, which did not amount to psychiatric illnesses. Since, in the instant appeal the victims had developed anxiety and depressive disorders, it followed that they had suffered 'bodily harm'.
(2) The making of silent telephone calls which caused psychiatric injury to the victim was capable of amounting to an assault in law under s47 of the 1861 Act where the calls caused the victim to apprehend an immediate application of force. Accordingly the appeal would be dismissed.
R v Constanza [1997] Crim LR 576
The defendant was convicted of occasioning actual bodily harm. The victim was a female ex-colleague. Between October 1993 and June 1995 he followed her home from work, made numerous silent telephone calls, sent over 800 letters, repeatedly drove past her home, visited her against her expressed wishes, and on three occasions wrote offensive words on her front door. In June 1995 the victim received two further letters which she interpreted as clear threats. She believed that he had "flipped" and that he might do something to her at any time. In July she was diagnosed as suffering from clinical depression and anxiety. It was the doctor's view that the defendant's actions had caused this harm.
The Court of Appeal held that the issue before the Court was whether it was enough if the Crown have proved a fear of violence at some time not excluding the immediate future. In the Court's view it was. It was an important factor that the defendant lived near the victim and she thought that something could happen at any time. The judge was entitled to leave to the jury the question whether or not she had a fear of immediate violence, and the jury were entitled to find that she did. The Court rejected the defence submission that a person cannot have a fear of immediate violence unless they can see the potential perpetrator. It rejected a further submission that an assault could not be committed by words alone without a physical action. The indictment made it clear that the assault relied on was that constituted by the last letter.
R v Savage; DPP v Parmenter [1991] 4 All ER 698
For facts, see below.
Lord Ackner said that once the assault was established, the only remaining question was whether the victim's injury was the natural consequence of that assault. This matter can be resolved by applying an objective test which does not involve enquiring into the defendant's state of mind. His Lordship stated:
"The verdict of assault occasioning actual bodily harm may be returned upon proof of an assault together with proof of the fact that actual bodily harm was occasioned by the assault. The prosecution are not obliged to prove that the defendant intended to cause some actual bodily harm or was reckless as to whether such harm would be caused."
3. MALICIOUSLY WOUNDING OR MALICIOUSLY INFLICTING GRIEVOUS BODILY HARM
R v Martin (1881) 8 QBD 54.
The defendant blocked the exit doors of a theatre, put out the lights in a passageway, and shouted 'Fire!' as the theatre-goers were leaving the performance. In the ensuing panic, many were severely injured by being crushed against the locked doors. The defendant was convicted under s20 and appealed. His conviction was confirmed and it is implicit in the decision that the indirect nature of the way in which the defendant's acts had caused the harm presented no bar to liability.
R v Wilson [1984] AC 242.
The defendant motorist had been involved in an argument with a pedestrian, which culminated in the defendant punching the pedestrian in the face. Lord Roskill stated:
"In our opinion, grievous bodily harm may be inflicted … either where the accused has directly and violently "inflicted" it by assaulting the victim, or where the accused has "inflicted" it by doing something, intentionally, which, although it is not itself a direct application of force to the body of the victim, does directly result in force being applied violently to the body of the victim, so that he suffers grievous bodily harm."
R v Burstow [1997] 4 All ER 225.
The defendant had conducted an eight-month campaign of harassment against a woman which included making both silent and abusive telephone calls to her, distributing offensive cards in the street where she lived, visiting her place of work and her home, taking photographs of her and her family, and sending her a note which was intended, and was understood to be, menacing. The victim was badly affected by that campaign of harassment; it preyed on her mind, she was fearful of personal violence and a consultant psychiatrist stated that she was suffering from a severe depressive illness. The defendant was charged with one count of unlawfully and maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm contrary to s20 of the 1861 Act. The House of Lords held:
(1) In the light of the best current scientific appreciation of the link between the body and psychiatric injury, the words 'bodily harm' in ss20 and 47 of the 1861 Act were capable of covering recognised psychiatric illnesses, such as an anxiety disorder or a depressive order, which affected the central nervous system of the body. However, those neuroses had to be distinguished from simple states of fear, or problems in coping with everyday life, which did not amount to psychiatric illnesses. Since, in the instant appeal the victims had developed anxiety and depressive disorders, it followed that they had suffered 'bodily harm'.
(2) Furthermore, an offence of inflicting grievous bodily harm under s20 of the 1861 Act could be committed even though no physical violence was applied directly or indirectly to the body of the victim. Accordingly the appeal would be dismissed.
R v Mowatt [1968] 1 QB 421.
The defendant was convicted under s20 following an attack he had carried out on a police officer, during which he had rained blows on the officer's face and pushed him roughly to the ground. Regarding the term 'maliciously' Lord Diplock stated:
"In the offence under section 20 … the word "maliciously" does import upon the part of the person who unlawfully inflicts the wound or other grievous bodily harm an awareness that his act may have the consequence of causing some physical harm to some other person … It is quite unnecessary that the accused should have foreseen that his unlawful act might cause physical harm of the gravity described in the section, ie a wound or serious physical injury. It is enough that he should have foreseen that some physical harm to some person, albeit of a minor character, might result."
R v Savage [1991] 4 All ER 698.
The defendant was charged with unlawful wounding under s20, the prosecution having alleged that she had approached the victim and thrown the contents of a glass of beer at her, and that she had let go of the glass which broke, with the result that the victim suffered cuts. She admitted that it had been her intention to throw the beer over the victim but denied any intention to cut her with the glass. The defendant appealed successfully against her conviction under s20 because of the trial judge's misdirection as to the mental element for that offence, but the court substituted a conviction for s47, on the basis that the offence did not require proof of recklessness or 'maliciousness' in relation to the 'occasioning' of the actual bodily harm. The defendant had deliberately thrown beer over the victim, an act which was obviously an assault, and that 'assault' had undoubtedly occasioned the actual bodily harm which occurred.
DPP v Parmenter [1991].
The defendant had caused injury to his young baby by tossing him about in a way which would have been acceptable with an older child, but not with one so young. He did not realise that he might cause harm by this action. The House of Lords held that he could not be liable under s20 as he had not foreseen the risk of any harm. It was not necessary under s20 that he foresee the grievous bodily harm which must be caused, but the defendant must foresee that he might cause some harm. An alternative verdict under s47 was substituted.
R v Sullivan [1981] Crim LR 46.
The defendant, who had swerved his car towards a group of pedestrians intending to scare them was acquitted of a charge under s20, when he lost control of the vehicle and subsequently collided with the pedestrians causing injury. As he had only foreseen the risk of 'psychic harm' his liability was reduced to s47.
R v Belfon [1976] 1 WLR 741.
The defendant had slashed the victim with a razor causing severe wounds to his face and chest. The Court of Appeal held that in order to establish the offence under s18 it was essential to prove the specific intent. References to the defendant foreseeing that such harm was likely to result or that he had been reckless as to whether such harm would result, would be insufficient.
