Beswick v Beswick

[1968] AC 58, [1967] 2 All ER 1197, [1967] 3 WLR 932, 111 Sol Jo 540

Court: HL

Judgment Date: circa 1968

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CONTRACT - CONSIDERATION AND PRIVITY - PRIVITY - GENERAL RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF STRANGERS TO CONTRACT - RIGHT TO SUE - EFFECT OF LAW OF PROPERTY ACT 1925 (C 20) S 56

In March 1962, deceased, a coal merchant, by agreement in writing under the hands of deceased and applicant, assigned his business assets to applicant who undertook to pay him £6 10s weekly for the remainder of his life and in the event of his death to pay his widow, respondent, an annuity of £5 weekly. Deceased died intestate in November 1963. In 1964 respondent took out letters of administration to his estate. Applicant made one payment of £5 to respondent and refused to make any further payment. Respondent as administratrix of her husband's estate and in her personal capacity (though, on the present appeal, only under Law of Property Act 1925 (c 25), s 56(1), in her personal capacity) claimed payment of arrears of the annuity and an order for specific performance of the continuing obligation to pay the annuity: Held respondent, as administratrix of the estate of her husband, a contracting party, was entitled to enforce the agreement and to do so by way of an order for specific performance in her own personal favour, and that remedy was available to her suing as administratrix notwithstanding that damages recoverable for her husband's estate were (or might be) nominal.

Per Lord Reid, Lord Hodson and Lord Guest: as the definition of the word 'property' in Law of Property Act 1925 (c 25), s 205(1)(xx) (where it was defined to include any thing in action and any interest in real or personal property) was introduced by the qualification 'unless the context otherwise requires', and as the 1925 Act was a consolidating Act and therefore was not intended to alter the law, and as s 56 replaced s 5 of Real Property Act 1845, which applied only to land, the context of s 56 'otherwise required' for the purposes of s 205(1) with the consequence that the definition of 'property' did not apply to the words 'land or other property' in s 56(1), and that section did not apply to the agreement in the present case.

Per Lord Upjohn (Lord Pearce concurring): Law of Property Act 1925 (c 25), s 56, was intended to sweep away the old common law rule that in an indenture inter partes the covenantee must be named as a party to the indenture and take the benefit of an immediate grant or the benefit of a covenant, and s 56(1) did not apply unless three conditions were satisfied, which they were not in the present case, viz - (i) the agreement did not purport to contain any contract or grant by applicant with or to respondent; (ii) the agreement was not under seal, but the words 'conveyance or other instrument' in s 56(1) were limited to documents under seal, and (iii) s 56(1) referred only to documents strictly inter partes and this agreement was not such a document.

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS - ACTIONS BY AND AGAINST PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES - ACCRUAL OF CAUSES OF ACTION - CAUSES OF ACTION ARISING AFTER DEATH - ARISING OUT OF CONTRACTS - IN GENERAL - ACTION TO ENFORCE CHARGE ARISING AFTER TESTATOR'S DEATH

In March 1962, deceased, a coal merchant, by agreement in writing under the hands of deceased and appellant assigned his business assets to appellant who undertook to pay him £6 10s weekly for the remainder of his life and in the event of his death to pay his widow, respondent, an annuity of £5 weekly. Deceased died intestate in November 1963. In 1964 respondent took out letters of administration to his estate. Appellant made one payment of £5 to respondent and refused to make any further payment. Respondent, as administratrix of her husband's estate and in her personal capacity (though, on the present appeal, only under Law of Property Act 1925 (c 20) s 56(1), in her personal capacity), claimed payment of arrears of the annuity and an order for specific performance of the continuing obligation to pay the annuity: Held respondent, as administratrix of the estate of her husband, a contracting party, was entitled to enforce the agreement and to do so by way of an order for specific performance in her own personal favour, and that remedy was available to her suing as administratrix notwithstanding that damages recoverable for her husband's estate were (or might be) nominal.

Per Lord Reid, Lord Hodson and Lord Guest: as the definition of the word 'property' in Law of Property Act 1925 (c 20) s 205(1)(xx) (where it is defined to include any thing in action and any interest in real or personal property) was introduced by the qualification 'unless the context otherwise requires', and as the 1925 Act was a consolidating Act and therefore was not intended to alter the law, and as s 56 replaced Real Property Act 1845 (c 106) s 5, which applied only to land, the context of s 56 'otherwise required' for the purposes of s 205(1) with the consequence that the definition of 'property' did not apply to the words 'land or other property' in s 56(1), and that section did not apply to the agreement in the present case.

Per Lord Upjohn (Lord Pearce concurring): Law of Property Act 1925 (c 20) s 56, was intended to sweep away the old common law rule that in an indenture inter partes the covenantee must be named as a party to the indenture and take the benefit of an immediate grant or the benefit of a covenant, and s 56(1) did not apply unless three conditions were satisfied, which they were not in the present case, viz (i) the agreement did not purport to contain any contract or grant by appellant with or to respondent; (ii) the agreement was not under seal, but the words 'conveyance or other instrument' in s 56(1) were limited to documents under seal, and (iii) s 56(1) referred only to documents strictly inter partes, and this agreement was not such a document.

SALE OF LAND - COMPLETION - FORM OF ASSURANCE OF FREEHOLDS - PARTIES - PARTIES TO WHOM THE ASSURANCE IS MADE - RIGHT OF PERSONS NOT PARTIES TO TAKE AN INTEREST - EFFECT OF LAW OF PROPERTY ACT 1925 (C 20) S 56

In March 1962, deceased, a coal merchant, by agreement in writing under the hands of deceased and applicant, assigned his business assets to applicant who undertook to pay him £6 10s weekly for the remainder of his life and in the event of his death to pay his widow, respondent, an annuity of £5 weekly. Deceased died intestate in November 1963. In 1964 respondent took out letters of administration to his estate. Applicant made one payment of £5 to respondent and refused to make any further payment. Respondent as administratrix of her husband's estate and in her personal capacity (though, on the present appeal, only under Law of Property Act 1925 (c 20) s 56(1), in her personal capacity) claimed payment of arrears of the annuity and an order for specific performance of the continuing obligation to pay the annuity: Held respondent, as administratrix of the estate of her husband, a contracting party, was entitled to enforce the agreement and to do so by way of an order for specific performance in her own personal favour, and that remedy was available to her suing as administratrix notwithstanding that damages recoverable for her husband's estate were (or might be) nominal.

Per Lord Reid, Lord Hodson and Lord Guest: as the definition of the word 'property' in Law of Property Act 1925 (c 20) s 205(1)(xx) (where it was defined to include any thing in action and any interest in real or personal property) was introduced by the qualification 'unless the context otherwise requires', and as the 1925 Act was a consolidating Act and therefore was not intended to alter the law, and as s 56 replaced s 5 of Real Property Act 1845, which applied only to land, the context of s 56 'otherwise required' for the purposes of s 205(1) with the consequence that the definition of 'property' did not apply to the words 'land or other property' in s 56(1), and that section did not apply to the agreement in the present case.

Per Lord Upjohn (Lord Pearce concurring): Law of Property Act 1925 (c 20) s 56 was intended to sweep away the old common law rule that in an indenture inter partes the covenantee must be named as a party to the indenture and take the benefit of an immediate grant or the benefit of a covenant, and s 56(1) did not apply unless three conditions were satisfied, which they were not in the present case, viz: (i) the agreement did not purport to contain any contract or grant by applicant with or to respondent; (ii) the agreement was not under seal, but the words 'conveyance or other instrument' in s 56(1) were limited to documents under seal, and (iii) s 56(1) referred only to documents strictly inter partes and this agreement was not such a document.

SETTLEMENTS - NATURE AND VALIDITY OF SETTLEMENTS - IN GENERAL - VALIDITY AND AVOIDANCE OF SETTLEMENTS - ENFORCEABILITY - TRUSTEES CANNOT SUE ON BEHALF OF VOLUNTEERS
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE - THE REMEDY AND ITS SCOPE - GENERAL LIMITS OF JURISDICTION - WHERE MONEY PAYMENT ADEQUATE OR DECREE VALUELESS - EXISTENCE OF ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW - GRANT OR SALE OF ANNUITIES OR RENTCHARGES - WHETHER ENFORCED - GRANT OF ANNUITY

In March 1962, deceased, a coal merchant by agreement in writing under the hands of deceased and appellant, assigned his business assets to appellant who undertook to pay him £6 10s weekly for the remainder of his life and in the event of his death to pay his widow, the respondent, an annuity of £5 weekly. Deceased died intestate in November 1963. In 1964 respondent took out letters of administration to his estate. Appellant made one payment of £5 to respondent and refused to make any further payment. Respondent as administratix of her husband's estate and in her personal capacity (though, on the present appeal, only under Law of Property Act 1925 (c 20) s 56(1), in her personal capacity) claimed payment of arrears of the annuity and an order for specific performance of the continuing obligation to pay the annuity: Held respondent as administratrix of the estate of her husband, a contracting party, was entitled to enforce the agreement and to do so by way of an order for specific performance in her own personal favour, and that remedy was available to her suing as administratrix notwithstanding that damages recoverable for her husband's estate were (or might be) nominal. Per Lord Reid, Lord Hodson and Lord Guest: as the definition of the word 'property' in the Law of Property Act 1925 (c 20) s 205(1)(xx) (where it was defined to include any thing in action and any interest in real or personal property) was introduced by the qualification 'unless the context otherwise requires', and as the 1925 Act was a consolidating Act and therefore was not intended to alter the law, and as s 56 replaced s 5 of the Real Property Act 1845, which applied only to land, the context of s 56 'otherwise required' for the purposes of s 205(1) with the consequence that the definition of 'property' did not apply to the words 'land or other property' in s 56(1), and that section did not apply to the agreement in the present case. Per Lord Upjohn (Lord Pearce concurring): s 56 of the Law of Property Act 1925 (c 20) was intended to sweep away the old common law rule that in an indenture inter partes the covenantee must be named as a party to the indenture and take the benefit of an immediate grant or the benefit of a covenant, and s 56(1) did not apply unless three conditions were satisfied, which they were not in the present case, viz: (i) the agreement did not purport to contain any contract or grant by appellant with or to respondent; (ii) the agreement was not under seal, but the words 'conveyance or other instrument' in s 56(1) were limited to documents under seal, and (iii) s 56(1) referred only to documents strictly inter partes, and this agreement was not such a document.

STATUTES - STATUTORY INTERPRETATION - THE INTERPRETATIVE CRITERIA - THE INFORMED INTERPRETATON RULE - INFORMED INTERPRETATION BY USE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY - ENACTING HISTORY - IN GENERAL - HOW FAR CONSIDERED - HANSARD

In construing any Act of Parliament we are seeking the intention of Parliament, and it is quite true that we must deduce that intention from the words of the Act. If the words of the Act are only capable of one meaning we must give them that meaning no matter how they got there. If, however, they are capable of having more than one meaning we are, in my view, well entitled to see how they got there. For purely practical reasons we do not permit debates in either House to be cited: it would add greatly to the time and expense involved in preparing cases involving the construction of a statute if counsel were expected to read all the debates in Hansard, and it would often be impracticable for counsel to get access to at least the older reports of debates in select committees of the House of Commons; moreover, in a very large proportion of cases such a search, even if practicable, would throw no light on the question before the court (Lord Reid).

107 CaseSearch

Beswick v Beswick

[1966] Ch 538, [1966] 3 All ER 1, [1966] 3 WLR 396, 110 Sol Jo 507, [1966] CLY 1915

Court: CA

Judgment Date: circa 1966

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108 CaseSearch

Beswick v Beswick

[1965] 3 All ER 858, [1965] CLY 632

Court: Ch Ct

Judgment Date: circa 1965

Case History