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A v Hoare; H v Suffolk County Council; X v Wandsworth London Borough Council

[2006] EWCA Civ 395, [2006] 1 WLR 2320, [2006] Fam Law 533, (2006) Times, 28 April, [2006] All ER (D) 203 (Apr)

Court: CA

Judgment Date: 12/04/2006

Case History

Cases considered by this case
Annotations: All CasesCourt: ALL COURTS

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - TRESPASS TO THE PERSON - PERIOD OF LIMITATION - EXTENSION - ACTIONS ALLEGING SEXUAL OFFENCES - CLAIMANTS BRINGING ACTIONS AFTER MORE THAN SIX YEARS - WHETHER CLAIMS SUBJECT TO SIX-YEAR LIMITATION PERIOD - WHETHER CLAIMS STATUTE-BARRED - LIMITATION ACT 1980, SS 2, 11, 14, 28

In the first of three appeals before the court, the claimant sought to claim damages from a defendant who had been convicted of attempting to rape her in 1988. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. He won £7m in the National Lottery in 2004. Her claim was struck out by a master, whose decision was upheld on appeal by a judge. In the two other appeals, the claimants' claims for damages for psychiatric harm they had suffered as a consequence of sexual abuse to which they been exposed during their schooldays were dismissed by judges in the county court. Each of the cases fell foul of the decision of the House of Lords in Stubbings v Webb [1993] 1 All ER 322, in which it was held that a claim based on an intentional sexual assault was subject to a non-extendable six-year limitation period. The claimants appealed against those decisions.
They submitted that (i) the decision of the House of Lords in Stubbings v Webb should no longer be followed because it was wrong and/or because the Law Commission had demonstrated that the approach should be different; (ii) the decision should no longer be followed because s 11(1) of the Limitation Act 1980 should now be construed differently in the light of s 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998; (iii) the decision did not apply to a claim against a public authority; (iv) if necessary, the court should grant a declaration of incompatibility between the 1980 Act and the Convention; and (v) Stubbings v Webb could be distinguished on the facts in those cases where the claimant could also rely on a breach or breaches of a duty of care that did not arise solely in connection with the deliberate act or acts of trespass to the person and/or was different from the simplistic duty of care to avoid causing personal injury which was at the centre of the discussion in that case.
Held - (1) The decision in Stubbings v Webb was binding on the court, and it was not open to the court to depart from it, at least absent the 1998 Act.
(2) Section 3 of the 1998 Act did not apply in the instant cases to enable a different interpretation of s 11(1) of the 1980 Act to be provided, because to give it that effect would interfere with the defendants' accrued right to say that the claim was time barred under s 2 of the 1980 Act. The 1998 Act did not have retrospective effect in the sense that it did not retrospectively confer upon a claimant a cause of action which he would not otherwise have had. The same applied to accrued defences. Whilst it was right that limitation had to be pleaded and that the claim would not be held to be time barred until the point had been taken, it was not right that a defendant did not have an accrued right to rely upon such a defence until he took the point in a defence. He had an accrued right when time expired. It followed that in each case the judge was bound to hold that the claim was time barred under s 2 of the 1980 Act.
(3) Whilst it was true that Stubbings v Webb itself was concerned with a claim against individuals, the basis of the decision of the House of Lords was that s 11(1) did not apply to the claim of deliberate sexual abuse because it did not give rise to an 'action for damages for negligence, nuisance, or breach of duty' as that expression was used in the subsection. One of the bases of the claim by H against the defendant education authority was that it was vicariously liable for the deliberate trespass of the teacher who was the perpetrator of the abuse. In order to avoid the effect of s 2 of the 1980 Act H had to show that his action against the authority was in that respect an 'action for damages for negligence, nuisance, or breach of duty' within s 11(1). It could not be held that his action against the teacher was not such an action (because it was an action for deliberate trespass) whereas his action against the authority came within the language of s 11(1) where the very basis of the claim was the authority's vicarious responsibility for an act of deliberate trespass. Such a distinction had no logical basis. On its true construction either both claims were within s 11(1) or both claims were outside it. The effect of the decision in Stubbings v Webb was that both claims were outside it and within s 2.
(4) In the instant case it was not appropriate to make a declaration of incompatibility.
(5) The court was bound by the decision in KR v Bryn Alyn Community (Holdings) Ltd (in liquidation) [2004] 2 All ER 716 to hold that an alternative claim based on breach of duty was not viable.