Vicarious Liability Lecture

Edited by: Barclay Littlewood

Last updated: 3 November 2026

In most scenarios in tort, the defendant will be the party who has actually done the relevant misdeed (or else faltered in their fulfilment of a duty.) There exists one important exception to this pattern, however - the concept of vicarious liability. In essence, vicarious liability deals with situations in which an individual has committed a tortious act in circumstances in which another person is also answerable for it. The primary situation in which the concept will arise is one in which someone is acting on behalf of an employer. This makes vicarious liability a useful tool. Firstly, it provides a sensible way to deal with situations in which an individual has not truly acted of their own volition, but instead has simply been doing as they have been told by their employer. It would be unjust to hold an employee wholly responsible in law for the plans and orders of their superiors, and so vicarious liability can make the employer answerable alongside the employee, even where the employer neither ordered nor knew of the wrong. Secondly, since attributing vicarious liability tends to involve the targeting of employers and business owners, it means that liability can be attributed to those who can best bear the costs of litigation - it is far more likely, for example, that an employer will have comprehensive insurance in place than an employee. One explanation for this phenomenon can be seen in Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam [2002] 3 WLR 1913. The case concerned a solicitor's firm's vicarious liability for the acts of one of its partners. The facts are unimportant - but of interest is the explanation given by Lord Nicholls:

"The underlying legal policy is based on the recognition that carrying on a business enterprise necessarily involves risks to others. It involves the risk that others will be harmed by wrongful acts committed by the agents through whom the business is carried on. When those risks ripen into loss, it is just that the business should be responsible for compensating the person who has been wronged."
- Lord Nicholls, at 21

What Lord Nicholls is essentially pointing out is that just as an employer gladly reaps the benefits of their employees' actions, they must also be prepared to bear the costs of those employees' misdeeds. With the theoretical basis for vicarious liability laid out, we can now examine its mechanics.

Vicarious liability is not a separate tort in and of itself (like negligence, or nuisance); instead, it is a way in which any of the other torts can be attributed to a particular defendant, even if that defendant was not directly involved in the tort. This makes vicarious liability a somewhat controversial mechanism, since it can involve imposing liability on a party who in reality was nowhere near the place where the tort occurred.

Establishing vicarious liability requires three primary criteria to be met. There must be a relationship capable of giving rise to vicarious liability, ordinarily employment or a relationship akin to employment, a tortious act, and that act must be sufficiently connected with the relationship.

Exam Consideration: It's worth paying extra attention to who the claimants, defendants and other parties are in vicarious liability cases so that you don't make mistakes when recounting them. Since they often involve several different actors, a lot of the time you won't be able to simply look at the case name for help.

Relationships Giving Rise to Vicarious Liability

The courts will first look for a sufficiently close relationship between tortfeasor and third party before allowing vicarious liability to be imposed. The tortfeasor remains personally liable. Since most people will at some point have an employer, this tends to be the most frequently encountered situation. However, certain other relationships give rise to vicarious liability - such as between a principal (someone who employs an agent) and their agent, between business partner and business partner, and between vehicle owners and drivers carrying out a task delegated by the owner. Permission to drive is not enough (Morgans v Launchbury [1973] AC 127).

Importantly, the Supreme Court has in recent years expanded the categories of relationship capable of giving rise to vicarious liability beyond the traditional employer-employee model, to include relationships that are "akin to employment". This development is discussed in detail below, after the traditional tests for distinguishing employees from independent contractors.

Exam Consideration: It is important to have a practical knowledge of how the above relationships function in an everyday setting. This is because a particularly devious defendant might give themselves an alternative title to help muddy the waters, in order to avoid vicarious liability being attributed. For example, business partners might call themselves 'joint-corporate leaders', or some other obfuscating term. What is important to the courts is not the title of the third party, but the nature of the relationship. So if it looks like a principal, or partner, or employer, and acts like a principal, partner or employer in all but name, then it is likely to be considered in law a principal, partner or employer!

Since the most commonly encountered relationship is employer-employee, it is important to know the features which define such a relationship. This is key, since independent contractors act a lot like employees, but those who engage a contractor genuinely in business on their own account are not vicariously liable for the contractor’s torts. Before continuing onto the law, it is worth briefly putting in place a rough idea of what an employee is versus what an independent contractor is. Employees tend to work in one place, on a formal basis. They can often be easily identified because they will have contracts with their employers formalising their working arrangements (pay, hours etc.). In contrast, independent contractors often have multiple clients, and often have less formalised working arrangements, often being paid per job, rather than per hour. Prime examples include gardeners, electricians and private tutors.

Since these definitions are general at best, the law has developed a number of tests to distinguish between these two camps. None are perfect on their own, but combined they form a framework which distinguishes between employees and contractors.

The Control Test

The first is the 'control test'. This involves asking who, exactly, is in control of the individual's work. Employees tend to have the nature of their task dictated specifically by their employer, whilst independent contractors tend to have more personal control. Imagine an independent electrician - you'd hire them to wire your house, but you wouldn't tell them which wire to put where!

The source of the control test can be found in Yewens v Noakes [1880] 6 QBD 530. The defendant was attempting to benefit from a law which stated that business premises could be exempt from inhabited house duty where a servant occupied them solely to take care of them. The Court of Appeal held that the merchant’s clerk did not qualify as a servant for this exemption. Bramwell LJ described a servant as 'a person subject to the command of his master as to the manner in which he shall do his work'.

This test works well in conventional employment situations - many employees are subject to the whims of their employers, and wouldn't find it odd if they were ordered to carry out a particular task. However, there are many employment situations which don't come under the Yewens definition, particularly where the employee is acting with a high level of skill. A hospital trust will employ many surgeons and doctors, but is hardly well placed to tell someone how to carry out brain surgery or deliver a baby.

The Organisation/Integration Test

The 'organisation' or 'integration test' distinguishes between people who sign contracts of service and those who contract to provide services. Employees tend to do work which is integral to the business's operations, whilst independent contractors tend to do work which is ancillary to the main functions of the business. This principle can be seen at play in Stevenson, Jordan & Harrison Ltd v MacDonald & Evans.

Case in Focus: Stevenson, Jordan & Harrison Ltd v MacDonald & Evans [1952] 1 TLR 101

An accountant wrote a book based on the skills and knowledge he gained during his employment by a firm. He died before the book was published. He had assigned his copyright to the publishers. The question then arose as to who was the owner of the copyright - the publishers or his former employer. Whilst authors are the primary owners of the copyright for things they write, if something is written under a contract of employment and the work is done in the course of employment, then copyright belongs to the employer unless they agree otherwise. Denning LJ distinguished material written in the course of the accountant's employment, which belonged to the firm, from lectures he was under no duty to give, in which he owned the copyright and could assign it to the publishers. This principle can also be applied to the employer versus contractor distinction - as per Lord Denning:

"One feature which seems to run through the instances is that, under a contract of service, a man is employed as part of the business, and his work is done as an integral part of the business; whereas under a contract for services, his work, although done for the business, is not integrated into it, but is only accessory to it."
- Lord Denning, at 111.

The 'accessory' idea is better understood by reference to examples. Consider a sales company. The company will need salespeople to operate, and will likely have an HR department to hire people, and a payroll team to pay them. All of these functions are key to the everyday workings of the organisation. That same organisation might employ a cleaner to hoover their offices at night, or a glazier to repair a broken window at their sales office. Whilst a sales office without a window, which hasn't been hoovered in years will not operate as effectively as it ordinarily would, neither the cleaner nor the glazier carry out business-essential activities. The cleaner and glazier can call in sick, and the business will continue to operate. If the sales team were to not come into work however, the company would cease to function.

This test is itself flawed, however. One day the sales computers might all crash with an irreparable bug. The company could not operate without their computers, and would call in an IT consultant for the day to deal with the issue. Whilst the IT consultant is doing business-vital work, they are still not an employee, despite apparently passing the organisation test. This demonstrates the usefulness of the multi-test approach - it helps to avoid anomalies which arise when only one of the rules is applied.

The Economic Reality Test

The 'economic reality test' is sometimes referred to as the 'multiple test' or the 'pragmatic test'. It involves examining the characteristics of the subject's work arrangements against a checklist of signs of conventional employment. The test appears in Ready Mixed Concrete Ltd v Minister of Pensions.

Case in Focus: Ready Mixed Concrete Ltd v Minister of Pensions [1968] 2 QB 497

The claimant hired a number of drivers to deliver concrete, paying the drivers by the quantity carried and the distance travelled. These drivers were named in their contracts as independent contractors. The drivers used vehicles which they had obtained on hire purchase from an associated finance company in order to do this. The vehicles had to be painted in the claimant's company colours, had to bear the company's logo, and the drivers were obliged to present their accounts in a special manner dictated by the claimant. The drivers also had to wear the company's uniform.

The drivers were responsible for maintaining the vehicles and could, with the company’s consent, employ a competent driver to carry out the work on their behalf.

The question arose as to whether the owner-driver whose case was before the court was an employee of the claimant or not. If so, the claimant would have to pay National Insurance contributions on their behalf (hence, 'Minister of Pensions' as the other party). If not, then the claimant did not have to make the payments. The court ruled that the owner-driver was not an employee, and identified three criteria which had to be met before employee status was granted:

Firstly, the individual must agree to provide their own work or skill for the employer in return for payment or other remuneration.

Secondly, the individual must have agreed (either expressly or impliedly) that they will work under a sufficient degree of control by the employer.

Thirdly, the other circumstances of the individual's working arrangements must be consistent with those of an employee.

The court also mentioned risk as a method of determining employment status. (Read 'servant' as 'employee'.):

"He who owns the assets and bears the risk is unlikely to be acting as an agent or a servant. If the man performing the service must provide the means of performance at his own expense and accept payment by results, he will own the assets, bear the risk, and be to that extent unlike a servant."
- MacKenna J at 521.

The first two of these criteria are relatively simple - personal service in return for payment and a sufficient framework of control. Those obligations can exist for a single engagement even if neither side must offer or accept further work (HMRC v Professional Game Match Officials Ltd [2024] UKSC 29). The third however, is far more open-ended. Particular characteristics to look out for include:

  • Working Hours: Employees tend to have fixed hours (or else a set amount of hours which they can structure flexibly). Independent contractors tend to have far more open arrangements, and are often employed to complete a certain task, with that task taking as long or as short an amount of time as it takes to finish the work.
  • Payment: Employees tend to have set weekly or monthly salaries, which they receive on a regular basis. Contractors tend to be paid per job, and thus do not tend to have guaranteed income.
  • Tax: Employees tend to be taxed at the source of their payments (so their employer will pay tax on their behalf, taking it from their wages as necessary). Independent contractors tend to be personally responsible for paying tax.
  • Equipment: Employees tend to have their working environment and equipment provided for them by their employer (office, computer etc.). Independent contractors will usually have their own premises (if any at all) and their own equipment, which they will be responsible for purchasing and maintaining.
  • Independence: Employees tend to be relatively restricted in the duties they carry out, and are rarely able to refuse work (at least in the sense of 'I won't do that', as opposed to 'I can't do that'). Independent contractors on the other hand have far more control. They can refuse jobs, negotiate the terms of their working agreement, and often have the capacity to work for multiple clients within the same period of time.

Exam Consideration: As you might have already noticed, the economic reality test is more practically minded than the other two. For this reason, it tends to be the test applied in modern settings. Nonetheless, you can demonstrate your knowledge of the development of the tests either directly by discussing them in essay questions, or indirectly, by applying all three of the tests to a problem question.

It should be noted that even as the most comprehensive of the tests, the economic reality test is by no means exhaustive. Indeed, the one certain principle is the non-exhaustive nature of the tests, as per Market Investigations Ltd v Minister of Social Security [1969] 2 QB 173. The claimant - a market research company - employed a number of individuals to carry out surveys on their behalf on a part-time basis. These interviewers worked on a job-by-job basis, could work for other firms and received neither sick pay nor holiday. As in Ready Mixed Concrete, a question arose as to who was responsible for the part-timers' National Insurance contributions. The High Court ruled that the interviewer whose case was before it was an employee on each engagement. She was not carrying on a business of her own. As Cooke J explained:

"No exhaustive list has been compiled and perhaps no exhaustive list can be compiled of the considerations which are relevant in determining that question, nor can strict rules be laid down as to the relative weight which the various considerations should carry in particular cases."

It is also worth noting the Supreme Court's decision in Uber BV v Aslam [2021] UKSC 5, in which the court held that Uber drivers were "workers" for the purposes of the employment legislation in issue. That category includes employees and certain other people who undertake to work personally. Whilst the case was primarily concerned with employment legislation rather than vicarious liability, the Supreme Court emphasised that employment status must be determined by reference to the reality of the working relationship, not merely the terms of the written contract. The court's willingness to look beyond contractual labels is consistent with the approach taken in the vicarious liability cases discussed above.

Exam Consideration: The advantage of the principle in Market Investigations is that it leaves a lot of leeway for you to argue a party's employment status either way (although this doesn't mean the tests should be ignored, merely that they can be built upon).

Relationships "Akin to Employment"

In a series of important decisions, the Supreme Court has extended the categories of relationship capable of giving rise to vicarious liability beyond the traditional employer-employee model. The key authority is Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society (the "Christian Brothers" case).

Case in Focus: Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society [2012] UKSC 56

The claimants were former residents of a residential school who brought claims of physical and sexual abuse against members of the Institute of the Brothers of the Christian Schools (the "Christian Brothers"), an unincorporated religious order. The brothers accused of abuse were not employees of the Institute - they were members of a religious order who had been placed at the home. The question was whether the Institute could be held vicariously liable for the brothers' conduct.

The Supreme Court held that vicarious liability could arise even where no contract of employment existed, provided the relationship between the tortfeasor and the defendant was sufficiently "akin to employment". Lord Phillips identified five policy factors relevant to determining whether it is appropriate to extend liability to such a relationship: (i) the employer is more likely to have the means to compensate the victim; (ii) the tort was committed as a result of activity being taken by the employee on behalf of the employer; (iii) the employee's activity was part of the business activity of the employer; (iv) the employer created the risk of the tort being committed by employing the employee in the business; and (v) the employee was, to a greater or lesser degree, under the control of the employer.

The Institute could be vicariously liable for abuse by the brothers alongside the defendants responsible for managing the school. The brothers were placed in the school under the authority of the Institute and were carrying out the Institute's mission of providing education. The relationship had sufficient characteristics of employment. Two defendants can also be vicariously liable for a worker lent by one to the other (Viasystems (Tyneside) Ltd v Thermal Transfer (Northern) Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 1151). An agreement for services does not by itself have that effect. In Burger v Risk Solutions BG Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 804 the pub operator was not vicariously liable alongside the security contractor for the door supervisors’ conduct.

The "akin to employment" principle was further developed in Cox v Ministry of Justice [2016] UKSC 10. The claimant was a catering manager at a prison who was injured when a prisoner working in the prison kitchen negligently dropped a sack of rice on her. The prisoner was obviously not an employee of the Ministry of Justice, but the Supreme Court held that the Ministry was nonetheless vicariously liable. Lord Reed, focusing on the activity undertaken for the defendant, its integration into the defendant’s operations and the resulting risk, held that the prisoners were integrated into the operations of the prison, their work was carried out for the benefit of the prison service, and the prison service created the risk by assigning the prisoners to work in the kitchen. The relationship was thus sufficiently akin to employment. In Armes v Nottinghamshire County Council [2017] UKSC 60, the local authority was vicariously liable for abuse by foster carers with whom it had placed the claimant. A family connection did not preclude liability once the child was in care and formally placed with approved foster carers in DJ v Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council [2024] EWCA Civ 841.

However, the Supreme Court has placed important limits on this expansion. In Barclays Bank plc v Various Claimants [2020] UKSC 13, the bank engaged a doctor (Dr Bates) to carry out medical assessments of prospective employees. The claimants alleged that the doctor had sexually assaulted them during these examinations. The Supreme Court held that Barclays was not vicariously liable. The doctor was a genuinely independent contractor - he was not integrated into the bank's business, he was not under the bank's control in any meaningful sense, and he carried on his own medical practice. Lady Hale emphasised that the traditional distinction between employees and independent contractors remained relevant, and that the "akin to employment" extension from the Christian Brothers case was not intended to blur or eliminate that distinction.

In Trustees of the Barry Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v BXB [2023] UKSC 15, the Supreme Court held that the Jehovah's Witnesses were not vicariously liable for sexual abuse committed by an elder of the congregation. The court confirmed that the "akin to employment" test requires the relationship to have sufficient characteristics of employment. The elder’s role was akin to employment. He was appointed to perform duties integral to the organisation’s work, within its hierarchy. The claim failed at the second stage. In raping the claimant at his home he abused their personal friendship, and the assault was not closely connected with his duties as an elder. By contrast, in X v Lord Advocate [2025] UKSC 44 the claim failed at the first stage. Judicial independence and the Scottish Government’s lack of control over a sheriff’s judicial functions meant that their relationship was not akin to employment.

Exam Consideration: The development from the Christian Brothers case through to Barclays Bank and BXB illustrates which relationships can give rise to vicarious liability. In problem questions, you should consider: (i) whether there is a traditional employer-employee relationship (using the tests above); and if not, (ii) whether the relationship is sufficiently "akin to employment" by comparing its features with those of employment. The five policy factors from the Christian Brothers case can help in a doubtful case. Remember that the Supreme Court in Barclays Bank and BXB has confirmed that this is not an open-ended extension - genuinely independent contractors and voluntary roles without sufficient characteristics of employment will not give rise to vicarious liability.

Establishing a Tortious Act

Once a sufficiently close relationship has been established, it must be shown that the employee (or agent, business partner etc.) had committed a tortious act. This is because no secondary liability can be imposed on a third party before someone acting on their behalf has attracted primary liability.

This means that whether vicarious liability is possible depends on whether liability exists for the relevant tort. So if it is asserted that an employee has acted negligently in the course of his work, liability for the tort of negligence must be established before that liability can be handed up to their employer. Thus, your ability to deal properly with vicarious liability will depend on your ability to deal properly with the relevant tort.

One technicality should be noted. If the employee (etc.) enjoys immunity from lawsuits by merit of their personal status, their employer will not receive the same protection. This principle is best understood by reference to the case of Broom v Morgan [1953] 1 QB 597. The claimant was employed alongside her husband to run a pub. She was injured in an act of negligence by her husband. At the time, husbands and wives generally could not sue each other in tort and so the defendant denied vicarious liability (since the husband could not be sued by his wife, primary liability did not exist, and so the employer argued secondary liability could not exist). The courts rejected this argument, holding that the spousal immunity was from being sued, rather than from being held responsible for a tort. Since the husband was not the one being sued, the immunity did not apply. In England and Wales, s.1 of the Law Reform (Husband and Wife) Act 1962 now generally allows spouses to sue one another in tort.

This particular phenomenon can best be understood through an examination of how vicarious liability operates - both the original tortfeasor and their employer are still considered separate legal entities, with their separate legal immunities (if any exist at all). Instead, the employer is answerable for the tortfeasor’s wrong even though the employer has committed no wrong of their own.

Tortious Acts Must be in the Course of Employment

An employer is not responsible for all of the acts one of their employees carries out. It would be absurd if an employer was held liable for a car crash one of their employees caused on their day off. Instead, for vicarious liability to be possible, the tortious act must occur in the course of employment (or, more precisely, must be sufficiently connected with the employment relationship). If the relevant relationship is not employer-employee, then the same principle applies but in a modified form - so an agent must be acting as an agent before vicarious liability can be attributed to their principal, and under ss.10 and 12 of the Partnership Act 1890 the partners are jointly and severally liable for a partner’s wrongful act or omission in the ordinary course of the firm’s business or with the authority of the other partners. There are several categories of employment scenarios which can arise with regard to this element of vicarious liability.

Authorised Acts

It will sometimes be simple to see when a tortious act is done in the course of employment - most notably when an employee is directly following their employer's express orders and in doing so, commits a tort. So a waste disposal company which orders an employee to dump toxic waste in a public waterway may be directly liable in nuisance for the resulting damage. Indeed, liability in such situations is so clear-cut that it can be considered a matter of primary liability - the employer is directly acting through their employees.

However, express authorisation is not an ever-present feature of many employment situations (particularly where an employer knows they are doing wrong - they are unlikely to put such orders in writing). An employee may have implied authority to act due to the scope of their employment. Even without authority to do the particular act, the employer may be liable if the close connection test is met.

Implied authority can be seen in Poland v Parr & Sons [1927] 1 KB 236. The defendant's employee believed that some children were stealing the defendant company's property. He struck one of the children, seriously injuring him. It was held that although this was an unreasonable act, he was acting to protect his employer’s property, a matter within his implied authority, although he used excessive force. The court noted that in general employees have an implied authority, in an emergency, to protect their employer's property (although the bench also noted that there was a limit - if, for example, the employee had shot at the boy, this would be beyond implied authority). The claim, therefore, succeeded.

Authorised Acts in an Unauthorised Manner

Situations will often arise in which an employee is undertaking an authorised act, but does so in an unauthorised manner. An example of this can be seen in Century Insurance v NI Road Transport Board [1942] AC 509. A driver was employed by the transport board to deliver petrol. Part of this task involved transferring the petrol from his lorry to a storage tank at the destination. Whilst doing this, the employee lit a cigarette, threw the match to the ground, and caused an explosion. The board was held vicariously liable for this conduct and was entitled to an indemnity from its insurer. Although the employee's conduct was clearly careless, he was nonetheless in the process of carrying out an authorised act - delivering petrol.

A distinction can be made between situations in which an employee acts within their employment responsibilities (as in Century Insurance), and when they act outside of them (albeit with the intention of aiding their employer). An example of this distinction can be found in Beard v London General Omnibus Co [1900] 2 QB 530. A bus conductor (i.e. not a driver) was at the terminus. In the driver’s absence he drove the bus through side streets to turn it round for its next journey. In doing so, he ran down the claimant. A claim was made against the employer bus company. The courts rejected vicarious liability - the conductor was acting outside of the course of his employment.

Explicitly Prohibited Acts

An express prohibition may mark the limits of an employee’s duties, or it may merely prohibit an employee from taking an authorised action in an unauthorised way. This distinction is often referred to as the difference between scope of action and manner of action. Scope of action can be seen in Iqbal v London Transport Executive [1973] EWCA Civ 3 (another, but different bus conductor case!). A bus conductor was prohibited from driving - it was explicitly outside the scope of his duties. Nonetheless, he decided to move a bus that was blocking a depot but crashed, injuring another employee. The court rejected vicarious liability on the basis that the conductor's conduct was beyond his duties.

In contrast, prohibited manner of conduct can be seen in London County Council v Cattermoles (Garages) Ltd [1953] 1 WLR 997. The employee worked for a garage, which had petrol pumps outside. Part of the employee's duty was to assist in the movement of vehicles around the garage, and this included either pushing them by hand, or guiding their drivers as they undertook tricky manoeuvres. He had been explicitly told not to drive, being threatened with dismissal on a previous occasion. One day, a van was parked at the pumps (blocking them) and two lorries were waiting for petrol. The employee jumped into the van in order to move it, and drove out into busy Pentonville Road in order to come back around into the garage. It was at this point that he hit the claimant's vehicle. The defendant employer argued that they should not be held vicariously liable, since they had prohibited such behaviour. The courts rejected this argument - whilst they had prohibited the manner of his conduct, he was still engaged in his duty - moving vehicles around to ensure the smooth running of the garage. Vicarious liability was, thus, imposed.

It can, therefore, be seen that a prohibition does not by itself settle whether the employer is vicariously liable. What matters is the connection between the wrongdoing and the work entrusted to the employee.

The "Close Connection" Test and Unlawful Activity

Another category of cases exists in which employees take criminal actions during their employment. Whilst these will often fall outside of the scope of vicarious liability, this is not a given. The modern test, established by the House of Lords, is whether there is a sufficiently close connection between the wrongful conduct and the employee's employment. This can be seen in the unfortunate case of Lister et al. v Hesley Hall Ltd [2002] 1 AC 215. The employee was a warden at a school for difficult children. It emerged that this warden was sexually abusing the children in his care. The claimants, thus, sought to hold the owners of the school vicariously liable for their harms. The House of Lords applied the test of 'closeness of connection' to the situation. The employer had entrusted the children’s care to the warden. His abuse of that position was so closely connected with his duties that vicarious liability was imposed. The claimants did not have to show fault on the employer’s part.

This principle can be considered an extension of the prohibition principle discussed in the section above - whilst sexual abuse was obviously prohibited, the warden used the very authority over the children that his employer had given him.

The close connection test was applied by the Supreme Court in Mohamud v WM Morrison Supermarkets plc [2016] UKSC 11 as a two-stage inquiry. The claimant stopped at a petrol station owned by the defendants. He entered the kiosk and asked the employee manning it whether he could print off some documents from a USB stick. The employee refused the request, using an expletive. The claimant objected to the employee's language, and the employee responded with a variety of threatening and racist language. When the claimant sought to leave, the employee followed him to his car, and the altercation escalated to the point of the employee physically attacking the claimant. The claimant sought to hold the petrol station's owners vicariously liable for their employee's actions. This claim was successful. Lord Toulson set out the two-stage test: first, the court must consider what functions or "field of activities" the employee was engaged to carry out; and second, the court must consider whether there was a sufficient connection between the position in which the employee was employed and the wrongful conduct to make it right for the employer to be held liable. Although the employee's conduct was clearly beyond what he was authorised to do, it was nonetheless held to have occurred during the course of his field of activities. The employee's job was to man the kiosk and respond to customer enquiries - and when he followed the claimant to his car he ordered him to stay away from the premises, purporting to act for his employer.

However, the Supreme Court has placed limits on the close connection test. In WM Morrison Supermarkets plc v Various Claimants [2020] UKSC 12, a senior internal auditor at Morrisons (Skelton) was tasked with transmitting payroll data for the company's entire workforce to external auditors. Skelton had a grudge against Morrisons following a disciplinary matter and, using a personal copy of the data, uploaded the personal details of nearly 100,000 employees onto the internet. The claimants (the affected employees) sought to hold Morrisons vicariously liable.

The Supreme Court held that Morrisons was not vicariously liable. Applying the Mohamud two-stage test, the court accepted that Skelton's field of activities included dealing with payroll data. However, the court held that there was not a sufficient connection between Skelton's employment and his wrongful conduct. Skelton's disclosure of the data was not made in the course of his employment at all - it was made at his home, using a mobile phone, in pursuit of a personal vendetta. His wrongful act was not so closely connected with acts he was authorised to do that it could fairly be regarded as done while acting in the ordinary course of his employment. Lord Reed distinguished between an employee carrying out the employer’s business, however misguidedly, and one pursuing a personal vendetta. Access to the data through work gave Skelton the opportunity to disclose it.

Exam Consideration: The Mohamud two-stage test is the current framework for determining whether a tortious act was committed in the course of employment. In applying it, consider: (1) what was the employee's "field of activities"? and (2) was the wrongful conduct sufficiently connected to that field? Remember that the connection must be between the wrongful act and the employee's role, not merely the fact that employment provided the opportunity. WM Morrison Supermarkets v Various Claimants [2020] shows that an employee pursuing a purely personal vendetta, even using information obtained through work, may fall outside the scope of vicarious liability.

Distinguishing Between Employment and Personal Conduct

It will often be the case that the lines between employment conduct and personal conduct are blurred. Further complications can occur when personal conduct occurs within working hours and in the workplace (so between 9-5 and in the employee's office, for example). The law, thus, makes a distinction between an employee's conduct which is in the course of employment and conduct which can be considered 'a frolic of his or her own'. This distinction can be traced back to Joel v Morison.

Case in Focus: Joel v Morison [1834] 172 ER 1338

The claimant was struck by a horse and cart which was under the control of a driver employed by the defendant. The defendant called evidence that the cart’s usual route did not take it into the City, where the claimant was injured. The judge directed the jury that the defendant was liable if the driver had merely detoured while on his master’s business. The jury found for the claimant.

As per Parke B at 5 (6 C & P 501, 503): "If the servants, being on their master's business, took a detour to call upon a friend, the master will be responsible [...] but if he was going on a frolic of his own, [...] the master will not be liable."

This principle is not entirely intuitive - the driver in the judge’s example in Joel decided, of his own volition, to go off track to visit his friend, so it can easily be argued that this should not be considered as part of his course of employment. The distinction between employment conduct and a personal frolic becomes a little clearer when Storey v Ashton [1869] LR 4 QB 476 is examined. The defendant employer, a wine merchant, sent his carriage driver to deliver some wine. On the return journey the driver turned well out of his way at the clerk’s request, on private business for the clerk. During this journey he knocked down the claimant and injured him. The courts rejected the claim against the driver's employer - it was held that the driver was engaged in a new and absolutely unauthorised journey.

Thus, the distinction between Joel and Storey can be seen - in the former case, the jury could find that the driver was doing his job despite a diversion. In the latter, the driver had embarked on a separate journey for the clerk’s own purposes.

Employers' Indemnity

Since vicarious liability depends on the existence of primary liability, both employer and employee are joint tortfeasors. An employer may be able to recover from their employee for their misdeed. There are two primary ways in which this can happen. Firstly, the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 allows a person liable for damage to recover a contribution from another person liable for the same damage. Section 1(4) also provides for a claim following a bona fide settlement, if the person settling would have been liable on the factual basis alleged. The split will be decided by the courts on the basis of what is 'just and equitable' as per s.2(1) of the Act.

Under the common law, it is possible for a defendant to recover an indemnity (a full recovery) for their loss from their employee if the employee has acted in breach of contract. This was the case in Lister v Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co Ltd [1957] AC 555. The defendant was held vicariously liable when one of their employees negligently backed over another employee in a lorry. The defendant's insurance company then brought a case on behalf of the defendant against the employee. They were successful - the employee had not been acting with reasonable care and skill, and thus had breached an implied term of their contract.

An employer’s own fault may prevent full recovery from an employee, as in Jones v Manchester Corporation [1952] 2 QB 852. The defendant hospital board sought to reclaim the damages it had paid out for a junior doctor's mistake. However, the board was held to be partially at fault - it had failed to provide him with proper supervision. The board could not pass the whole loss on to the doctor.

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