Sample 2:1 Undergraduate Law Dissertation
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Corporate Crime: Holding Companies Accountable
Abstract
This dissertation critically examines the theoretical, legal and practical foundations of corporate crime. In the endeavour to propose and develop arguments concerning how companies may be held responsible for criminal conduct, particularly manslaughter, UK legislation will be critically examined. The identification of problems and weaknesses in UK law will fuel proposals for reform, which primarily suggests that both individual and collective liability should be imposed.
Introduction
The problem of corporate crime has fuelled rich debate for decades. This is primarily due to the fact that the notion of corporate criminal liability challenges all aspects of traditional criminal law and liability.[1] However, the problems posed by corporate criminal liability have not hindered the need for the law to hold companies liable when they commit crimes. The main issue is that criminal law is rooted in individualistic foundations, meaning that it does not fit in with the collective nature of corporate conduct.[2] This reveals the core of the issue – should (and, indeed, can) companies be convicted of crimes as collective entities, or must its individual members be targeted? The criminal law concepts of mens rea and actus reus are rooted in individual responsibility, while collective corporate entities challenge this approach towards criminal liability.[3] A further problem lies in the fact that the doctrine of separate corporate personality[4] separates the rights and liabilities of the company from its members.[5] How, then, can criminal responsibility be imposed upon individual members without distorting this cornerstone principle of company law?
The fact that it may be difficult to develop a system for imposing criminal liability upon companies does not mean that they should escape liability when they commit crimes. Companies pose a potentially major threat to life and health, as their actions have caused the death and injury of many individuals across the globe.[6] The notion that companies should be convicted for corporate manslaughter was addressed in Northern Strip Mining Construction Co Ltd,[7] in which a worker had been killed when the bridge he was helping to demolish collapsed. The company was acquitted on the facts of the case, but the indictment proceeded on the basis that a company could be convicted of manslaughter. Since this important decision, the number of criminal offences that companies may be convicted of has increased in scope and volume.[8] A separate statutory offence was not created until the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007. Before then, companies had on rare occasions been convicted of common law manslaughter. Health and safety offences could also be prosecuted under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974. Sanctions on companies following a conviction under the 1974 Act are however fine-based, and may not reflect the nature of criminal conduct, or have a major impact on the financial viability of companies.[9]
There are both theoretical and practical problems that arise when considering the potential to convict companies of criminal offences.[10] A prominent debate pertains to whether individual or collective liability should (and can) be imposed, and also whether a company can be convicted and punished in the same manner as an individual.[11] Who, then, should be held responsible for corporate criminal conduct – individual company members, or the company as a whole?[12] A most prominent offence in this respect is corporate manslaughter, obviously because it involves the loss of life.[13] When an individual loses his/her life due to the conduct of a company, is it the individual members, or the company as a whole, that should be convicted and punished?
This dissertation will critically examine the imposition of liability for the offence of corporate manslaughter, in order to determine how companies may be most effectively held responsible for such conduct. The dissertation will commence with a brief overview of the development of corporate criminal liability in the UK, with particular reference to England and Wales. This will reveal the principles that underline the development of corporate liability, and the approach that has been, and is, adopted towards corporate crime. An overview and critical examination will then be undertaken of two core statutes (the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, and the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007) that provide for the conviction and punishment of corporate criminal conduct. Whether individual or collective liability is imposed under these statutes, and which may be deemed the most appropriate will be critically examined. Strengths and weaknesses in these two statutes will be addressed, and how they may be improved will be presented, with reference to Italian law. The purpose of this reference to Italian decree 231/2001 is that it provides for the liability of the company alongside the ordinary criminal liability of individuals, depending upon the circumstances of the case. It therefore reveals potent weaknesses in the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, which does not allow individual members to be convicted of the corporate offence. In exploring the theoretical underpinnings of individual and collective criminal responsibility, arguments will be presented for the reform of UK law to enable culpable company members to be convicted as accessories alongside the company itself.
Corporate Liability: A Historical Overview
Historically, convicting and punishing companies for criminal conduct does not fit comfortably with traditional criminal law foundations and principles.[14] Even in modern society, it appears baffling to some to consider that a company can be convicted as individual offenders can. This is primarily because companies cannot appear in court per se. In 1701, Holt CJ stated that 'a corporation is not indictable, but the particular members of it are'.[15] This stance indicated a response to the practical and theoretical problems that typically arise from the attempt to impose liability on companies for criminal conduct. It could not be accepted or understood that companies could have criminal intention and be held morally blameworthy – two important components of criminal liability.[16] Practical obstacles were also considered to pose an undefeatable hindrance – particularly the need for a defendant to appear in court. Finally, it was considered that criminal conduct could not be attributed to companies, and they were therefore effectively immune to liability.[17]
It was commonly stated that companies had 'no soul to damn and no body to kick', because they were placed beyond the reach of the criminal law.[18] Crimes committed via the corporate structure were responded to by convicting and punishing individual company members rather than the company as a distinct legal entity.[19] At assizes or quarter sessions the requirement for the defendant to appear in person caused difficulty. Section 33 of the Criminal Justice Act 1925 made provision for a corporation to appear by a representative. Even once such procedural obstacles had been addressed, the imposition of liability upon companies was still hindered by difficulties in attributing mens rea.[20]
The legal approach towards corporate crime shifted in the 19th century, as it was recognised that companies should not be able to escape liability when they commit crimes.[21] Legal systems around the world began to identify and seek to solve the problem of corporate criminal responsibility. The UK courts imposed liability upon certain types of companies (such as quasi-public companies) for public nuisance offences.[22] Early cases concerned nonfeasance,[23] but liability was later extended to acts of misfeasance and a broader range of companies, such as commercial companies. The previous notion that companies could not be held liable for criminal conduct gradually faded, particularly due to shifts in public opinion as to the liability of companies,[24] and the increased presence of companies in society.[25] Corporate liability for criminal conduct therefore became widely accepted as the 19th century drew to a close. Such acceptance gained pace following certain corporate disasters, which were given extensive media coverage, causing corporate crime to be further pressed into the public spotlight.[26] The King's Cross fire, for example was caused by safety failures and the incompetence of company members.[27] The Piper Alpha oil rig disaster, which caused 167 deaths, further emphasised the need to hold companies liable.[28] The disaster was caused by unsafe working conditions, human error and design faults in the rig.[29]
The 20th century brought with it more aggressive attempts to regulate companies, and to hold them criminally liable for damage inflicted upon individuals, society and the environment. In the UK, the regulation of companies is dispersed throughout various legislative provisions. The next chapters will outline and critically examine these provisions.
Corporate Liability in the UK
The Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974
The Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (HSWA 1974) is founded upon the core aim of securing the 'health, safety and welfare of persons at work', and others affected by work-related activities.[30] The Act created a Health and Safety Executive, who enforces the HSWA 1974 and other legislation pertaining to health and safety at work. Under section 37 an officer can be convicted alongside the company if its offence was committed with that officer's consent or connivance or was attributable to their neglect. Offences under the Act can attract a fine and, for individuals, some offences can also attract imprisonment. The HSWA 1974 is based on the need to protect both workers and the public from corporate activities.[31] It specifies certain duties that must be fulfilled by various categories of company members, such as managers, employers and employees. The Act is enforced by the Health and Safety Executive and other enforcing authorities, including local authorities. The former Health and Safety Commission merged with the Executive in 2008.[32]
Under Part 1 of the HSWA 1974, general, preliminary duties, and to whom they are owed, are stipulated. For example, section 2 states that employers must ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the 'health, safety and welfare at work' of all employees. This duty includes the provision of safe systems of work, to provide training to employees, and to ensure that working conditions are sufficiently safe.[33] The Act is therefore broad, as the duties of employers are extended to those that are not even in their employment, but who 'may be affected'.[34] Employees are, under section 7, required to 'take reasonable care' of themselves and others who may be affected by their acts or omissions at work. A separate common law duty may also arise. In Pittwood,[35] a railway gatekeeper's contractual duty could found liability for manslaughter by omission. The duty of employees under section 7 HSWA 1974 differs from the broader duty placed upon employers.[36]
The broad scope of the Act is further indicated in the fact that employers may also be responsible for work entrusted to contractors as part of their undertaking. In such cases, employers must ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that non-employees are not exposed to risks from the undertaking.[37] The Act has been interpreted by the courts broadly and rigorously. For example, in the judgement of Board of Trustees of the Science Museum,[38] it was established that exposure to a real risk sufficed even though no one was shown to have been injured. A merely fanciful risk is insufficient. The courts have also interpreted the HSWA 1974 to impose high standards on employers. The court in British Steel[39] did not for instance accept that the company could avoid liability by showing that senior management had taken reasonable steps, when such steps had not been taken at the operational level. It is therefore generally accepted that it is not a defence to state that a duty was breached by an employee if the employer could have reasonably ensured a sufficient degree of safety.[40] This rule also operates to ensure that employers are not subject to unreasonably high standards, because an employee that is in breach of a duty under the HSWA 1974, will not automatically give rise to the assumption that his employer also breached a duty.[41] In assessing whether sufficient steps to prevent risk have been taken, the courts will weigh the risk of accident and the measures implemented to eradicate the risk. In Austin Rover Group Ltd v HM Inspector of Factories[42] the House of Lords considered reasonably foreseeable use of premises in deciding whether they were safe under section 4.
A particularly important feature of the HSWA 1974 is section 37, which stipulates that directors and senior management, 'as well as the body corporate', will be held liable for offences committed under their 'consent, connivance' or 'neglect'.[43] Neglect can include a failure to act where the officer ought to have taken steps to prevent the offence. This section clearly indicates the attempt to avoid difficulties in imposing liability upon particular individuals. A failure to provide adequate equipment can therefore expose both the company and an officer to liability if the conditions of section 37 are proved. Section 37 HSWA 1974 is therefore a powerful mechanism because it creates a direct relationship between the company and those who control and direct it, assigning them responsibility in such situations. This attaches importance to the fact that managing members exert the most control over the company, and therefore should be held liable for deaths that result from the acts or omissions of the company.[44] In the event of a breach of a general duty, unlimited fines are provided for under the Act. Each fine is calculated according to potential danger, risk and the extent to which the defendant violated his duties. A death caused by the offence may increase the fine. The guideline also takes account of the organisation's financial means.
Although the HSWA 1974 may be applauded on the grounds that it is a powerful mechanism for convicting and punishing corporate crime, it is not without its weaknesses. A prominent problem is that the Act states that the principal duties of employers are qualified by the words 'so far as is reasonably practicable'.[45] The problem with this is that applying this objective standard to particular facts is not always easy. The risk must be weighed against the sacrifice involved in avoiding it, and precautions are required unless that sacrifice is grossly disproportionate to the risk.[46] This injects a lack of clarity into the Act, because the precautions required depend on the particular risk. This has created a conflict between judicial and legislative integrity in terms of the standard of responsibility that is applied under the HSWA 1974.[47] This is exacerbated by the broad powers of authority granted to the enforcing authorities under the Act. Such a division of power has resulted in the inconsistent application of the Act, which has also hindered its ability to effectively impose liability upon individuals who have committed corporate crimes.[48] The HSWA 1974 does allow directors to be held liable, although proving an officer's own consent, connivance or neglect can be difficult. In cases of corporate manslaughter at common law, a directing mind responsible for the death had to be identified.[49] Such prosecutions often failed because it was difficult to identify a responsible directing mind in companies with many directors.
The abovementioned weaknesses have not escaped attention. In Davies v Health and Safety Executive,[50] Tuckey LJ described the Act as 'regulatory rather than prescriptive' because it specifies the result to be achieved without prescribing every precaution.[51] For an employer's duty under section 3, the risk must arise from the conduct of its undertaking. Liability of an individual officer turns on the further requirements of section 37.[52] On the other hand, the HSWA 1974 has, due to its broad approach towards work-related health and safety, facilitated compliance.[53] The Act is flexible, which has enabled compliance bodies to enforce its provisions, and the courts to impose sanctions on those convicted. This has enabled it to have a prominent impact on corporate crime, and it may be applauded as a legislative mechanism that adopts a suitable approach towards corporate criminal liability.
The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007
The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 (CMCHA 2007) is the consequence of a long history of attempts to hold companies criminally liable for manslaughter. Prior to the implementation of the Act, companies could be convicted for crimes under the legal concept of vicarious liability, or under the identification doctrine as rooted in tort law.[54] These legal mechanisms enabled responsibility to be attributed to a company for the purpose of holding it criminally liable.[55] Under the principle of vicarious liability, companies are held liable for the criminal conduct of their employees, in the same manner that individual employers are held liable for the crimes of their employees.[56] However, this is a relatively limited mechanism from the perspective of corporate criminal liability, because it depends on the terms and purpose of the particular offence. It cannot therefore be utilised to hold companies liable for criminal offences such as manslaughter.[57]
Before the CMCHA 2007 was implemented, the identification doctrine was utilised to enable companies to be convicted for criminal conduct. The identification doctrine is founded upon the notion that there are certain company members that can be identified as those that constitute the company itself.[58] The conduct of such members may therefore be treated as the conduct of the company.[59] In the judgement of Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd v TJ Graham & Sons Ltd,[60] this approach was adopted, and it was held that companies can be defined as entities with a human body, with a human mind and human limbs.[61] It was stated that the mind of the company could be attributed to the company's managers and directors, because they yield considerable power over the company's decisions and actions.[62] This approach operates to exclude ordinary workers from being identified with the company, because they cannot be said to embody the mind and will of the company per se – they are in this analogy its hands.[63] This principle therefore endeavoured to create a link between the thought process behind the actions of companies, and the members responsible for implementing them – the management. Corporate criminal liability therefore arises under the identification doctrine when company members constituting the mind and will of the company have committed the requisite elements of the criminal offence concerned.
Such mechanisms applied to justify the imposition of criminal liability upon companies however suffered a number of weaknesses,[64] which will be identified under the chapter on the identification/aggregation doctrine below. This ultimately resulted in the CMCHA 2007, which abolished the common law offence of gross negligence manslaughter for the organisations within its scope and created the statutory offence of corporate manslaughter (corporate homicide in Scotland). Under section 1(1), the way an organisation's activities are managed or organised must cause death and amount to a gross breach of a relevant duty of care owed by the organisation to the deceased. The scope of the CMCHA 2007 is broad, and applies to a variety of corporate structures and types.[65] Section 18 CMCHA 2007 most importantly excludes individual accessory liability for the corporate offence, which thus avoids the problems that plagued the HSWA 1974 concerning the relationship between employees, employers, and the company.[66] A conviction under the Act can attract a variety of sanctions, such as a remedial order, a publicity order, and/or unlimited fines.
A company can be held liable under section 1(3) of the CMCHA 2007 if the manner in which its functions and activities are organised by senior management constitutes a substantial element of a breach of section 1(1). The terms 'relevant duty of care' is used in this provision, meaning that companies can be convicted of corporate manslaughter if the manner in which its activities are managed causes death and constitutes a gross breach of a duty within section 2.[67] The management failure need not be the sole cause of death, but it must make more than a minimal contribution. A breach is gross if the conduct falls far below what could reasonably be expected of the organisation.[68]
The CMCHA 2007 may be deemed effective in that it overcomes problems that undermine the aggregation principle (as will be outlined further below). It attaches core importance to the systems that are featured in companies, rendering it irrelevant whether they were implemented by a sole individual, or several individuals.[69] The Act targets the company's system itself. For instance, senior management is defined under section 1(4)(c) as those who play significant roles in decisions about, or the actual management or organisation of, the whole or a substantial part of its activities. It has been argued that liability under the CMCHA 2007, 'whether primary or secondary, is predicated on a form of ameliorated aggregation'.[70] Furthermore, managerial failure eliminates problems related to identification, because the way senior management managed or organised the activities need only form a substantial rather than a complete proportion of the breach of duty. Therefore, the participation of non-senior workers and employees in company activities that result in a breach will not prevent liability from being imposed under the Act, or undermine the importance of the role of senior managers in imposing responsibility.[71]
Despite its strengths, the CMCHA 2007 has been criticised. One problem appears to be that there is a lack of clarity as to who performs a senior management role in practice, meaning that previous problems relating to this issue have not been eased.[72] This problem is pertinent because it could encourage companies to outsource important decisions that run a high risk of death, in order to avoid potential liability under the CMCHA 2007. This could complicate proof of the role of senior management within a company that has outsourced them.[73] This could be identified as an evidential difficulty in the Act. It has for example been proposed that
'the legal debate as to whether a defendant is so senior as to embody the company will be replaced by a similar debate as to whether or not the defendants are senior managers…an issue that should be relevant to sentencing but not liability'.[74]
This is an important problem, which reveals the biggest weakness of the CMCHA 2007. It essentially causes uncertainty to arise, which companies could take advantage of in order to escape liability.
It could be argued that companies should be held responsible for a wider range of crimes that mere organisational failures resulting in death. It has been recognised that 'most accident sequences, like the road to hell, are paved with good intentions – or with what seemed like a good idea at the time'.[75] It could therefore be argued that the scope of the CMCHA 2007 is too narrow, and that it should be expanded to include other decisions and actions (other than organisational failures) that result in death. Moreover, the Act seems to fail to embody a full understanding of what legal academics originally meant by the term 'corporate mens rea'.[76] On the other hand, the Act still requires proof of a substantial senior management contribution to the breach.[77] It could be argued that death could also result from a failure in a company's systems, rather than purely human error.[78] In such cases, there is little logic in making liability depend on how far the failure reached senior management. This is due to the fact that
'direct proof of mens rea should not pose any particular problems once it is understood that this can be located in the company's policies and organisational structure'.[79]
While this approach could be defined as one that is identical to that which is implemented under the CMCHA 2007, it is, in practice, distinct, because it directs attention away from proof of a substantial senior management contribution to the breach towards a general duty to promote an overall safe system of work. This approach would enable corporate liability to be imposed when a failure or an omission to work as part of a safe system can be found.
Section 18 CMCHA 2007 stipulates that an individual company member cannot be convicted for aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring corporate manslaughter. This is problematic because it undermines the Act's overall force, purpose and impact. This section does not achieve much in terms of enforcing compliance with the Act, because it separates individual members from the corporate structure. Furthermore, the corporate offence does not address the fact that certain individuals may be responsible for a death. Clearly, companies consist of their members, and therefore to exclude accessory liability for such individuals is to thwart the force and effectiveness of the CMCHA 2007.[80] The corporate veil separates the liabilities of the company from those of its members.[81] It is unnecessary to pierce it to prosecute an individual for his or her own conduct.[82] Section 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 does not override the express exclusion in section 18. Directors and employees can nevertheless be prosecuted for their own gross negligence manslaughter or health and safety offences. The focus of the CMCHA 2007 therefore remains corporate criminal liability.[83]
A further criticism of the CMCHA 2007 is that its approach towards sentencing is not focused, does not seek to effectively enforce compliance, and does not recognise the gravity of the offences contained therein.[84] This was revealed in the judgement of Cotswold Geotechnical (Holdings) Ltd.[85]The company was convicted of manslaughter, yet was fined a mere £385,000, which was actually below the £500,000 figure which the guidelines then in force said fines would seldom fall below.[86] Although the Court of Appeal recognised that the fine might put this small company out of business, this sentence suggests that the CMCHA 2007 does not adopt a sufficiently robust response towards corporate crime.[87] However, it is important to recognise that this single case example may not necessarily be indicative of the Act's application since it was first implemented. Several other cases have been tried under the Act. The first company to be acquitted under the Act was PS and JE Ward Ltd,[88] whose employee was killed after a trailer he was towing hit a power cable. The jury acquitted the company of manslaughter. Interestingly, the company was convicted under the HSWA 1974 for the failure to 'ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health, safety and welfare at work' of its employees.[89] The company was, under this Act ordered to pay a fine and costs totalling almost £100,000. This indicates that the HSWA 1974 functions as an alternative mechanism for the imposition of corporate criminal liability when CMCHA 2007 requirements are not satisfied. Cavendish Masonry Ltd[90] was convicted in 2014 of corporate manslaughter under the CMCHA 2007 when an employee was crushed by a block of limestone. It was held that the company had grossly breached its duty of care in organising and managing the work site, and had not taken reasonable care when executing activities on site. Such cases strongly suggest that convictions can be obtained under the CMCHA 2007, and that it is effective in holding companies accountable.
While companies have been convicted under the CMCHA 2007, sanctions remain problematic. A particularly problematic decision is Mobile Sweepers (Reading) Ltd,[91] in which a company employee had been crushed to death. Although the company was convicted of corporate manslaughter, it was fined a mere £8,000. Where the Act has strength in convicting companies, it suffers weaknesses when it comes to sanctions. The fines in these early cases were low in comparison to the gravity of the offence of corporate manslaughter, which undermines the seriousness of such offences and hinders the rigour of the CMCHA 2007. This problem further serves to emphasise the uncomfortable relationship between punishing and convicting corporate crime. While it is possible to try and convict corporate entities in the same manner as individuals, companies cannot be incarcerated. Imposing fines is problematic because this category of sanctions does not mirror the criminal characteristics of the offence of manslaughter. It implies that human life can be valued at a monetary amount – something that the traditional criminal law does not generally accept.
On the other hand, the size and means of the companies in these early cases help explain the fines. The current sentencing guideline for England and Wales takes turnover into account and spans fines from £180,000 to £20 million, with no statutory upper limit. Moreover, fines are not the only available sanction. The courts have also displayed a willingness to impose alternative, harsher sanctions upon convicted companies. This may be observed in Peter Mawson and Peter Mawson Ltd[92] in which an employee fell through a skylight and died. The company was fined a total of £220,000 for the manslaughter and health and safety offences, and, a publicity order was also imposed under section 10 CMCHA 2007. This meant that the company was required to publish information about its conviction in the local newspaper and on its website. This case indicates that the courts have gradually increased the severity of the sanctions that they impose, which lays testimony to its potentially aggressive response to corporate manslaughter.[93] Publicity orders can be highly damaging on a company's reputation, because it can result in boycotting and severely reduced profits.
The CMCHA 2007 essentially appears to have established a suitable balance between the need to hold companies accountable, and the need to overcome difficulties posed by corporate crime.[94] Indeed, it has been recognised that the conviction and punishment of companies for criminal offences is intrinsically problematic because a high threshold is involved in attaching liability to corporate activities. Under the former common law test, a company could only be held liable for manslaughter if it can be shown that the individuals directing the mind and will of the company participated in the commission of the offence.[95] It was typically difficult to identify an individual who directed the company's mind and will, and this is particularly the case if a company is multinational, with complex, dispersed systems of decision-making. It could be argued that such problems help explain the concentration of early convictions among smaller companies under the CMCHA 2007.[96] The punishment of a collective corporate entity fails to embody the seriousness of the actions of individuals that constitute the company's mind and will. It is moreover relevant to point out that the CMCHA 2007 is rather unfair for small companies, because the directors of such companies are much more likely to have played a more central role in the decision-making process, and thus the offence.[97] This may explain why many early convictions under the Act have been for smaller companies. Larger companies may be harder to prosecute because it is more difficult to establish the contribution of senior management. Their hierarchical structures and decision-making processes are considerably more complex, rendering it difficult to assign blame to specific individuals.[98] The CMCHA 2007 could, in this respect, be said to have failed to have adopted a consistent approach towards small and large companies, with the consequence that failures within the latter can be harder to prove. This could encourage larger companies to develop corporate structures designed to conceal their decision-making processes in order to render it all the more difficult to trace failures to senior management.
Despite the aforementioned weaknesses, the CMCHA 2007 has gathered considerable ground in imposing criminal liability upon companies for conduct resulting in death. The Act does not require proof that an individual director personally committed manslaughter. It is sufficient that the way the company's activities were managed or organised caused death and constituted a gross breach, with senior management's role forming a substantial element of that breach. It is no longer the case that companies can cause death without legal repercussions.
Individual and Collective Responsibility: A Critique of the Law
Thus far, basic criticisms of the law have been presented, which must be explored in more detail in order to form the basis for reform proposals. Prior to such elaboration, the theoretical foundations of corporate crime must be outlined, for they serve to legitimise the imposition of liability upon collective entities for criminal conduct. This pertains to, and will assist in developing an approach that strikes a suitable balance between collective and individual liability.
The identification doctrine was developed as a result of the courts' attempt to solve the problem of attributing the mens rea of criminal liability to the collective corporate structure.[99] Corporate entities are unable to 'think' per se, meaning that the courts would identify an individual directing the company's 'mind and will'.[100] The identification doctrine was applied by the courts to offences requiring proof of the state of mind of the company where the particular offence called for that rule of attribution. The location of an individual who directs the mind and will of the company is based on the justification that it is such individuals who cause their companies to act in the fashion that results in the commission of the criminal offence. Although this seems to be an effective approach towards the imposition of corporate criminal liability, it has its weaknesses. The endeavour to identify a sole individual who controls the company's mind and will is arguably to approach the issue of corporate liability in an unrealistic and narrow manner.[101] This is due to the fact that it does not recognise that company decisions and actions are often dispersed, and developed and implemented by a number of individuals. This problem has become emphasised as an increasing number of companies are becoming larger, and even operating on a transnational level. For such companies, decisions are divided between several individuals, with different degrees of authority.[102] This renders it extremely difficult to identify a sole, responsible individual, because larger companies have unclear hierarchies. This means that it is not always possible to locate with certainty an individual that made, or substantially participated in, a particular decision.
Under the former common law approach, assuming it was possible to identify an individual directing the mind and will of a company, the prosecution then had to prove the additional elements of gross negligence manslaughter.[103] An individual may still be convicted where a breach of an existing duty of care creates a reasonably foreseeable, serious and obvious risk of death, causes death, and is so gross as to justify criminal punishment. These elements are notoriously difficult to prove, particularly in cases concerning larger companies, as the causal contribution of a decision may be difficult to establish if someone else implemented it.[104] Clearly then, the elements of the identification doctrine do not bridge the gap between corporate crime and traditional principles of criminal law.[105]
An alternative is the aggregation of individual failings, which seeks to avoid and ease the problems posed by the identification doctrine. The proposed aggregation doctrine is based on the notion that the criminal elements of mens rea and actus reus can be attributed to companies as collective entities, enabling them to be held liable for criminal conduct. In identifying the aggregate fault of several individual faults that would otherwise lack the requisite mens rea, the aggregation doctrine attributes criminal responsibility to the company.[106] This addresses problems that plague the need to identify a single responsible individual. Early cases recognised corporate liability for omissions,[107] but the Court of Appeal rejected aggregation of individual failings as a basis for corporate manslaughter at common law.[108] This is due to problems that weaken the effectiveness of the aggregation doctrine. For example, it has been deemed inefficient because it does not have a deterrent impact. This is due to the fact that it does not provide an advance warning to companies about what they can do to minimise the risk that they will be held criminally liable. Moreover, it does not attach a sufficient degree of importance to, or address the conditions leading to, the offence. For instance, the commission of a corporate crime need not essentially result from the individual fault of company members, but may be due to an overall failure of a company's policies and systems.
The problems surrounding the aggregation principle resulted in the use of the identification doctrine in England and Wales for gross negligence manslaughter. In particular, the UK courts expressed a clear reluctance to develop an alternative approach to the identification doctrine.[109] This caused the courts to adopt a rather limited approach towards corporate criminal liability, and meant that companies could only be convicted of crimes in limited cases where the offence required proof of fault.[110] This limited application of the identification doctrine has been heavily criticised, mainly by the courts. In Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission,[111] Lord Hoffmann asked: 'Whose act (or knowledge, or state of mind) was for this purpose intended to count as the act etc. of the company?'[112] This depended on the purpose of the particular legal rule. The knowledge of an investment manager authorised to acquire securities could count as the company's knowledge for the statutory disclosure obligation. In the UK, section 250 of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 now also attributes an offence to a body corporate or partnership where a senior manager commits it within the scope of their actual or apparent authority. The 2007 Act retains its separate test for corporate manslaughter.
While this approach may appear to be effective, it has been pointed out that this approach is problematic because 'it still requires an individual to be identified within the corporate structure whose acts and knowledge can be attributed to the company'.[113] It has moreover been recognised that,
'while corporations are only metaphysical entities, this does not prevent them being culpability-bearing agents who, through their rules, policies and operational procedures can exhibit the requisite degree of mens rea and be blamed therefore'.[114]
This statement establishes a distinction between the individual decisions and actions of company members, and the overall structure of company systems and policies that resulted in such decisions and actions. This approach avoids the problems that plague the identification doctrine, because it promotes an extreme application of the aggregation doctrine.[115] Therefore, it may be proposed that such an approach would eliminate current weaknesses in the law, and would moreover evade the need to implement a complete overhaul of corporate criminal law.[116] This supports the claim that an important distinction between decisions made by individuals, and decisions made as a result of company policies must be made. This would operate to set a vital boundary between individual liability, and collective liability – not only in cases concerning manslaughter, but in relation to all corporate crimes.
The law as it currently stands is problematic because it does not adopt a principled or consistent approach towards corporate crime. This is most prominent in the context of corporate manslaughter, despite the fact that a single statute concerning this offence exists. The law appears to embody a large variety of approaches towards corporate manslaughter, resulting in the imposition of liability on individual company members for unlawful acts or gross negligence, or on the company as a collective entity. The latter approach is based on a duty of care, though this principle does appear to be somewhat illogical when applied to corporate crime. The CMCHA 2007 also operates to segregate the actions of individual company members from the company itself, and provides no clear principles within the same Act for holding an individual responsible alongside the company.
Could such problems be rooted in the duty of care component of corporate manslaughter? It has been suggested that proof of a duty of care is now obsolete, and that it thus has no relevant role in the CMCHA 2007. It could be proposed that the duty of care requirement is no longer necessary because individuals and companies could already be said to be subject to the duty to not kill another. Moreover, this could be said to feature as an intrinsic component of the duties that directors owe to the company, in that they are required to act in the company's best interests. Evidently, to make and implement decisions that run a high risk of causing death would not be in the best interests of a company.[117] This produces the need to inject simplicity into the law on corporate manslaughter, so that where a company's conduct falls far below what may be reasonably expected, and this results in the death of another, a duty of care does not need to be proven. The need to prove the existence of a duty of care simply operates to provide a ground on which the company may escape liability, and directs focus away from the need to identify the company's role in the incident. Whether or not a duty of care could be said to exist in the context of corporate manslaughter is arguably not relevant, because it is ultimately the actions of the individual company member, and/or the company itself that resulted in death.[118] To focus on anything other than this simple point is to hinder the ability of the law to effectively and legitimately convict those responsible for corporate manslaughter.
It has been briefly stated that the core fault element for corporate manslaughter is a 'gross breach' of a duty.[119] This means that conduct must have fallen far 'below what can reasonably be expected of the organisation in the circumstances'.[120] However, there is often a lack of clarity surrounding what can and should be expected of companies in specific situations, and some ambiguity surrounds the extent to which a company must fall from a reasonable expectations in order to be held to have committed a gross breach of a duty. Problems materialise when one seeks to identify the exact conditions that may be considered relevant in examining whether or not liability should be imposed. For instance, could it be deemed reasonable to include within this category the increased profitability that usually accompanies the imposition of lower standards of health and safety?[121] Section 8 CMCHA 2007 addresses this, in that it requires that the jury consider whether the evidence shows that the organisation failed to comply with health and safety legislation relating to the breach and, if so, how serious that failure was and how much of a risk of death it posed.[122] The jury can also consider and attach importance to company systems or policies that would be likely to have, or did, encourage or tolerate the failure.[123] However, this would cause the base standard to be placed much lower than, for instance, evidence that a company systematically failed to organise its affairs in a suitable fashion. Such an approach seeks to avoid the inclusion within its scope of failures if individual managing members, whereas the CMCHA 2007 enables the court to identify and assess the failures of individual members. Arguably, this is not consistent with the CMCHA 2007's ultimate principle: that it does not allow individuals to be convicted for corporate manslaughter.
Such problems appear to be caused by inaccurate terminology contained in the 2007 Act, as well as the unclear approach that it adopts towards corporate criminal liability. Although the Act targets organisational failure even where an individual member caused death, this is not clearly evident in the Act's terminology. In this respect, it should have either completely committed to the imposition of individual or collective liability, and specified the conditions that could give rise to each. A different approach to the liability of the organisation was adopted in Italian Decree 231/2001, which will be outlined in greater detail in the following chapter.
A further problem with the 2007 Act is proving that the way the company's activities were managed or organised was a cause of death. The prosecution need not prove that it was the sole or main cause. An individual's act or omission may be the immediate cause of death while management failures also make a more than minimal contribution. The difficulty is tracing that contribution where both senior management and subordinate company members have made errors. The traditional tests of causation do not sit comfortably with corporate crime, because failures are typically too far, both in time and space, from the occurrence of harm. Despite such an issue, the CMCHA 2007 roots causation within previous judicial decisions, which have been heavily criticised on the grounds that they are inconsistent and confusing.[124]
A further problem with the 2007 Act is that it adopts a narrow approach towards corporate crime. This is because it focuses purely on manslaughter, and therefore ignores other forms of corporate criminal conduct. It instead should have adopted more of a wholesale approach towards corporate crime, and applied to all forms of corporate criminal conduct. Corporate grievous bodily harm could for instance have been included in the Act – this occurs much more frequently than corporate manslaughter.[125] The fact that corporate manslaughter does not occur very frequently means that the CMCHA 2007 is too far removed from the reality of corporate functioning. This essentially means that it could be more financially feasible for companies to take health and safety risks, because it would be likely to be more cost effective on a long-term basis. An example of this is when Ford Motor Company deferred changes to the fuel system of its Pinto despite evidence of a fire risk in rear-end collisions.[126] In Grimshaw v Ford Motor Co the court held that the jury could infer that management had deferred corrective measures to save money. Ford later agreed to recall the affected models.[127] This indicates that the CMCHA 2007's narrow approach is limited in deterring corporate crime.
While it is evident that companies can be convicted of many offences that individuals can be convicted of, the core problem resides in the need to modify elements of criminal offences so that they apply to collective entities.[128] Although the Act seeks to impose criminal liability on companies, it could have addressed the need to hold individual company members liable, in accordance with, for instance, the extent to which their actions contributed to the death. To focus on the liability of the company is to fail to address the fact that individual company members may have contributed to the commission of a corporate crime. Therefore, the CMCHA 2007 fails to create a link between corporate crime and individual company members. Moreover, the HSWA 1974 takes a different approach to offences under that Act.[129] Under section 37 HSWA 1974, criminal liability can be imposed upon both the company and its members when a criminal offence that has been committed by a company through the 'consent, connivance' or 'neglect' of a managing member. Section 18 excludes an accessory charge for corporate manslaughter even where an individual knowingly assisted the company's offence. Acting under company policy provides no general defence to a charge based on that individual's own wrongdoing. This is however unrealistic, because it does not recognise the fact that, company policy is almost always drafted and/or reviewed by the management. Directors are under a duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence in overseeing the company's activities. To impose such a duty, and to then decline to impose individual liability on such members for corporate manslaughter, distorts the overall foundations of corporate criminal law.
A Reformed System of Corporate Liability
One of the main debates that arises in the context of corporate crime is essentially whether individual or collective liability may be considered more effective and appropriate. This also relates to the extent to which the corporate entity may be defined as a person. Under the CMCHA 2007, the corporate culture is mentioned, which can be considered by the jury in determining whether or not a gross breach of a duty has taken place.[130] This seeks to justify the shift away from individual responsibility towards collective responsibility, in that it searches for evidence of 'attitudes, policies, systems or accepted practices…that were likely to have encouraged' or produced tolerance of a failure to comply with health and safety legislation.[131] Section 8 applies where the relevant duty of care is established and the jury is deciding whether there was a gross breach. The jury must consider any evidence of failure to comply with relevant health and safety legislation, but consideration of the company's culture is discretionary. The HSWA 1974 contains no corresponding requirement to consider corporate culture in every case.
Much debate surrounds whether individual company members should be held liable for complying with and/or participating in company policies resulting in manslaughter. Although it could be argued that individual liability would promote maximum compliance with the law, there is theoretical ambiguity surrounding the extent to which individuals should be held liable for the company's actions.[132] This issue is particularly problematic because it is a long-standing principle of company law that a company is distinct to its members.[133] Should the same approach be adopted in the context of corporate criminal law, or should the corporate veil be entirely demolished in order to hold individual company members liable? One could argue that the divide between individual and collective liability is an unavoidable consequence of the confusing relationship between traditional concepts of criminal law and corporate crime. On the one hand, the company is ultimately constituted of its members, and therefore the exclude criminal liability for them is to undermine the traditional notion of criminal liability, which is individualistic.[134] It moreover fails to promote compliance, because company members may be insufficiently deterred by a sanction on the company alone from engaging in negligent conduct, particularly if such conduct maximises profits. On the other hand, it is increasingly argued that 'companies should be liable for the same offences as individuals and subject to the same normal principles of criminal liability'.[135] Therefore, it is no longer possible to accept that companies are fictional entities that are comprised of their members. Companies are in fact real, powerful actors, whose actions can have a huge impact upon society. Alternatively, it has been proposed that the conviction and punishment of companies causes innocent shareholders to suffer the consequences of criminal sanctions.[136] However, such a statement fails to recognise certain important points. For example, it fails to acknowledge that it is company shareholders that benefit from dangerous yet profitable company policies that are geared towards maximising shareholder profits. Additionally, the core value of the concept of separate corporate personality is that it exists as a distinct legal entity to its shareholders. This means that shareholders are not personally liable for criminal sanctions that are imposed upon companies – they will only lose equity in their shares. Shareholders can profit considerably from corporate criminal activities, and it is therefore acceptable to states that they should suffer losses arising from the sanctioning of the company.
An alternative argument is that the imposition of liability upon powerful company members for complying with a company's commission of a criminal offence can bring a variety of advantages. Firstly, it would assign blame where it should belong in the majority of cases. It would also prevent individual members of the company from avoiding an accessory charge for the corporate offence, particularly as managing members are required to remain aware of the company's policies and activities. Thus, to state that the corporate entity rather than its members should be held criminally liable fails to recognise that the company is essentially a puppet, the strings of which are held by its members.[137] The fact that the company is not able to guide its actions or form its own intentions means that it lies at the mercy of those who control it. To punish only the company where a member is personally culpable is to assign responsibility to an abstract entity, with no legitimate basis or practical purpose.[138] In order for corporate criminal law to have a practical impact, it is imperative that individual liability be imposed. This would achieve much in enforcing compliance with the law, and reinforcing the importance and impact of directors' duties.
A dual approach towards criminal liability appears to have been made under the CMCHA 2007, because it targets the systematic failures of company members, and imputes the offence to the company itself. This recognises that deaths may often be caused by companies as a result of the cumulative effect of inappropriate company policies, and the acts and omissions of more than one company members.[139] In referring to senior managing members, the 2007 Act seems to embody the aggregation doctrine, at the very least indirectly. Furthermore, it establishes a link between the management and individual company members who play an important role in the implementation of company decisions.[140] An employee's wrongful acts may be evidence of the organisational breach under section 1(1). Section 1(3) requires the way senior management managed or organised the activities to form a substantial element of that breach. Alternatively, it may be pointed out that the CMCHA 2007 eliminates the need to identify a specific company member who has committed manslaughter. At the very least, this could be defined as a significant improvement upon the identification doctrine. This indicates that the imposition of a hybrid type of individual/collective liability is arguably the most desirable approach towards corporate crime. It establishes a compromise between the need to identify individual actors who form a part of the broader corporate structure. The CMCHA 2007 on the other hand seems to retain some aspects of the identification doctrine. This is because even systemic fault requires a substantial contribution at senior management level. This creates uncertainty in relation to who may be said to have played a significant role in the implementation of the corporate policy that caused death. It is still not clear the degree to which an individual must participate in decision-making before his role may be identified as significant.[141] There is also a lack of clarity surrounding the proportion of a company's activities that a company member must be involved for the 'substantial part' requirement to be satisfied. This is a particularly problematic issue when death results from failings that have occurred on a number of different levels.
The CMCHA 2007's impact seems to be only marginally positive. It has most prominently concretised the principle that a company is capable of committing serious criminal offences. This demonstrates that its impact is more symbolic than practical. However, symbolism is not to be underestimated. The CMCHA 2007 has, at the very least, eroded the pre-existing notion that death caused at work is usually the result of an accident. The 2007 Act has strengthened the notion that such deaths can be attributed to companies, who are under a duty to prevent the conditions that result in work-related deaths.[142] The CMCHA 2007 could therefore be said to have created a clear distinction between corporate behaviour that is acceptable and that which is unacceptable. In drawing this distinction, it focuses on the decisions and actions of individual company members, groups of company members, and the company itself as a collective entity.
It is helpful to consider how criminal responsibility is imposed upon companies under other jurisdictions, as this would provide important guidance on how the law in the UK could be reformed.[143] The most important law in this respect is Italian Legislative Decree 231/2001, which introduced a general system of administrative liability for entities arising from specified criminal offences. Employees would typically be held individually responsible for criminal conduct, which meant that companies themselves could not be convicted of crimes. Under Legislative Decree 231/2001, companies can incur administrative liability for specified crimes that have been committed by their managing members and their subordinates. Such liability arises from the fact that such members have acted on behalf of the company, provided the criminal act in question was committed in the company's interest or to its advantage.[144] The Decree sets out a comprehensive list of offences that can give rise to this liability.[145] Although the Decree is not directed specifically towards corporate manslaughter, Article 25-septies covers negligent homicide and serious or very serious injury arising from breaches of workplace safety law. As the Italian Court of Cassation held in the ThyssenKrupp case, the interest or advantage relates to the unsafe conduct, such as saving the cost of precautions, rather than to the death itself. The CMCHA 2007, in stark contrast, focuses solely on corporate manslaughter.
The Decree's operation in practice reveals much about its strengths. It was for instance triggered following the Costa Concordia incident, in which many people were killed and injured after a cruise ship sank.[146] The captain was blamed because he had deviated from the ships initial navigational route, and this was exacerbated by his abandoning of the ship while it was sinking. The captain had deviated from the planned route in order to enable guests to view a 'near shore salute', which caused the ship to strike a reef and sink.[147] The captain was given a 16-year prison sentence. Decree 231/2001 distinguishes two routes to the liability of the entity.[148] For offences by senior personnel, Article 6 provides a defence where the company had adopted and effectively implemented a suitable prevention model, provided for independent supervision, and the offender fraudulently evaded the model without a failure of supervision. For offences by subordinates, Article 7 asks whether a failure of direction or supervision made the offence possible. This type of corporate liability is based on the principle of organisational fault.[149] An appropriate model adopted and effectively implemented before the offence can therefore matter in both cases. Under Article 5 of the Decree, offences committed by the managing members,[150] and those committed by subordinate members[151] are distinct. It does not therefore exclude the ability for an individual to be held liable, regardless of their position in the company. The individual's own criminal liability is separate from the entity's liability under the Decree. Under Article 8 the entity can be liable even if the individual offender has not been identified. The CMCHA 2007 likewise dispenses with the need to identify a directing mind who personally committed manslaughter. This moreover supports the claim that the 2007 Act should enable a company, and its individual members as distinct categories, to be convicted. This would allow proceedings against a culpable individual under the same Act, alongside the existing possibility of prosecution for a separate offence.
Article 5 of the Decree allows a company to be held liable in a broad variety of situations, including where the offender in fact manages or controls the company. Share ownership alone is insufficient. The decree in this respect is much broader than the CMCHA 2007, enabling it to apply in a wider array of situations than the 2007 Act. The Act is too narrow because it requires a substantial senior management contribution to the breach, and focuses solely on manslaughter. The broadness of the Decree is protected against unfair convictions, by the conditions for liability of the entity.[152] Article 5(1)(b) enables liability to be imposed when a subordinate staff member commits a listed offence in the interest or to the advantage of the company and a failure of direction or supervision made it possible. The Decree therefore recognises different sources of organisational fault, and distinguishes between criminal acts committed by the management, subordinate members, and those arising from structural negligence and company policy. It can therefore be considered more effective at deterring corporate crime in comparison to the CMCHA 2007. In forming the basis for reform of UK law, the Decree indicates that a single statute could provide for the imposition of both individual and collective liability in the realm of corporate crime, depending upon the particular facts of each case.[153]
Conclusions
A number of conclusions may be drawn following the above analysis. It is firstly evident that the law on corporate manslaughter in the UK is unduly narrow, in that it excludes individual company members from liability as accessories to the corporate offence. This distorts the concept of corporate liability, because it fails to recognise that a company's actions are essentially implemented by its members. To hold companies, but not their members, accountable for corporate crimes achieves little in terms of deterring such conduct. This is because a conviction of the company alone may have little deterrent effect on the individuals involved, even though they may be prosecuted for their own offences. The fact that corporate crime is dispersed throughout various legislative statutes has also caused the law to become 'impenetrable and ambiguous'.[154]
The CMCHA 2007 has gathered ground in holding companies accountable for corporate manslaughter. It however adopts a confusing approach, because it requires a substantial senior management contribution to the breach, yet only provides for the criminal liability of companies as a whole. It could be argued that this disjointed approach towards corporate manslaughter is merely the consequence of the uneasy relationship between the individualistic roots of criminal liability, and the collective corporate structure.[155] While the concept of corporate crime does pose problems for the criminal law, the manner in which the Italian Decree imposes liability indicates that this should not hinder an informed approach. The Italian Decree provides a basis for reform of the CMCHA 2007, in that it allows the entity to be held liable alongside an individual prosecuted under ordinary criminal law, where necessary and justifiable. The CMCHA 2007 should therefore allow for individual company members to be held liable as accessories where they culpably assist the corporate offence in departing from company policy. Such an amendment would prevent company members from escaping liability for their part in the corporate offence, and inject legitimacy and logic into the law on corporate manslaughter.
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Cases
Cassazione penale, sezioni unite, no 38343/2014 (ThyssenKrupp).
Cassazione penale, sezione IV, no 35585/2017 (Schettino).
A-G's Ref (No.2 of 1999) [2000] QB 796.
Adams v Cape Industries [1990] 2 WLR 657.
Anonymous Case (No. 935) 88 ER 1518, KB 1701.
Associated Octel Co Ltd (1996) 1 WLR 1543.
Austin Rover Group Ltd v HM Inspector of Factories (1990) 1AC 619.
Birmingham and Gloucester Railway (1842) 3 QB 223.
Boal (1992) 3 All ER 177.
Board of Trustees of the Science Museum (1993) 1 WLR 1171.
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Mobile Sweepers (Reading) Ltd [2014] Winchester Crown Court, 26/2/2014, unreported.
Nelson Group Services (Maintenance) Ltd (1999) 1 WLR 1527.
Northern Strip Mining Construction Co Ltd (The Times, 2,4,5 February, 1965).
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PS and JE Ward Ltd (2014) Norwich Crown Court, unreported.
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Legislation
Crime and Policing Act 2026
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007
Decree 231/2001 (Italian)
Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974
Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999
Footnotes
[1] B Fisse, 'Reconstructing corporate criminal law: Deterrence, retribution, fault, and sanctions' [1982] 56 SCLR 1141, 1143.
[2] C Wells, Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (2nd edn, OUP 2001) 88-89; LH Leigh, The Criminal Liability of Corporations in English Law (Littlehampton Book Services 1969) ch. 2.
[3] A Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (6th edn, OUP 2009) 146.
[4]Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1896] UKHL 1.
[5]Lee v Lee's Air Farming (1961) AC 12; Macaura v Northern Assurance (1925) AC 619.
[6] S Tombs & P Almond, 'Corporate manslaughter and regulatory reform' [2014] 61 CLSC 5, 590.
[7]Northern Strip Mining Construction Co Ltd (The Times, 2,4,5 February, 1965). Law Commission, Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter (Law Com No 237, 1996) paras 6.40–6.41.
[8] S Tombs & D Whyte, 'Introduction to the Special Issue on 'Crimes of the Powerful'' [2015] 54 HJCJ 1, 4.
[9] WG Carson, The Other Price of Britain's Oil: Safety and Control in the North Sea (Robertson 1981) 269-289; MD Ermann & RJ Lundman. Corporate deviance (Holt, Rinehart, and Winston 1982) 148.
[10] B Lewis & S Woodward, 'Corporate criminal liability' [2014] 51 ACLR 923, 930.
[11] TH Morris, 'Too Big to Jail: The Lack of Suitable Culpability Elements in the Criminal Liability of Principals' [2014] 9 BJCFCL 335, 338.
[12] J Arlen, 'Corporate criminal liability: Theory and evidence' in Research Handbook on the Economics of Criminal Law (A Harel & K Hylton eds, Edward Elgar 2012) 13-14.
[13] P Szawarski, 'Classic Cases Revisited: Medical Manslaughter, Corporate Liability and the Death of Sean Phillips' [2014] 15 JICS 2, 119.
[14] M Clinard & P Yeager, Corporate crime (Vol. 1, Transaction Publishers 2011) 110.
[15]Anonymous Case (No. 935) 88 ER 1518, KB 1701, Lord Holt, [118].
[16] VS Khanna, 'Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose does it Serve?' [1996] 109 HLR 7, 1479.
[17] B Fisse & J Braithwaite, 'The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime: Individualism, Collectivism and Accountability' [1986] 11 SLR 468, 471.
[18] London School of Economics and Political Science, The criminal liability of corporations in English law (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1969) 4.
[19] JP Locker & B Godfrey, 'Ontological boundaries and temporal watersheds in the development of white-collar crime' [2006] 46 BJC 6, 988.
[20]City of London (1882) St Tr 1039, [1138].
[21] H Hansmann & R Kraakman, 'The End of History for Corporate Law' [2000] 89 GLJ 439, 442.
[22] KF Brickey, 'Corporate criminal accountability: A brief history and an observation' [1982] 60 WULQ 393, 398.
[23]Birmingham and Gloucester Railway (1842) 3 QB 223.
[24] DC Korten, 'When corporations rule the world' [1998] 98 EBR 1, 12.
[25] VS Khanna, 'Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose does it Serve?' [1996] 109 HLR 7, 1510.
[26] CMV Clarkson, 'Kicking Corporate Bodies and Damning their souls' [1996] 59 MLR 4, 562.
[27] D Fennell, Investigation into the King's Cross Underground Fire: CM 449 (Department of Transport 1988) 120, 184-185.
[28] G Slapper, 'Corporate Homicide and Legal Chaos' [1999] 149 NLJ 1031, 1034; N Cavanagh, 'Corporate Criminal Liability: An Assessment of the Models of Fault' [2011] 75 JCL 414, 417-418.
[29] L Cullen, Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster: CM 1310 (Stationery Office 1990) 58-61.
[30] HSWA 1974, s. 1.
[31] A Holt & H Andrews, Principles of health and safety at work (Institution of Occupational Safety and Health 1999) 5.
[32] AR Hale, BHJ Heming, J Carthey & B Kirwan, 'Modelling of safety management systems' [1997] 26 SS 1, 126. Legislative Reform (Health and Safety Executive) Order 2008, arts 3–4.
[33] HSWA 1974, s. 2(2)(a), (c) & (d).
[34] HSWA 1974, s. 3(1) &(2).
[35]Pittwood (1902) 19 TLR 37.
[36] N Lewis, 'Health and Safety at Work Act 1974' (1975) 38 MLR 442, 445.
[37]Associated Octel Co Ltd (1996) 1 WLR 1543.
[38]Board of Trustees of the Science Museum (1993) 1 WLR 1171.
[39]British Steel (1995) 1 WLR 1356. See also R v Chargot Ltd [2008] UKHL 73.
[40] Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999, Regulation 21.
[41]Nelson Group Services (Maintenance) Ltd (1999) 1 WLR 1527.
[42]Austin Rover Group Ltd v HM Inspector of Factories (1990) 1AC 619.
[43]Boal (1992) 3 All ER 177 outlines managing members that can be held liable under section 37 HSWA 1974.
[44] R Johnstone, M Quinlan & D Walters, 'Statutory occupational health and safety workplace arrangements for the modern labour market' [2005] 47 JIR 1, 110.
[45] HSWA 1974, ss. 2(1), 3(1) and 7.
[46] D Walters, 'One step forward, two steps back: Worker representation and health and safety in the United Kingdom' [2006] 36 IJHS 1, 98.
[47] P James & D Walters, 'Worker representation in health and safety: Options for regulatory reform' [2002] 33 IRJ 2, 150.
[48] M Beck & C Woolfson, 'The regulation of health and safety in Britain: From old Labour to new Labour' [2000] 31 IRJ 1, 43.
[49] P Almond & S Colover, 'Communication and Social Regulation: The Criminalization of Work-Related Death' [2012] 52 BJC 5, 999.
[50]Davies v Health and Safety Executive [2002] EWCA Crim 2949.
[51] Ibid., [15].
[52] A Dobson, 'Section 37 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974-re-invigorated' [2013] 55 IJLM 2, 146.
[53] V Howes, 'Duties and liabilities under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974: A step forward?' [2009] 38 ILJ 3, 311.
[54] G Stessens, 'Corporate criminal liability: A comparative perspective' [1994] 43 ICLQ 3, 505.
[55] M Hsiao, 'Abandonment of the Doctrine of Attribution in Favour of Gross Negligence Test in the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007' [2009] 30 CL 4, 110-111.
[56] D Ormerod, Smith and Hogan's Criminal Law (13th edn, OUP 2011) 258.
[57] M Hsiao, 'Abandonment of the Doctrine of Attribution in Favour of Gross Negligence Test in the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007' [2009] 30 CL 4, 110-112.
[58] P Almond, 'Understanding the seriousness of corporate crime: Some lessons for the new 'corporate manslaughter' offence' [2009] 9 CCJ 2, 155.
[59] J Gobert, 'The Evolving Legal Test of Corporate Criminal Liability' in Corporate and White Collar Crime (J Minkes & L Minkes eds, Sage 2008) 67-68.
[60]Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd v TJ Graham & Sons Ltd [1956] 3 All ER 624.
[61] Ibid., [89].
[62] H Croall, Understanding White Collar Crime (Open University Press 2001) 130.
[63] A Reiss & A Biderman, Data Sources on White Collar Lawbreaking (National Institute of Justice 1980) 77.
[64] CMV Clarkson, 'Kicking Corporate Bodies and Damning their souls' [1996] 59 MLR 4, 569; AP Simester, JR Spencer, GR Sullivan & GJ Virgo, Simester & Sullivan's Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine (4th edn, Hart 2010) 280.
[65] CMCHA 2007: s. 1(2) includes a corporation, a listed department or body or a police force. A partnership, trade union or employers' association is covered if it is an employer.
[66] Individuals may however be liable under the common law of gross negligence manslaughter, and under existing health and safety legislation. CMCHA 2007, ss 18 and 20. See also R v Rose [2017] EWCA Crim 1168.
[67] J Gobert, 'The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007–Thirteen Years in the making but was it worth the wait?' [2008] 71 MLR 3, 421-422.
[68] R Craig, 'Corporate Manslaughter - Thou Shall do no Murder: A Discussion Paper on the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007' [2009] 30 CL 1, 18.
[69] RC Slye, 'Corporations, Veils, and International Criminal Liability' (2008) 33 BJIL 955, 959.
[70] A Dobson, 'Shifting Sands: Multiple Counts in Prosecutions for Corporate Manslaughter' [2012] 3 CLR 201, 208.
[71] D Ormerod, Smith and Hogan's Criminal Law (13th edn, OUP 2011), 571.
[72] CMCHA 2007, s 1(4)(c). Centre for Corporate Accountability, supplementary memorandum on the Draft Corporate Manslaughter Bill (HC 540-III, 2005–06) paras 4.13–4.18.
[73] L Jones & S Field, 'Crime–Corporate Manslaughter' [2011] 1 BLR 79, 83.
[74] G Bebb, 'Plus Ce Change?' [2006] 68 ELJ 22, 24.
[75] J Reason, 'Understanding Adverse Events: Human Factors' [1995] 4 QHC 80, 87; G Forlin & L Smail, Corporate Liability: Work Related Deaths and Criminal Prosecutions (Bloomsbury 2010) 85.
[76] S Field & L Jones, 'Corporate criminal liability for manslaughter: The evolving approach of the prosecuting authorities and courts in England and Wales' (2011) 32 BLR 80, 88.
[77] CMCHA 2007, s. 1(3).
[78] K Gibson, 'Toward an Intermediate Position on Corporate Moral Personhood' [2011] 101 JBE 1, 75-76.
[79] CMV Clarkson, 'Kicking Corporate Bodies and Damning their souls' [1996] 59 MLR 4, 572.
[80] C Wells, 'Corporate Criminal Liability in England and Wales: Past, Present, and Future' in M Pieth and R Ivory (eds), Corporate Criminal Liability (Springer 2011) 91, 105.
[81] A Hicks & SH Goo, Cases & Materials on Company Law (7th edn, OUP 2011) 99-102.
[82]Merchandise Transport v British Transport Commission (No.1) [1962] 2 QB 173; Creasey v Breachwood Motors Ltd [1993] BCLC 480; Jones v Lipman [1962] 1 WLR 832; Adams v Cape Industries [1990] 2 WLR 657. See Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] UKSC 34 on the narrow scope of veil piercing.
[83] P Almond, 'Regulation Crisis: Evaluating the Potential Legitimizing Effects of 'Corporate Manslaughter Cases' (2007) 29 Law & Policy 285, 285.
[84] P Almond, 'Understanding the seriousness of corporate crime: Some lessons for the new 'corporate manslaughter' offence' [2009] 9 CCJ 2, 149.
[85]Cotswold Geotechnical (Holdings) Ltd [2011] ALL ER (D) 100 (May).
[86] Sentencing Guidelines Council, Corporate Manslaughter and Health and Safety Offences Causing Death (SGC 2010) [24]. For the current guideline see Sentencing Council, Corporate manslaughter (effective 1 February 2016).
[87] R v Cotswold Geotechnical Holdings Ltd [2011] EWCA Crim 1337.
[88]PS and JE Ward Ltd (2014) Norwich Crown Court, unreported.
[89] HSWA 1974, s. 2(1).
[90]Cavendish Masonry Ltd (2014) Oxford Crown Court, unreported.
[91]Mobile Sweepers (Reading) Ltd [2014] Winchester Crown Court, 26/2/2014, unreported.
[92]Peter Mawson and Peter Mawson Ltd (2015) Preston Crown Court, February 3, unreported.
[93] B Haigh, An analysis of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act (2007): A Badly Flawed Reform? (PhD diss., Durham University 2012) 43.
[94] S Field & L Jones, 'Five years on: The impact of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007—plus ça change?' (2013) 24 ICCLR 239, 240.
[95] L Price, 'Finding fault in organisations–reconceptualising the role of senior managers in corporate manslaughter' (2015) 35 Legal Studies 385. Attorney-General's Reference (No 2 of 1999) [2000] QB 796.
[96] S Tombs, 'Still killing with impunity: Corporate criminal law reform in the UK' [2013] 11 PPHS 2, 75.
[97] P Almond, Corporate manslaughter and regulatory reform (Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 82.
[98] M Punch, 'Theorganisational component in corporate crime' in European Developments in Corporate Criminal Liability (J Gobert ed, Routledge 2011) 103.
[99] D Hanna, 'Corporate Criminal Liability' [1988] 31 CLQ 452, 466.
[100]Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153 HL.
[101] T Archibald, K Jull & K Roach, 'The changed face of corporate criminal liability' [2004] 48 CLQ 367, 369.
[102] J Gobert, 'The Evolving Legal Test of Corporate Criminal Liability' in Corporate and White Collar Crime (J Minkes & L Minkes eds, Sage 2008) 77-78.
[103] PH Bucy, 'Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability' (1991) 75 Minn L Rev 1095, 1099.
[104] E Colvin, 'Corporate Personality and Criminal Liability' [1995] 6 CLF 1, 6-7.
[105] C Wells, 'Corporate Criminal Liability in England and Wales: Past, Present, and Future' in M Pieth and R Ivory (eds), Corporate Criminal Liability (Springer 2011) 91, 99.
[106] E Lederman, 'Models for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability: From Adaptation and Imitation toward Aggregation and the Search for Self-Identity' [2000] 4 BCLR 641, 644.
[107]Birmingham and Gloucester Railway (1842) 3 QB 223.
[108]A-G's Ref (No.2 of 1999) [2000] QB 796.
[109] J Braithwaite & B Fisse, 'On the plausibility of corporate crime theory' in Advances in criminological theory (F Adler ed, Transaction Publishers 1990) 18-20.
[110] GR Sullivan, 'The Attribution of Culpability to Limited Companies' [1996] CLJ 515, 542.
[111]Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission (1995) 2 AC 500.
[112] Ibid., 507. Crime and Policing Act 2026, s 250.
[113] CMV Clarkson, 'Kicking Corporate Bodies and Damning their souls' [1996] 59 MLR 4, 564.
[114] Ibid., 566.
[115] E Lederman, 'Models for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability: From Adaptation and Imitation toward Aggregation and the Search for Self-Identity' [2000] 4 BCLR 641, 653-655.
[116] B Fisse & J Braithwaite, 'The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime: Individualism, Collectivism and Accountability' [1986] 11 SLR 468, 471.
[117] NP Beveridge, 'The Corporate Director's Duty of Care: Riddles Wisely Expounded' [1990] 24 SLR 923, 925.
[118] P Almond, 'Understanding the seriousness of corporate crime: Some lessons for the new 'corporate manslaughter' offence' [2009] 9 CCJ 2, 160.
[119] CMCHA 2007, s. 1(1)(b).
[120] CMCHA 2007, s. 1(4)(b).
[121]F Howe & Sons (Engineering) Ltd [1999] 2 All ER 249.
[122] PR Glazebrook 'A Better Way of Convicting Businesses of Avoidable Deaths and Injuries' [2002] 61 CLJ 405, 410. CMCHA 2007, s 8(2).
[123] CMCHA 2007, s. 8(3)(a).
[124] HLA Hart & T Honore, Causation in the Law (2nd edn, OUP 1985) 67-70.
[125] J Gobert, 'The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007–Thirteen Years in the making but was it worth the wait?' [2008] 71 MLR 3, 422.
[126] SL Hills, Corporate violence: Injury and death for profit (Rowman & Littlefield 1987) 24.
[127] M Punch, Dirty Business: Exploring corporate misconduct: Analysis and cases (Sage 1996) 23-24. Grimshaw v Ford Motor Co (1981) 119 Cal App 3d 757.
[128] J Gobert, 'Corporate criminality: Four models of fault' [1994] 14 LS 393, 398; C Wells, 'Corporate Manslaughter: Why does Reform Matter?' (2006) 123 SALJ 648, 650.
[129] F Wright, 'Criminal Liability of Directors and Senior Managers for Deaths at Work' [2007] CLR 949, 951. Companies Act 2006, s 174.
[130] P Almond, Corporate manslaughter and regulatory reform (Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 222.
[131] CMCHA 2007, s. 8(3)(a).
[132] J Arlen & R Kraakman, 'Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes' [1997] 72 NYULR 687, 689.
[133] R Grantham, 'The Corporate Veil: An Ingenious Device' [2013] 32 UQLJ 311, 315.
[134] C Wells, 'Corporate Criminal Liability in England and Wales: Past, Present, and Future' in M Pieth and R Ivory (eds), Corporate Criminal Liability (Springer 2011) 91, 105.
[135] CMV Clarkson, 'Kicking Corporate Bodies and Damning their souls' [1996] 59 MLR 4, 570.
[136] AW Alschuler, 'Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of Corporations' [2009] 46 ACLR 1359, 1366.
[137] JD Greenberg & EC Brotman, 'Strict Vicarious Criminal Liability for Corporations and Corporate Executives: Stretching the Boundaries of Criminalization' [2014] 51 ACLR 79, 82.
[138] J Arlen, 'Corporate criminal liability: Theory and evidence' in Research Handbook on the Economics of Criminal Law (A Harel & K Hylton eds, Edward Elgar 2012) 18-19.
[139] M Punch, 'The organisational component in corporate crime' in European Developments in Corporate Criminal Liability (J Gobert ed, Routledge 2011) 78.
[140] S Tombs & D Whyte, The Corporate Criminal: Why Corporations Must be Abolished (Routledge 2015) 89.
[141] S Eldar, 'Exploring International Criminal Law's Reluctance to Resort to Modalities of Group Responsibility: Five Challenges to International Prosecutions and their Impact on Broader Forms of Responsibility' [2013] 11 JICJ 2, 346.
[142] J Gobert, 'The Politics of Corporate Manslaughter—The British Experience' [2005] 8 FJLR 1, 12.
[143] L Jones & S Field, 'Crime–Corporate Manslaughter' [2011] 1 BLR 79, 83-84.
[144] A Castaldo & G Nizi, 'Entity Liability and Deterrence: Recent Reforms in Italy' (2007) 3 Erasmus Law and Economics Review 1, 4-5.
[145] These include bribery, terrorism, financial crimes and market abuse. Legislative Decree 231/2001, arts 5–8 and 25-septies. Cassazione penale, sezioni unite, no 38343/2014.
[146] TA Dickerson, 'The Cruise Passenger's Rights and Remedies 2014: The COSTA CONCORDIA Disaster: One Year Later, Many More Incidents Both on Board Megaships and during Risky Show Excursions' [2013] 38 TMLJ 515, 519.
[147] Cassazione penale, sezione IV, no 35585/2017 (Schettino).
[148] J Gobert & E Mugnai, 'Coping with Corporate Criminality: Some Lessons from Italy' [2002] 1 CLR 619, 621.
[149] J Gobert, 'Corporate criminality: Four models of fault' [1994] 14 LS 393, 399.
[150] Decree 231/2001, Article 5, paragraph 1(a)
[151] Decree 231/2001, Article 5, paragraph 1(b).
[152] S Maffei & IM Betsos, 'Crime and Criminal Policy in Italy Tradition and Modernity in a Troubled Country' [2007] 4 EJC 4, 477.
[153] A Castaldo & G Nizi, 'Entity Liability and Deterrence: Recent Reforms in Italy' (2007) 3 Erasmus Law and Economics Review 1, 6.
[154] L Snider, 'Corporate Economic Crimes' in J Minkes and L Minkes (eds), Corporate and White-collar Crime (Sage 2008) 40-41.
[155] C Wells, 'Corporate Criminal Liability in England and Wales: Past, Present, and Future' in M Pieth and R Ivory (eds), Corporate Criminal Liability (Springer 2011) 91.
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