Why was it introduced (political/sociological context)?
All parties to a crime are accomplices, and the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 was passed by Parliament to consolidate the various provisions contained within English Criminal Law relating to accomplices. The pre-existing provisions were transposed into a single Act with little or no changes to their phraseology, because the principal aim of the Act was to simplify the law and consolidate the previous statutory framework into one Act. Section 8 applies to indictable offences, including offences triable either way. The Act applies in England and Wales and Northern Ireland, but not Scotland. The following account concerns England and Wales; section 44 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 makes corresponding provision for summary offences. The chief thrust of the Act is that an accomplice to an indictable offence may be tried and punished as if he had committed the offence himself. This does not require an identical sentence for every participant; individual culpability remains relevant. The theory underpinning imposing liability upon accomplices derives from the notion that accomplices should bear responsibility for their participation in criminal enterprises, even though the actus reus of the offence was conducted by another. The law on accessorial liability is viewed as necessary to protect the public, and effectively punish offences committed in groups where there may otherwise be evidential difficulties in establishing precisely who conducted the actus reus.
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What was the aim of the Act (legal context)?
In England and Wales, sections 1 to 7 and 9 of the Act were repealed by the Criminal Law Act 1967 and section 11 was repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act 1892. The principal provision of the Act and the one which is still in force is to be found in s8 which provides that a defendant who aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission of an indictable offence is liable to be tried, indicted and punished as a principal offender. The previous law relating to accessorial liability had been found in the so-called Peel’s Acts which consolidated parts of the criminal statute law. The idea that all parties to a crime should face punishment and that an accessory’s liability for the commission of the offence depends upon the actions of the principal did not amount to a change in the law, but the Act did amount to a consolidation of the previous statutes and a definitive clarification of the liability of all parties to criminal offences.
What main changes did it make to the law (key points)?
If a defendant is charged as an accessory the actus reus of the offence can be any one of the four elements contained within s8, namely, he must have aided, abetted, counselled or procured the substantive offence. In A-G’s Reference (No.1 of 1975) [1975] QB 773, each of the four elements was given a different meaning, and the court took the view that the individual words should be given their ordinary meaning.
Aiding involves giving help, support or assistance to the principal to commit the offence either prior to or at the time of its commission, and the aiding need not necessarily take place at the scene where the crime took place. Abetting refers to the accessory who incites, instigates or encourages the principal to commit the substantive offence; this need not be carried out at the scene of the crime. Counselling involves encouraging the commission of the principal offence, and this can include advising the principal regarding the commission of the crime or providing information which encourages its commission. Supplying equipment to assist the commission of the crime is an example of aiding. The accessory who counsels need not be present at the scene of the crime. Procuring means to set out to produce a particular state of affairs, and to take steps to endeavour to produce that state of affairs. There must be a causal link between the procurement and the actions of the principal, and the principal need not be aware of the procurer’s acts provided there is such a causal link. Unlike procuring, assistance or encouragement need not be shown to have caused the principal to commit the offence. Mere presence or association is not enough by itself, although presence intended to support the principal may amount to encouragement.
The mens rea of an accessory requires that he had an intention to aid, abet, counsel or procure, and he must have sufficient knowledge of the circumstances of the substantive offence. For assistance or encouragement, it is not necessary to prove the accessory wanted the substantive offence to be committed. He may merely be indifferent to the commission of the crime and still possess the requisite mens rea for liability as an accessory. The intention that must be shown is an intention to assist or encourage the principal in committing the crime, not merely foresight that assistance or the crime might result. Procuring requires an intention to bring about the commission of the offence.
In addition, the accessory must have sufficient knowledge of the essential circumstances constituting the criminal offence in question. The accessory need not actually know the offence has been committed. He must have knowledge of the factual elements constituting the actus reus of the offence, and, where the offence requires a particular intent, he must intend to assist or encourage the principal to act with that intent. The level of knowledge required need not be as to the precise minute details of the intended offence, but he must intentionally assist or encourage the type of offence that was intended and later committed. He, therefore, will have the requisite mens rea where he contemplates the commission of one or more of a selection of offences, and he intentionally lends assistance to the principal offender, who goes on to commit any one or more of these offences.
In R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8, the Supreme Court held that the law had taken a “wrong turn” in Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen [1985] AC 168, followed in R v Powell; R v English [1999] AC 1. Foresight that the principal might commit an offence is evidence from which intention may be inferred, but it is not a substitute for intention. This does not abolish the distinction between intending to assist an offence and positively desiring its commission.
This is particularly significant for “joint enterprise” cases where D1 and D2 embark on crime A, and D1 commits crime B. Pre-Jogee, D2 could be liable for crime B if D2 merely foresaw that D1 might commit it. Post-Jogee, D2 must have intended to assist or encourage crime B. That intention may be conditional: D2 may intend to assist crime B if the occasion arises, even while hoping it will not. An agreement is not essential to secondary liability, but an agreed plan can be evidence of assistance, encouragement and intention.
An accessory may escape liability by effectively withdrawing before the offence is committed. What withdrawal requires depends on the nature of the participation and the circumstances; merely changing one’s mind is not necessarily enough. Liability also does not arise where earlier assistance or encouragement has become too remote to be connected with the principal’s offence: R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8, paragraph 12.
Sections 44-46 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 created separate inchoate offences of encouraging or assisting crime. These are distinct from accessory liability under the 1861 Act and can apply even where the principal offence is not committed. Section 44 requires intention to encourage or assist; sections 45 and 46 require the specified beliefs that an offence, or one or more of a number of offences, will be committed and that the defendant’s act will encourage or assist it. The further requirements in section 47 and applicable statutory defences must also be considered. Section 8 of the 1861 Act remains in force.
Last updated: 11 November 2026