The Computer Misuse Act (1990) was introduced to help deal with the problems caused by the misuse of computers and communication systems, especially that of ‘hacking’ and ‘unauthorised access.’ This essay will give an insight into the workings of the Act. It will introduce the concept of ‘computer misuse’ and the work by the Law Commission of England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission to categorise it. This essay will identify the reasons behind the Act’s introduction and shed light on the introduction of the Act in dealing with misuse and hacking. I will identify with the use of cases, the protections covered in the Act and evaluate whether or not it has been an effective deterrent to hackers.
Law Teacher writing support
Writing a law essay?
We choose a writer who is an expert in your area of law and qualified to at least the academic level you select. Most of our writers hold a master’s degree or PhD, have teaching experience, or both.
Send us your question and, if you wish, any marking criteria. We’ll write an essay to your instructions.
The most significant area when discussing the Computer Misuse Act is how to define ‘computer misuse’. Computers can be described as tools, and like any other tools, can be used by people with the intent of carrying out illegal activity or causing damage. There are a variety of ways in which computers can be used for crime. These crimes include piracy, fraud, forgery, and damaging or modifying computerised systems. Prior to the Act, criminal damage to computer equipment was illustrated by Cox v Riley [1986] 83 Cr App R 54, where erasing a program impaired the usefulness of the circuit card on which it was stored. The current position in England and Wales is qualified by section 10(5) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971: modifying computer contents is not damage to the computer or storage medium unless its physical condition is impaired. Computers and the Internet are a very large and complex area, however they function on a narrow set of technical principles. This provides an amount of ‘flexibility’, however it is difficult to legislate certain types of activity without affecting others, and to categorise the misuse of any one of them.
The English Law Commission, combined with the extensive work done by the Scottish Law Commission, proposed new criminal offences for simple unauthorised access, and also for the unauthorised modification of computer material. They proposed a new two-tier structure of access offences – ‘hacking’ and ‘hacking in pursuit of a further serious crime’ – alongside an offence dealing with unauthorised alteration or erasure of data. The Law Commission concluded that unauthorised access had become sufficiently widespread to be a matter of significant concern to computer users. This decision was based on the escalating losses and costs incurred by computer communications owners whose systems had been breached.
A number of significant problems remained after the categorisation of computer misuses by the Scottish and English Law Commissions. Most important of all was that there was no Parliamentary legislation in place which could cover all the offences made. This became clear with the case of R v Gold and Schifreen [1988] AC 1063, which became the driving-force behind the passing of The Computer Misuse Act. The defendants were convicted under the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act (1981), but their convictions were quashed: their use of unauthorised passwords to access the Prestel system did not amount to making a false instrument within that Act. At the time, England and Wales had no general offence of obtaining unauthorised access to a computer, although associated conduct could constitute other offences. It became increasingly clear after R v Gold and Schifreen that hacking should be against the Law and that laws should be drawn up to effectively prosecute computer crime offenders. Legislation was required to secure computer material against unauthorised access and this would become known as the Computer Misuse Act.
In the period prior to the passing of the Computer Misuse Act in 1990, there was confusion over its jurisdiction, since it is quite possible for the offender to be in one country, the relevant computer in another and the victim in a third. For example, when a person uses a computer in one country connected by a network to a computer in another in order to commit a crime, it is hard to decide in which country this person is to be tried. The Court of Appeal in 1985 indicated that where a person sent a message from London to divert funds from New York to his account in Geneva, the theft, had the attempt succeeded, would have taken place in New York and so English courts would not have had jurisdiction to try that theft. The Computer Misuse Act introduced specific jurisdictional rules for its own offences, rather than a general rule covering every crime involving a computer. Sections 4–8 allow prosecution in specified circumstances where conduct occurs abroad, including where the accused or the relevant computer is in the home jurisdiction. The 2015 amendments also cover specified offences committed abroad by UK nationals where the conduct is criminal in that country, and section 3ZA cases where serious damage, or a significant risk of it, occurs in the home jurisdiction. However this would require mutual co-operation between the countries involved to effectively enforce the Law.
The Computer Misuse Act originally introduced three new criminal offences and applies across the United Kingdom. The first offence which is covered in section 1 of the Act is the ‘unauthorised access to computer material.’ No damage need be done, but the prosecution must prove that the defendant caused a computer to perform a function intending to secure unauthorised access to a program or data, knowing that the intended access was unauthorised. In Scotland, section 1 also expressly covers intending to enable such access. Under section 17(5), access is unauthorised where the person is neither entitled to control access of that kind nor has the consent of someone who is, subject to section 10’s savings for conduct authorised or required by law. The case of Ellis v DPP [2001] EWHC 362 (Admin) is a significant example of the breaching of conditions in section 1 of the Act. The second offence under the Act is ‘unauthorised access with intent to commit or facilitate commission of further offences.’ The further offence must be one carrying a sentence fixed by law or a maximum prison term of at least five years; it need not actually be committed, or even be possible. The case of R v Delamare [2003] EWCA Crim 424 is an example of an offence in breach of section 2 of the Act. The third offence was originally ‘unauthorised modification of computer material’. This could take the form of introducing viruses, corruption of programs or data, and the deliberate deletion of files. In R v Vallor [2003] EWCA Crim 2288, the defendant received two years’ imprisonment on each of three offences, running concurrently, and his sentence appeal was dismissed. Section 3 has since been replaced by the broader impairment offence described below.
The Computer Misuse Act (1990) contains a number of significant flaws and has failed to provide a complete answer to the problems of unauthorized access to computers. The trial of R v Bedworth in 1993 highlights the problem of proving criminal intent: the defence argued that his addiction to computers prevented him from forming the necessary intent. The charges included conspiracy relating to unauthorised access and unauthorised modification, under sections 1 and 3, and the jury acquitted him. The acquittal did not create a general legal defence of computer addiction or remove the statutory requirements of intent and knowledge. Another problem which arose with the use of the Computer Misuse Act is whether or not judges lack the specialist knowledge of computers to apply the law, and whether they tend to make inappropriate interpretations. This problem arose during the case of R v Cropp [1991] where the judge acquitted the defendant as he mistakenly felt that an offence could only be committed if one computer was used to obtain material stored on another computer. In Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 1991) [1993] QB 94, the Court of Appeal rejected that interpretation: unauthorised access to data on the same computer is sufficient.
The problems and limitations with the Computer Misuse Act do raise some questions regarding its effectiveness in the prosecution of computer crime offenders, and also its influence on the deterrence of ‘hackers’. The Act covers certain offences specific to the penetration, alteration and damage to computer systems. The Act does not define all ‘computer crime’ simply as ‘unauthorised access to computer material’; that is the subject of section 1, while other sections address further offences and impairment. The Law itself was drafted in the hope of ensuring enough scope so that the Law would not date with the continual development of technology. However this has meant that the Act can sometimes be a rather ‘blunt instrument’ when policing computer crime. In the case of DPP v Bignell [1998] 1 Cr App R 1, two officers asked a police computer operator to obtain information for their private purposes. They were prosecuted, but their convictions were overturned. The distinction between the authorised operator’s access and the officers’ improper purpose was central; the decision does not give employees general permission to access data outside their authority.
I conclude that the ever increasing reliance on computers in today’s society will more likely serve both as a target and a tool for those whose motives might be regarded as criminal. There are a number of problems with the Computer Misuse Act 1990 and it has by no means provided a complete answer to problems of unauthorised access to computers whether by the spread of viruses or by hackers. The Government must develop improved methods when tracking hackers, as they sometimes do not use their own IP address. However, in spite of these problems, I am of the opinion that the Computer Misuse Act has provided legal protection for people’s work and information against hackers. I think that public awareness of the Act is the most important factor in why the Act is useful as a deterrent and a safeguard against hacking. Awareness of the Act can be helped by its remaining in the media, such as the news, allowing it to be a part of the public’s consciousness.
2026 update
The Computer Misuse Act 1990 has been substantially amended since this summary was written. Students should be aware of the following changes:
Police and Justice Act 2006: Section 3A added offences of making, adapting, supplying, offering to supply, or obtaining articles for use in computer misuse offences. They require the specified intention that an article be used in an offence under section 1, 3 or 3ZA, or, for supply or an offer to supply, belief that it is likely to be so used. Obtaining an article with a view to its supply for criminal use is also covered. The provisions can apply to malware and hacking tools, but possession of legitimate security tools is not, by itself, an offence under section 3A. The amendments took effect on 1 October 2007 in Scotland and 1 October 2008 elsewhere in the UK; the 2015 amendments extended the obtaining offence to articles intended for the offender’s own use.
Section 3 amended: The offence of “unauthorised modification of computer material” was replaced by “unauthorised acts with intent to impair, or with recklessness as to impairing, operation of computer, etc.” The defendant must know that the act is unauthorised and intend, or be reckless as to, impairment of a computer’s operation, obstruction of access to programs or data, or impairment of a program’s operation or data reliability. Temporary impairment is sufficient, so denial-of-service attacks can be covered. In Scotland, section 3 also expressly covers intending, or being reckless as to, enabling those results.
Serious Crime Act 2015:
New section 3ZA: Introduced on 3 May 2015, this offence covers a knowingly unauthorised act causing, or creating a significant risk of, serious damage to human welfare, the environment, the economy, or national security, with intent or recklessness as to serious damage. The usual maximum on indictment is 14 years’ imprisonment. Life imprisonment is available where the serious damage or significant risk concerns loss of life, human illness or injury, or national security.
Increased maximum sentences: The Police and Justice Act 2006 increased the section 1 maximum from six months to two years and the section 3 maximum from five to ten years, with the commencement dates noted above. The current maxima on indictment are two years under sections 1 and 3A, five years under section 2, and ten years under section 3; section 3ZA has the separate maxima described above. Fines may also be imposed.
The sentence in R v Vallor [2003] was imposed under the original section 3, whose maximum was five years. The significantly increased maximum sentences reflect Parliament’s view that computer misuse offences are now treated more seriously.
DPP v Bignell: In R v Bow Street Magistrates’ Court, ex parte Government of the United States of America (Allison) [2000] 2 AC 216, decided in 1999, the House of Lords confirmed that an employee authorised to access some data may commit an offence by intentionally accessing other data which the employee knows is outside that authority. The result in Bignell could be justified by the authorised operator’s role, but its broader reasoning did not restrict the Act to outside hackers.
The Act remains in force but has been significantly strengthened since 1990. As at November 2026, proposed reforms, including a statutory defence for responsible cyber-security research, remain under consideration; there is no general public-interest or ethical-hacking defence in the Act. Authorisation and the statutory elements of each offence remain essential.
Bibliography
- http://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/01/21/welsh_virus_writer_vallor_jailed/
- http://www.dcs.warwick.ac.uk/~rws/CS122/lecture6.html
Last updated: 11 November 2026