Attorney-General v Antrobus [1905] 2 Ch 188, ChD
The ability of the public to acquire a public right of way over land acquired through long user
Facts
The case concerned Stonehenge and the public’s right of access to it. The site’s owner had taken steps to protect the monument by enclosing it with fencing. While well intentioned, this had the effect of preventing the public from accessing the monument. The Attorney-General started the action in order to compel the owner to remove the fencing around Stonehenge, with the aim of allowing the public to access site once again.
Issue
The issue in the case was whether the public had acquired a long user in the land leading up to the monument, which could be a public right of way, through the years of accessing the monument before it was fenced off.
Decision/Outcome
The court held that there was no public right of access in this case. It was not possible in law to establish such a right of access through historic user and in this case too, the public’s historic user did not contribute to establish such a right. The public’s habit of visiting a monument cannot, without more, establish a public right of way over the route to that monument.
“Now the cases establish that a public path is prima facie a road that leads from one public place to another public place-or as Holmes LJ suggests in the Giant’s Causeway case there cannot prima facie be a right for the public to go to a place where the public have no right to be. But the existence of a terminus ad quem is not essential to the legal existence of a public road. -But in no case has mere user by the public without more been held sufficient” (Farewel J)
Updated 21 March 2026
This article accurately summarises the decision in Attorney-General v Antrobus [1905] 2 Ch 188. The legal principle remains good law: mere public user of land, without more, is insufficient to establish a public right of way, and there is no freestanding public right of access to open land or historic monuments at common law. Readers should note, however, that the statutory position regarding public access to land has developed significantly since 1905. The Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 (CRoW Act) introduced a statutory right of access on foot to mapped ‘open country’ (mountain, moor, heath, and down) and registered common land in England and Wales. This right does not depend on establishing a public right of way and operates independently of the common law principles discussed in this case. Stonehenge itself is managed by English Heritage and public access is now regulated separately. The common law principles in Antrobus remain relevant to public rights of way disputes, but students should be aware that statutory access rights now provide a distinct and important parallel framework.
