Alexander v Home Office [1988] 1 WLR 968; [1988] ICR 685; [1988] 2 All ER 118
Court of Appeal, 12 February 1988
The Court of Appeal increased a prisoner’s award for injury to feelings arising from racial discrimination from £50 to £500. Compensation was not confined to financial loss. It could also reflect the humiliation and distress caused by discrimination, including additional injury caused by the manner in which the defendant acted.
Facts
John Alexander, a Black prisoner, complained of racial discrimination in the allocation of prison work. His initial assessment at Wandsworth and induction report at Parkhurst contained racially stereotyped comments. The trial judge found that these reports had led to his being treated as a racial stereotype rather than as an individual at Parkhurst.
Law Teacher writing support
Writing a law essay?
We choose a writer who is an expert in your area of law and qualified to at least the academic level you select. Most of our writers hold a master’s degree or PhD, have teaching experience, or both.
Send us your question and, if you wish, any marking criteria. We’ll write an essay to your instructions.
Alexander worked in the prison’s press shop and repeatedly applied for a kitchen job. The judge did not find that the first refusal was discriminatory: the usual minimum period in the press shop was an important factor in that decision. Further applications were refused after Alexander had complained to the Commission for Racial Equality.
He brought proceedings under the Race Relations Act 1976 in the county court. The judge awarded £50 for injury to feelings. Alexander appealed, arguing that the sum was inadequate. The trial judge’s specific factual findings were not challenged on appeal.
Issue
How should damages for injury to feelings caused by unlawful racial discrimination be assessed, and was the £50 award sufficient?
Section 57(4) of the 1976 Act expressly allowed compensation for injury to feelings, whether or not compensation was awarded under another head. The difficulty of putting a monetary value on distress did not remove the right to compensation.
Decision and reasoning
The appeal was allowed and the injury-to-feelings award increased to £500.
Compensation extended beyond financial loss
May LJ explained that the objective was to compensate the claimant for the consequences of discrimination. A financial loss could often be calculated directly. Humiliation and injured feelings required a judgment about an appropriate monetary award, informed by the judge’s experience and the assistance of the assessors.
Awards should not be so small that they trivialised discrimination or undermined respect for the legislation. Equally, they should remain restrained: excessive awards could also damage the policy the Act sought to uphold. The court therefore had to assess meaningful compensation rather than give a merely nominal sum or impose a punishment.
Aggravated damages remained compensatory
May LJ recognised that compensatory damages could include an aggravated element where the manner of discrimination heightened the claimant’s injury. He gave examples of malicious, insulting, oppressive or high-handed conduct. This concerned additional compensation for injured feelings and was distinct from exemplary damages imposed to punish a defendant.
Significance
The case distinguishes compensation for measurable financial loss from compensation for injury to feelings. The latter was a substantive part of the remedy for unlawful racial discrimination under the 1976 Act, even though it could not be calculated from a wage shortfall or other specific financial loss.
Source: Court of Appeal judgment.
