Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd v Panatown Ltd [2000] UKHL 43
The House of Lords allowed McAlpine’s appeal by three votes to two. Panatown could not recover substantial damages in the circumstances because the landowner, UIPL, had its own direct contractual remedy under a duty of care deed.
The building contract and the appeal
On 2 November 1989 Panatown Ltd, a member of the Unex group, contracted with Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd to design and construct an office building and car park at Hills Road, Cambridge. The modified JCT contract sum was a little under £10.5 million. The site belonged throughout to Unex Investment Properties Ltd (UIPL), another group company. Panatown was chosen as employer, rather than UIPL, in order to avoid VAT. Group funds of £7.5 million were advanced to Panatown, which paid McAlpine about £7.4 million.
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The arrangements included a duty of care deed between McAlpine and UIPL. It gave UIPL a direct claim for any failure by McAlpine to exercise reasonable skill, care and attention in matters within the building contract, and it was assignable to successors in title with consent that was not to be unreasonably withheld. Although the deed described Panatown as acting on behalf of the building owner, it was common ground that Panatown contracted as principal, not as agent. The consultants gave similar deeds.
Serious defects later emerged. Panatown began arbitration in 1992, claiming damages for defective work and delay. It alleged that the defects were so serious that demolition and rebuilding might be necessary; the claim ran to many millions of pounds. Breach had not been decided, but the appeal proceeded on the assumption, favourable to Panatown, that McAlpine was in breach. McAlpine raised a preliminary issue: because Panatown had never owned the site, it had suffered no loss and could recover only nominal damages.
The arbitrator held that substantial damages were available. An Official Referee answered the legal questions against Panatown. The Court of Appeal restored the arbitrator’s conclusion, and McAlpine appealed. The issue was whether the employer under a building contract may recover substantial damages for loss falling on the landowner.
The general rule and the two suggested routes
The majority accepted the general rule, stated by Lord Diplock in The Albazero, that apart from nominal damages a claimant may recover only the actual loss he has himself sustained. Panatown advanced two possible routes to substantial damages. The narrow route concerned recovery of UIPL’s loss; the broad route treated Panatown as having suffered its own loss.
The narrower route, associated with Dunlop v Lambert and applied to building contracts in St Martins Property Corporation Ltd v Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd, allows the contracting party to recover a third party’s loss and requires him to account for it. It is justified by the need to stop a substantial claim falling into a legal black hole where the person who suffers the loss cannot sue. It is excluded where that person already has a direct remedy.
The broader route, proposed by Lord Griffiths in St Martins, treats the employer as suffering his own loss because he did not receive the performance for which he contracted. The suggested measure is the cost of obtaining that performance. Ownership of the land is irrelevant, and the employer recovers for himself rather than for the landowner.
Why the duty of care deed excluded both routes
Lord Clyde, Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle and Lord Browne-Wilkinson held that the duty of care deed defeated both arguments.
On the narrow ground, the deed was an integral part of the package and gave UIPL a direct cause of action. Lord Clyde held that this express remedy excluded the exception even though a strict obligation under the building contract and a duty of reasonable care under the deed did not coincide exactly. Lord Jauncey held that the exception is displaced once the third party can recover substantial damages, without those damages having to be identical to the employer’s remedies. Lord Browne-Wilkinson stressed that the principle exists only to provide a remedy where otherwise none would be available; UIPL’s own claim removed that rationale.
The majority did not need a final ruling on the broader ground in a case where the third party has no direct claim. Lord Browne-Wilkinson assumed that it might be sound in such a case, but held that Panatown’s performance interest was not damaged here: the scheme deliberately gave UIPL and its successors a remedy against McAlpine. Lord Jauncey considered that Lord Griffiths’ reasoning required the employer to have incurred, or to intend to incur, the cost of remedial work. Panatown had suffered no such financial loss. Lord Clyde preferred in principle a solution under which the contracting party recovers the relevant loss and accounts for it, but held that the group’s deliberate decision to give the company at risk its own entitlement excluded any exception.
The dissenting views
Lord Goff of Chieveley and Lord Millett dissented. They would have treated Panatown’s defeated expectation as its own recoverable loss, including the cost of cure and damages for delay. They regarded the duty of care deed, limited to negligence and principally useful to later owners, as not removing Panatown’s rights under the building contract. They considered that payment of damages to one claimant would prevent double recovery; Lord Millett added that UIPL in fact supported Panatown’s claim.
Outcome and scope
Panatown’s claim to substantial damages failed on the preliminary issue. The appeal proceeded on an assumption of breach and did not decide whether McAlpine had committed the alleged breaches or determine a final damages award. Nor did the decision establish that an employer can never recover substantial damages for work on someone else’s land. The separate remedy deliberately provided to UIPL was decisive here; the House did not finally settle the broader ground for cases without such a remedy.