Legal Case Summary
Attorney-General v Jonathan Cape Ltd and Others [1976] QB 752
Joint responsibility; public policy; publication
Facts
Richard Crossman, a Cabinet minister, kept a diary of Cabinet discussions and events with the intention of publishing the contents in a book. After the minister’s death, volume one of the book (Diaries of a Cabinet Minister) was sent for approval to and rejected by the Secretary of the Cabinet. The literary executors undertook not to publish the book without prior notice to the Treasury Solicitor. Extracts were later published in the Sunday Times without the Cabinet Secretary’s consent. The Attorney-General applied for an injunction against the publishers.
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Issues
The reason for the Attorney-General’s request for an injunction was that publishing the book would be contrary to the public interest. More specifically, the doctrine of collective responsibility required details of Cabinet discussions and potential differences to be kept confidential.
Decision / Outcome
The Court held that it had the power to stop the publication of information that was in breach of confidence based on public policy grounds. The preservation of the doctrine of collective responsibility within the Cabinet was held to be in the public interest. Agreeing with the Attorney-General, the Court found that the revelation of individual Ministers’ views and opinions disclosed within the framework of confidential Cabinet meetings could undermine the doctrine if disclosed prematurely. In this particular case, however, the events were about 10 years old and the Attorney-General had not shown that publication of volume one would inhibit free and open Cabinet discussion. Consequently, the injunction was refused. The court did not impose a fixed period after which all Cabinet information could be published.
The legal basis was the duty of confidence, rather than direct enforcement of a constitutional convention. The Attorney-General had to establish a breach of confidence, a public interest requiring restraint, and no stronger competing public interest. Restrictions could extend no further than the public need required. The court left open a further application concerning material outside volume one.
Report: [1976] QB 752. Parallel citations: [1975] 3 All ER 484; [1975] 3 WLR 606.