Legal Case Summary
Bourhill v Young [1943] AC 92
NEGLIGENCE – PSYCHIATRIC DAMAGE – DUTY OF CARE – PROXIMITY – REMOTENESS
Facts
Mr Young had been negligently riding his motorcycle and was responsible for a collision with car in which he himself suffered fatal injuries. At the time of the crash, Mrs Bourhill (C) was in the process of leaving a tram about 50 feet away. C heard the crash and, after Mr Young’s body had been removed from the scene, she approached and witnessed the immediate aftermath. C was 8 months pregnant at the time of the incident and later gave birth to a stillborn child. C subsequently brought an action against Mr Young’s estate, claiming she had suffered nervous shock, stress and sustained loss due to the negligence of D.
Issue
The principal issue on appeal to the House of Lords was whether D owed a duty of care to C. In order for such a duty to be found it had to be said that that C was both sufficiently proximate to the incident itself and, if so, that D ought reasonably to have foreseen that, in driving negligently, he might cause psychiatric damage to a person hearing the crash from C’s position.
Decision/Outcome
D was not liable for any psychiatric harm that C might have suffered as a result of the accident. It was not foreseeable that C would suffer psychiatric harm as a result of D negligently causing a loud traffic accident, nor was C sufficiently proximate to the scene of the crash itself. D, therefore, could owe no duty of care to C.
Updated 19 March 2026
This case summary remains legally accurate. Bourhill v Young [1943] AC 92 is a foundational House of Lords authority on duty of care, proximity, and psychiatric damage (nervous shock) in negligence, and its legal status has not changed. The principles it established — that a claimant must be sufficiently proximate to the incident and that psychiatric harm must be reasonably foreseeable to a person of ordinary fortitude in the claimant’s position — continue to form part of English law.
Readers should be aware that the law on psychiatric damage has developed considerably since 1943. The leading modern authorities are Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310 and Page v Smith [1996] AC 155, which refined the distinction between primary and secondary victims. More recently, the Supreme Court in Paul v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust [2024] UKSC 1 revisited and significantly clarified the law on secondary victim claims, particularly regarding the proximity requirements laid down in Alcock. Bourhill v Young is best understood in this broader context of subsequent development rather than as a standalone statement of current law.
