Brice v Brown [1984] 1 All ER 997
NEGLIGENCE – PSYCHIATRIC DAMAGE – FORESEEABILITY OF TYPE OF DAMAGE CAUSED – PRIMARY VICTIMS
Facts
C, a woman aged 42, had suffered from a hysterical personality disorder since childhood. She was, however, able to lead a normal life with her husband and family, albeit she suffered bouts of depression, hysteria and other mental health crises. Due to D’s negligence as a driver he caused an accident in which C’s daughter suffered what appeared to be a very serious injury. This had a severely detrimental effect on P’s mental stability, leading to violent displays of temper, several attempts at suicide and, ultimately, an admission to hospital. C’s condition subsequently stabilised to agree, but C’s mental state left her in need of constant supervision. C brought an action against D for the psychiatric damage caused as a result of witnessing her daughter’s injuries.
Issues
It was contended by D that, in order to be liable in negligence for causing psychiatric harm, the extent of the damage in questionable must itself be reasonably foreseeable. As D could not have foreseen that C would be of a particularly fragile disposition, it was argued, he could not be liable in negligence.
Decision/Outcome
Finding in favour of C, Stuart-Smith J held that, provided ‘nervous shock’ (i.e. recognised psychiatric damage) was a foreseeable consequence of D’s actions, which was not in dispute, then there was no reason in principle to bar an action in negligence purely because the extent of the damage in question could not have been foreseen. The tortfeasor must take the victim as he or she is, the only question is whether psychiatric damage is itself a reasonably foreseeable consequence of D’s negligence.
Updated 19 March 2026
This case summary remains accurate. Brice v Brown [1984] 1 All ER 997 continues to be recognised as a leading authority on the application of the ‘thin skull’ (eggshell skull) rule to psychiatric damage in negligence. The principle that a defendant must take their victim as they find them, and that only the type of damage (recognised psychiatric illness) need be foreseeable rather than its extent, has been consistently affirmed in subsequent case law, including by the House of Lords in Page v Smith [1996] AC 155, which further developed the primary/secondary victim distinction. The article does not address that distinction, but this is unlikely to cause confusion given the summary’s limited scope. The legal position described remains good law as of the current date.
