CIBC Mortgages plc v Pitt [1993] UKHL 7; [1994] 1 AC 200
Actual undue influence, manifest disadvantage and a lender’s notice of wrongdoing in a joint mortgage transaction.
Facts
Mr and Mrs Pitt jointly owned their matrimonial home. Mr Pitt wanted to borrow against it to buy shares. Mrs Pitt was reluctant, but agreed after pressure from her husband which the trial judge found amounted to actual undue influence.
The mortgage application presented a different purpose to CIBC: refinancing the existing mortgage and buying a holiday home. CIBC offered a £150,000 loan to both spouses jointly, secured on their home. Mrs Pitt signed the relevant documents without reading them, did not know how much was being borrowed and received no separate advice.
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The existing mortgage was repaid from the advance. The balance was paid by a cheque in both spouses’ names into their joint account. Mr Pitt used the money to buy shares, apparently in his own name, and used those securities to support further borrowing and share purchases. Following the 1987 stock-market crash, arrears arose and CIBC sought possession of the home.
The trial judge rejected Mrs Pitt’s misrepresentation allegation but found actual undue influence. He nevertheless ordered possession because the husband had not acted as CIBC’s agent and the grounds advanced did not defeat the lender’s security. The Court of Appeal dismissed Mrs Pitt’s appeal.
Issues
Did a person who had proved actual undue influence also need to show that the transaction was manifestly disadvantageous? Separately, could Mrs Pitt set aside CIBC’s charge because of her husband’s wrongdoing, when the loan appeared to the lender to be for their joint benefit?
Decision
The House of Lords unanimously dismissed the appeal. Mrs Pitt succeeded on the legal point that manifest disadvantage was not an additional requirement where actual undue influence had been proved. However, she could not set aside the charge against CIBC. Her husband had not acted as its agent, and the lender had neither actual nor constructive notice of the undue influence. The possession order therefore stood.
Reasoning
Actual undue influence did not require a further showing of disadvantage
Lord Browne-Wilkinson distinguished proof that undue influence had actually occurred from reliance on a presumption that it had occurred. The requirement discussed in National Westminster Bank v Morgan concerned raising a presumption. The Court of Appeal had wrongly extended it to proved actual undue influence in BCCI v Aboody.
Once actual undue influence was established, the wrongdoer could not defend the transaction by arguing that its terms benefited the victim. The objection was that the victim had been deprived of a free and properly informed decision. Mrs Pitt was therefore entitled, as against her husband, to have the transaction set aside without proving a separate financial disadvantage.
Relief against the husband did not automatically defeat the lender
CIBC’s position required a further inquiry. Applying the principles in Barclays Bank v O’Brien, decided the same day, the House asked whether the husband had acted as the lender’s agent or whether the lender had actual or constructive notice of his wrongdoing.
The trial judge’s finding excluded agency, and CIBC had no actual notice. Constructive notice depended on whether the facts known to it called for further inquiry. Those facts indicated an ordinary joint loan: both spouses were borrowers, the stated purpose included a holiday home, and the balance of the advance was payable jointly.
The marriage alone did not put the lender on inquiry. The House distinguished a wife guaranteeing her husband’s debts, where an apparent lack of financial benefit to her could combine with the risk of influence to require precautions. Nothing known to CIBC indicated that this joint advance was really for the husband’s separate purposes.
The case thus separated two questions: whether the husband had wrongfully procured consent, and whether that wrongdoing affected the lender’s enforceable rights. The first was established; the second was not.