Crabb v Arun DC [1975] EWCA Civ 7
LAND LAW – ENFORCEMENT OF GRATUITOUS PROMISES – PROPRIETARY ESTOPPEL
Facts
The claimant purchased land with a limited number of access points. The defendant authority placed gates at the access points, and an informal arrangement was reached by which the claimant would be able to keep using the access points. The claimant sold part of his land, leaving him entirely reliant on one of the access points to access the remainder. The defendant replaced the gate with a fence, and refused to open the access point.
Issues
Normally for a promise to be binding, a contract must be established. Here, there was no contract because the promise was gratuitous: there was no consideration. The issue in this case was whether the promise could ever be binding in the absence of consideration.
Decision/Outcome
The Court of Appeal held that the promise was enforceable under the doctrine of ‘proprietary estoppel’. This doctrine applies where it would be inequitable for the defendant to insist on its strict legal rights to renege on the arrangement. Inequity arises where the defendant has promised that the claimant will have a proprietary interest knowing or intending that the claimant will act upon it, and where the claimant has acted upon it. The relevant promise can be made by either words or conduct.
In this case, while there was no firm assurance that the claimant could use the access point, the council’s conduct (putting up a gate and leaving it open for many years) solidified the claimant’s expectation. The council was aware that the claimant intended to sell a portion of the land and would be reliant on the access point, but did nothing to disabuse him of the belief that he had a right to it. A proprietary estoppel arose.
Updated 21 March 2026
This case summary accurately reflects the decision in Crabb v Arun District Council [1976] Ch 179 (Court of Appeal). One point to note: the neutral citation given in the article ([1975] EWCA Civ 7) refers to the date of the judgment, but the case is most commonly cited in legal literature by its law report reference of [1976] Ch 179. Students should use whichever citation their institution requires, but should be aware both refer to the same decision. The legal principles described — particularly the requirements for proprietary estoppel, including assurance, reliance, and detriment, and the relevance of conduct as well as words — remain good law. The doctrine of proprietary estoppel has been further developed in subsequent cases, most notably Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18, which confirmed and refined the requirement that an assurance must be clear enough that it was reasonable for the claimant to rely on it, and Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 and Kernott v Jones [2011] UKSC 53, which addressed overlapping issues in the domestic context. The broader framework for proprietary estoppel remedies was also considered in Jennings v Rice [2002] EWCA Civ 159, which emphasised that the court’s remedy must be proportionate to the detriment suffered and need not always satisfy the claimant’s full expectation. These later developments do not undermine the principles stated in this article, but students should be aware that the law has been elaborated considerably since 1975.
