Crawley BC v Ure [1996] 1 QB 13
Landlord and tenant; one joint tenant giving notice to quit without consulting the other
Facts
Mr and Mrs Ure were joint tenants of a council flat. Mrs Ure left and applied to the council for accommodation as a homeless person. They advised her to give notice to quit to terminate the tenancy. She did so without consulting Mr Ure. A possession order was served upon Mr Ure. Mr Ure appealed against the possession order.
Issues
Mr Ure argued that in failing to consult him, his wife had committed a breach of trust because a joint tenancy amounted to a trust for sale under s36 Law of Property Act 1925,with each tenant being both trustee and beneficiary. Under s26(3) Law of Property Act 1925 he claimed his wife was under a duty to consult him prior to giving notice. Further, he argued, the council had procured a breach of trust by advising Mrs Ure to give notice. The council argued a periodic tenancy is not a capital asset and cannot, therefore, be held on trust for sale. Even if it was a trust for sale, the trust only persists if both tenants wish it to continue. S26(3) only applies to positive acts, and the giving of notice to quit is not a positive act, but a proclamation that one tenant no longer wishes the tenancy to continue at the end of the term.
Decision/Outcome
Notice to quit given by one joint tenant without the consent of the other was effective to terminate the tenancy. Although the tenancy did amount to a trust for sale, s26(3) did not apply to the giving of notice to quit because this was not, in substance, a positive act but merely an intimation that the tenant did not wish the tenancy to continue.
Updated 21 March 2026
This case summary remains accurate as a description of the 1996 Court of Appeal decision in Crawley BC v Ure [1996] QB 13. However, readers should be aware of two significant subsequent developments.
First, the House of Lords confirmed the core principle — that one joint tenant may unilaterally serve a notice to quit without the consent of the other — in Hammersmith and Fulham LBC v Monk [1992] 1 AC 478, which predates Crawley and on which Crawley relied. That principle remains good law.
Second, and more importantly, the human rights dimension of this rule was subsequently challenged. In Harrow LBC v Qazi [2003] UKHL 43 and later cases, the courts considered whether unilateral notice to quit by one joint tenant, and resulting possession proceedings, engaged Article 8 ECHR rights. The House of Lords and subsequently the Supreme Court confirmed in Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45 that Article 8 may be raised as a defence in possession proceedings, though the proportionality threshold is high and will rarely succeed against a local authority seeking possession after a valid termination of tenancy.
The article’s references to s26(3) and s36 of the Law of Property Act 1925 should also be read in light of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 (TOLATA 1996), which abolished the trust for sale and replaced it with a trust of land. The specific s26(3) consultation argument discussed in the article would now fall to be considered under s11 TOLATA 1996. This does not alter the outcome of Crawley itself, but the statutory framework described is no longer current.
