Davies v Marshall (1861) 10 CB (NS) 697; 142 ER 627
Court of Common Pleas, 5 June 1861 — consent to building work, equitable defences and misrepresentation.
A neighbour who induces another person to spend money on building work in reliance on his consent may be prevented from later objecting to that work. But consent obtained through material misrepresentation can answer that defence. Davies v Marshall decided the legal sufficiency of those competing arguments as pleaded, rather than resolving the disputed evidence at a trial.
The neighbouring properties
Davies alleged that Marshall’s demolition and rebuilding of adjoining premises interfered with his house in three ways. New walls and buildings obstructed light and air to his windows; their height prevented smoke and vapour from escaping freely through his chimneys; and removal of the old buildings deprived his house of support. He claimed resulting damage and expense.
Law Teacher writing support
Writing a law essay?
We choose a writer who is an expert in your area of law and qualified to at least the academic level you select. Most of our writers hold a master’s degree or PhD, have teaching experience, or both.
Send us your question and, if you wish, any marking criteria. We’ll write an essay to your instructions.
Marshall pleaded that she had carried out the works and spent substantial sums with Davies’s knowledge, acquiescence and consent, relying on that consent. She put this forward as an equitable defence to his claims.
Davies replied that he had consented because Marshall and her agents had falsely represented that the work would not produce the injuries he now complained of.
What was the Court deciding?
Each side challenged the legal adequacy of the other’s pleading by a procedure called a demurrer. Davies challenged Marshall’s defence; Marshall challenged his reply, then known as a replication. The Court considered whether the facts alleged, if established, supplied a legally sufficient defence or answer.
By agreement, Marshall’s plea was considered as an equitable defence, rather than being relied upon as a common-law plea of leave and licence. The question was whether it disclosed circumstances in which a court of equity would restrain Davies from pursuing his legal rights.
Why the defence was legally sufficient
Erle CJ read the defence as alleging that Davies knew of and consented to the alterations, and that the interference complained of followed naturally from them. It also alleged that Marshall spent money on the faith of that consent.
On those allegations, Davies had induced Marshall to believe that she could carry out the work. He could not then withdraw his consent and sue over its consequences. The Court therefore upheld the legal sufficiency of the equitable defence.
Willes J similarly considered that the plea alleged either actual consent or conduct from which a reasonable person could infer consent. Whether Marshall could prove it was a separate matter: he expressly anticipated that the substantial dispute would concern the evidence.
Why Davies’s reply was also sufficient
The reply alleged that Davies had relied on assurances that the harmful consequences would not occur. Erle CJ explained that this effectively denied that Davies knowingly sanctioned interference with his rights. If his allegation was true, his acquiescence had not misled Marshall into believing she could proceed without objection in the circumstances alleged.
Willes J applied the equitable principle that a person who obtains consent through a material misrepresentation cannot insist upon that consent. The reply was therefore a legally sufficient answer to the defence.
Outcome
The Court gave judgment for Marshall on the demurrer to her defence and judgment for Davies on the demurrer to his reply. It did not simply reject the defence or make a final finding that the disputed representations had been proved.
The case illustrates both sides of equitable acquiescence: expenditure induced by consent can prevent a later objection, while the circumstances in which that consent was obtained may defeat reliance on it.
Source: Original report, (1861) 10 CB (NS) 697–712, reproduced at 142 ER 627–633.