OBTAINING PROPERTY BY DECEPTION
These cases concern deception, causation and dishonesty under the Theft Act 1968, as applied at the time of each decision.
DPP v Ray [1973] UKHL 3; [1974] AC 370
The defendant had ordered a meal in a restaurant and had consumed it with an honest state of mind. He then decided with his companions not to pay for the meal and continued to behave as an ordinary customer. The defendant waited until the dining area was clear of waiters before running out. The defendant was convicted under s16(1), read with s16(2)(a), of the Theft Act 1968 as it then stood. The House of Lords, by a majority of three to two, allowed the prosecutor’s appeal and restored the conviction. It held that the defendant had practised a deception by continuing to behave as an ordinary customer after deciding not to pay. His remaining in this position created the implied and continuing representation that he was an honest customer who intended to pay the bill, thus keeping the waiter off guard so that he left the dining area unattended, giving him the opportunity to run off without paying.
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R v Collis-Smith [1971] EWCA Crim 1; [1971] Crim LR 716
The attendant had put petrol into the defendant’s car, and he then falsely told her that his employer would be paying for the petrol. The defendant’s appeal against conviction under s15 was successful in the Court of Appeal on the basis that the alleged oral deception did not arise until after he had obtained possession and control of the petrol. The court expressly left ownership aside. It confined its decision to the charge and evidence before it, noting that a differently framed implied-representation charge or a charge under s16 could raise a different question.
R v Coady [1996] Crim LR 518
The Court of Appeal quashed the defendant’s conviction for obtaining petrol at a self-service station by the deception that he was authorised to charge the petrol to the account of his former employer, which he was no longer entitled to do. The fatal flaw in the prosecution case was that it was clear that the defendant had informed the cashier that the petrol should be charged to the account only after he had got the petrol. The court was sceptical about the wider representation that when the defendant drove onto the forecourt he represented an intention to pay which he did not in fact possess. This was alleged to be inconsistent with the indistinguishable case of Collis-Smith (1971).
Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis v Charles [1977] AC 177
The defendant had drawn cheques on his account, supported by his cheque guarantee card, in order to buy gaming chips at a casino. The manager of the casino had given evidence that questions of creditworthiness did not arise where a valid cheque guarantee card was proffered. Nevertheless, the House of Lords affirmed the defendant’s conviction for obtaining a pecuniary advantage by deception under s16(1), read with s16(2)(b). The House of Lords accepted that use of a cheque and a cheque card represented actual authority from the bank to bind it to honour the cheque, and that it was to be assumed that the casino would not have accepted the cheques as supported by the guarantee card, had the truth been known, ie that the defendant had exceeded his authorised limit.
R v Lambie [1981] UKHL 4; [1982] AC 449
The defendant used her own credit card knowing that authorisation had been withdrawn. She was convicted of obtaining a pecuniary advantage by deception in the form of evading a debt, under s16(1) read with s16(2)(a). The House of Lords allowed the prosecutor’s appeal and restored the conviction that the Court of Appeal had quashed. Use of the card represented actual authority from the bank to make the transaction. If the shop assistant had known that the defendant lacked authority, she would not have accepted the card. Reliance on that representation could be inferred from the evidence as a whole; the cashier did not have to recall the transaction personally. The defendant could, of course, call the retailer to give evidence that she was quite happy to accept the credit card in full knowledge of the defendant’s lack of authority, but the retailer is unlikely to want to run the risk of becoming an accomplice to the defendant’s fraud on the credit card company.
R v Goodwin [1996] Crim LR 262
The Court of Appeal held that the defendant had rightly been convicted of going equipped for theft (contrary to s25 Theft Act 1968) when the evidence showed that he had used Kenyan 5 shilling coins (coins of the same size, shape and weight as 50p coins but of about half the value) to play gaming machines in an amusement arcade. The defendant knew full well that he was trying to obtain the prize coins in a way which he knew would not have the machine owner’s consent.
R v Ghosh [1982] EWCA Crim 2; [1982] QB 1053
The defendant was a surgeon acting as a locum consultant at a hospital. The charges concerned false claims for operations he had not carried out or for fees not due. He maintained that the sums were legitimate consultation fees or balances properly payable, and denied deception and dishonesty. He was convicted on four counts, including attempts under ss20(2) and 15(1) and completed offences under s15(1). His appeal against conviction was dismissed: once the jury rejected his factual explanations, dishonesty was inevitable on either of the tests considered.
The Court of Appeal held that the jury first had to decide whether the conduct was dishonest according to the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people. If it was, the jury then had to consider whether the defendant himself must have realised that what he was doing was dishonest by those standards.
OBTAINING A PECUNIARY ADVANTAGE BY DECEPTION
R v Clarke [1996] Crim LR 824
The defendant, a private investigator, allegedly told V (a group of people who had been defrauded) that he was a former fraud squad officer and a court bailiff. In consequence, he was engaged to trace funds belonging to them. Initially, D maintained not only that he did not make the representations but also that he was not dishonest since he believed he could do the work, intended to do so, and eventually did so. He changed his plea to guilty after the judge indicated that he considered the offence committed if D made the representations, they were false and that V engaged him as a result of those representations. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction. The judge’s indication inevitably implied that it was necessarily dishonest to tell lies to obtain employment, no matter what D’s explanation for the lies or more general explanation for his conduct. This was unduly restrictive and the jury should have been given the opportunity to consider the issues.