Dickinson v Abel [1969] 1 All ER 484
Dickinson v Abel [1969] 1 All ER 484
Taxpayer not liable to income tax for money received following conditional promise
Facts
The defendant taxpayer was approached by the representative of a company which wished to buy farmland with which the taxpayer had a familial connection. The taxpayer is reported to have asked “What’s in it for me?” and was offered £10,000. The taxpayer received this money despite not offering any services in relation to the eventual sale.
Issues
The taxpayer was assessed for income tax on the sum of £10,000. However, at first instance, it was held that there was no contractual basis for the £10,000 payment. The sum was not a “payment for services” and, therefore, the assessment for income tax ought accordingly to be discharged. The Revenue appealed against this decision.
Decision/Outcome
The High Court dismissed the appeal. It held that the evidence was inconsistent with a contractual consensus, either express or tacit, between the taxpayer and the company which purchased the farmland. There was no evidence that the £10,000 was paid in return for some specified service made by the taxpayer. All that existed between the taxpayer and the company was a conditional promise made without valuable consideration. The Court, as an appellate tribunal, was precluded upon the basis of well-established principles from going against the findings of fact made at first instance. Accordingly, the payment of £10,000 was not chargeable in terms of income tax. It was irrelevant in determining whether there was a contractual consensus that the taxpayer believed that he had a moral right in the land in question. If fact, he had no interest in that land.
266 words
Updated 19 March 2026
This case summary accurately describes the decision in Dickinson v Abel [1969] 1 All ER 484. The core principle — that a payment made pursuant to a conditional promise without valuable consideration does not constitute a taxable receipt as income from a contractual arrangement for services — remains part of the wider body of income tax case law on the distinction between receipts of a capital or gratuitous nature and taxable emoluments or receipts from services.
Readers should note that the statutory framework governing income tax has changed substantially since 1969. The relevant charging provisions are now consolidated in the Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003 and the Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005, replacing the former Schedule E and Schedule D structures under the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 and its predecessors. However, this does not affect the continuing relevance of the underlying common law principle discussed in this case, which turns on the absence of a contractual or quasi-contractual basis for the payment rather than on the precise statutory charging provision in issue. The case remains useful as an illustration of how courts approach the characterisation of payments for income tax purposes.
