Fisher v Bell [1961] 1 QB 394; [1960] 3 WLR 919; [1960] 3 All ER 731
Queen’s Bench Divisional Court, 10 November 1960 — invitation to treat and the interpretation of a criminal statute.
A priced item in a shop window was an invitation to customers to make an offer, rather than an offer capable of immediate acceptance. Applying that distinction, the Court held that the display did not amount to offering a flick knife for sale under the wording of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959.
The shop-window display
James Charles Bell ran a retail shop in Bristol. A police constable saw a knife displayed in its window with a ticket reading “Ejector knife—4s.” Chief Inspector Fisher brought proceedings alleging that Bell had offered a flick knife for sale contrary to section 1(1) of the 1959 Act.
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The Bristol magistrates dismissed the charge. They considered that, without an extended statutory definition, the expression “offer for sale” carried its contractual meaning. Displaying the knife was only an invitation to treat. They did not need to determine whether the knife met the statutory description of a flick knife.
The prosecutor appealed by way of case stated, asking the Divisional Court to decide whether the display and price ticket constituted an offer for sale within the Act.
Why the display was not an offer
Lord Parker CJ acknowledged that, in everyday language, the knife would naturally be described as being for sale. But Parliament legislated against the background of the general law. Under ordinary contract principles, displaying an article with a price in a shop window invited customers to make an offer; it did not itself create an offer that a customer could accept to conclude a contract.
The wording of other legislation reinforced that reading. Where Parliament wished to prohibit displays, it could expressly refer to goods being exposed for sale or define an offer for sale more broadly. The relevant provision of the 1959 Act did neither.
Could the Court fill the gap?
The result appeared anomalous because the Act prohibited activities including manufacture, sale, hire, lending and giving, yet the display fell outside the charge. Lord Parker nevertheless rejected the suggestion that the Court could supply an omission in Parliament’s wording.
The prosecutor’s authorities did not establish otherwise. Keating v Horwood and Wiles v Maddison concerned provisions which expressly included exposing goods for sale. They therefore did not require the Court to treat this shop-window display as an offer under the differently worded 1959 Act.
Decision and scope
Ashworth and Elwes JJ agreed with Lord Parker CJ. The prosecutor’s appeal was dismissed, leaving the dismissal of the charge in place.
Although frequently studied in contract law, the dispute was a criminal prosecution in which the meaning of an offence depended on a contract-law expression. The decision concerned the particular statutory wording before the Court.
Source: Original Divisional Court report, [1960] 3 All ER 731–733.
