Gray v Jones [1939] 1 All ER 798
Slander; words actionable per se; words imputing criminal offence
(172 words)
Facts
The defendant said the following to the claimant: “You are a convicted person. I will not have you here.” The claimant brought an action for slander. The jury found that the words were in fact said by the defendant and awarded damages to the claimant. The defendant disagreed with the conclusion.
Issues
The question before the Court was whether the defendant’s words were actionable even without proof of special damage.
Decision/Outcome
The Court found that, in this case, the words said to the claimant were in fact actionable without proof of special damage. This was not because the words caused the claimant to face criminal prosecution (he had arguably been through criminal proceedings already), but because such words could make other people exclude the claimant from society and could make him the subject of ridicule, hatred and contempt. The defendant’s words could well have caused others to believe that the claimant was convicted of a criminal offence for which he should have been imprisoned – instead of being there with them, free.
Updated 19 March 2026
This case brief accurately summarises the decision in Gray v Jones [1939] 1 All ER 798. The legal principles described remain broadly correct as a statement of the historical common law position on slander actionable per se where words impute a criminal offence. However, readers should be aware that the law of defamation in England and Wales has been significantly reformed by the Defamation Act 2013, which introduced important changes including a serious harm threshold (section 1) and revised defences. The 2013 Act did not abolish the categories of slander actionable per se, but the threshold and procedural landscape have changed. This case is best understood as illustrating the pre-2013 common law principles and should be read alongside the 2013 Act when considering the modern position.
