Hinz v Berry [1970] 2 QB 40
NEGLIGENCE – PSYCHIATRIC DAMAGE – DUTY OF CARE
Facts
The plaintiff (P) and her husband were out driving for the afternoon with their four children and four children whom they were currently fostering. The group stopped in a lay-by for a picnic and the plaintiff took one of the children across the road to pick flowers. The defendant, Mr Berry (D), was driving recklessly and crashed into the couple’s van, where the plaintiff’s husband and the other children were making preparations. Most of the children suffered injuries, and the plaintiff’s husband was so seriously hurt by the crash that he died at the scene three hours later. P witnessed the entire event and its aftermath, developing long-term ‘morbid depression’ as a consequence.
P had successfully sued D for negligence and had been awarded damages for, amongst other things, the ‘nervous shock’ she had suffered and an appeal was lodged by D.
Issues
In this case it fell to be determined in which circumstances a person could recover damages for purely nervous shock caused by the negligence of the defendant and, where damages were so recoverable, how quantum fell to be determined, as it was alleged by D that the sum awarded at first instance (£4000) was excessive.
Decision/Outcome
C, being a person who would foreseeably suffer psychiatric harm as a consequence of D’s negligence, was entitled to compensation; she was not so remote a victim as to be outside the contemplation of D and had suffered recognised psychiatric harm, rather than non-clinical grief or sorrow, which is not compensatable. Moreover, although considered to be on the high side, the quantum of damages awarded to C could not be described as wholly erroneous and thus would not be revisited.
Updated 19 March 2026
This case summary accurately reflects the decision in Hinz v Berry [1970] 2 QB 40. The core legal principles it describes — that a claimant may recover damages for recognised psychiatric illness caused by witnessing a traumatic event, but not for ordinary grief or sorrow — remain good law and continue to be cited in English tort law.
However, readers should be aware that the law on psychiatric damage (sometimes called ‘nervous shock’) has developed considerably since 1970. The leading authority is now the House of Lords decision in Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310, which established the distinction between primary and secondary victims and laid down the proximity requirements (proximity of relationship, proximity to the event, and perception through unaided senses) that secondary victims must satisfy. Those requirements were further considered in White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1999] 2 AC 455. More recently, the Supreme Court revisited the secondary victim rules in Paul v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust [2024] UKSC 1, clarifying aspects of the proximity requirements, particularly regarding the immediacy of the shocking event. Students should read Hinz v Berry alongside these later authorities for a complete picture of the current law.
The article’s description of the facts and outcome is accurate. The use of ‘plaintiff’ reflects the terminology of the era; modern proceedings use ‘claimant’.
