Hodgson v Trapp [1989] AC 807
QUANTIFICATION OF DAMAGES
Facts
The claimant suffered extensive injuries as a result of the defendant’s negligence, as a consequence of which he was unable to take care of himself. He was granted state benefits in the form of attendance and mobility allowances to assist with the cost of his care. However, he also sued the defendant in the tort of negligence.
Issues
The issue was whether the state benefits received by the claimant which would not have been received but for his injury should be deducted from the award of damages.
Decision/Outcome
As a general rule, any state benefits received as the consequence of a tortious act should be deducted from any award of damages, in order to prevent the claimant from obtaining double recovery. The purpose of damages in negligence is ‘purely compensatory’ and it is therefore the net loss and expense caused by the injury which the defendant should be required to meet. The principal reason for this is less a matter of statutory construction and more of public policy, as the award of damages for personal injuries is generally met in the final analysis by the defendant’s insurer who will simply pass on the cost of an increased award to their future customers. Further, as a matter of principle, to allow double recovery would be a step towards a ‘no fault’ system of compensation, which would exacerbate the existing disparity between the position of those who establish liability in negligence for their injuries (and are thereby able to recover damages) and those who do not.
Updated 19 March 2026
This case summary accurately reflects the decision in Hodgson v Trapp [1989] AC 807. However, readers should be aware of significant subsequent statutory developments that have substantially altered the practical position on deductibility of state benefits in personal injury claims.
The Social Security (Recovery of Benefits) Act 1997 introduced a statutory recoupment scheme that now governs most personal injury cases. Under this scheme, compensators (typically insurers) must repay specified listed benefits directly to the Compensation Recovery Unit (CRU) before damages are paid to the claimant, and certain benefits are offset only against specified heads of damage rather than the overall award. This regime largely supersedes the broad common law principle in Hodgson v Trapp for cases falling within its scope. The 1997 Act has been amended over time to reflect changes in the benefits system, including the replacement of attendance allowance and mobility allowance with other benefits such as Personal Independence Payment (PIP).
The common law principles articulated in Hodgson v Trapp retain relevance for benefits or payments falling outside the statutory scheme, and the underlying compensatory principle remains good law. Students should however read this case alongside the 1997 Act and current CRU practice when considering how state benefits are treated in personal injury quantum today.
