Hunter v British Coal [1998] 2 All ER 97
NEGLIGENCE – EMPLOYER DUTY OF CARE – PSYCHIATRIC DAMAGE – DISTINCTION BETWEEN PRIMARY AND SECONDARY VICTIMS – PROXIMITY TO TRAUMATIC EVENT
Facts
The claimant (C) was driving along a roadway in a mine owned by the defendant company (D) when he drove into a hydrant, causing it to leak water. After C and a fellow employee had attempted, unsuccessfully, to turn off the hydrant, C left to look for a hose so as to divert the water. While C was away the hydrant exploded, killing the other employee.
Although C did not see the fatal accident and was prevented from returning to the scene, he alleged that he had suffered shock at hearing of the death. C brought an action for damages for psychiatric injury against D, who were negligent in fulfilling their statutory duties to maintain the roadway. C’s claim was rejected, on the grounds that he did meet the necessary criteria to be described as a primary or secondary victim, and an appeal was brought.
Issue
This case called for a close consideration of the categories of ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ victim set out in Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1992] 1 AC 310. It was argued by counsel for C that he had been involved throughout the event as a primary victim; in attempting to deal with the negligently kept hydrant, C was a participant in the event, despite having only suffered shock when he was informed of his co-worker’s death, at which point he was no longer at the scene.
Decision/Outcome
In finding for D the Court of Appeal rejected C’s argument; there was no case in which a person, who had not been present at the scene of an accident and who had not come upon the scene as a rescuer, had been able to recover damages for psychiatric injury as a primary victim; C lacked the necessary physical and temporal proximity to the accident. Moreover, there was nothing in the judgment in Alcock which suggested that H could be treated as a secondary victim
Updated 19 March 2026
This case summary remains legally accurate. Hunter v British Coal Corporation [1998] 2 All ER 97 is still good law and continues to be cited in discussions of psychiatric injury claims in negligence, particularly regarding the distinction between primary and secondary victims. The foundational framework established in Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1992] 1 AC 310, upon which this case turns, remains the leading authority for secondary victim claims, though readers should be aware that the law on psychiatric injury has continued to develop. Most significantly, the Supreme Court revisited and refined the secondary victim criteria in Paul v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust [2024] UKSC 1, clarifying aspects of the proximity requirements in secondary victim cases, particularly in the clinical negligence context. That decision does not undermine the outcome or reasoning in Hunter, but students researching this area should read Paul as essential further reading alongside Alcock. The article contains one minor factual slip worth noting: it states that C did not meet the criteria to be described as a primary or secondary victim, which is correct, but the final sentence refers to the claimant as ‘H’ rather than ‘C’, which may cause momentary confusion though it does not affect the legal analysis.
