Hyman v Hyman [1929] AC 601
Courts will not enforce contracts which frustrate Acts of Parliament.
Facts
The appellant, Mr Hyman, was married to respondent. He left her to live with another woman. Both he and the respondent executed a deed of separation in which he covenanted to pay his wife £2000 alimony as well as a weekly sum of £20 for her maintenance during her life. The wife in return covenanted not to petition any court for further alimony or maintenance other than the sums that had already been agreed. After divorcing her husband, she petitioned the court for maintenance. At first instance the court ordered that the deed did not prevent the wife from claiming maintenance. The husband appealed.
Issues
The ex-husband argued that the respondent was still bound by her covenant in the deed of separation not to petition the court for permanent maintenance even though they had divorced. He also argued that public policy required that contracts should be kept and covenants honoured, and that he was simply keeping his ex-wife to her bargain.
Decision/Outcome
Their Lordships held that there was no provision in the covenant terminating it on dissolution of the marriage. Therefore, it still operated. However, Lord Hailsham said that under the Judicature Act 1925 s.190(1), a court had discretion to make an order granting such sums of maintenance as it thought reasonable and order payment of alimony that it thought just. The agreement in the deed amounted to a covenant not to bring proceedings. This would have ousted the jurisdiction of the court to make such orders. Therefore, it was illegal and invalid. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.
Updated 19 March 2026
This case summary remains accurate as a description of the 1929 House of Lords decision in Hyman v Hyman [1929] AC 601 and the legal principle it established. The core principle — that parties cannot by private agreement oust the court’s jurisdiction to award financial provision on divorce — continues to be good law and is regularly cited in family law proceedings.
However, readers should note that the statutory framework has changed substantially since 1929. The Judicature Act 1925, s.190(1), referred to in the article, has long been repealed. The court’s powers to award financial provision on divorce are now governed primarily by the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (as amended), particularly ss.23–25. The principle from Hyman v Hyman was affirmed and developed under this modern framework, including in later cases such as Edgar v Edgar [1980] 1 WLR 1410 and Xydhias v Xydhias [1999] 1 FLR 683, which explored when and to what extent prior agreements between spouses may nonetheless be given weight by the court. More recently, the Supreme Court in Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42 gave significant (though not absolute) weight to pre-nuptial agreements, a development which qualifies the broader application of the Hyman principle in practice, though it does not overrule it. The court retains ultimate jurisdiction and cannot be wholly ousted by agreement.
The article is therefore reliable as a case summary but should be read alongside the current statutory regime and subsequent case law developments.
