Case: Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd (t/a Crockfords) [2017] UKSC 67
Court: UK Supreme Court
Judgment date: 25 October 2017
Mr Ivey used edge-sorting to gain an advantage at Punto Banco and won approximately £7.7 million, but the Supreme Court held that this was cheating. He was therefore in breach of an implied term of the betting contract and could not recover the winnings. The Court also held that cheating does not require a separate element of dishonesty and restated the test for dishonesty.
The game and the advantage
In August 2012 Mr Ivey, a professional gambler, played Punto Banco at Crockfords with another professional, Ms Sun. The game depends on cards being dealt at random, with their values unknown to the players and the house.
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The cards had a slight asymmetry in the pattern on their backs. If high-value cards were rotated differently from the rest, their edges could reveal whether the next card was high or low. Only the croupier could touch the cards, so she had to be induced to sort them without understanding the purpose.
What Mr Ivey did
On 20 August Ms Sun asked the croupier to rotate selected cards in different directions, presenting the request as a way of changing luck. Mr Ivey supported her requests. The croupier did not understand their significance. The cards were retained and reshuffled by machine, which preserved their orientation. Reusing them gave Mr Ivey an advantage, and by the end of play on 21 August he had won approximately £7.7 million. After investigating, the casino refused to pay and arranged to refund his £1 million deposited stake.
The judge accepted that Mr Ivey gave truthful evidence and genuinely believed that this was legitimate gamesmanship by an advantage player, not cheating. The issue was whether in fact and in law it was cheating.
Cheating
It was common ground that the contract contained an implied term that neither party would cheat. If Mr Ivey had cheated, he could not recover. The casino also relied on the offence of cheating in section 42 of the Gambling Act 2005. Mitting J held that the implied term had been broken and that it was unnecessary to decide whether the offence had been committed. Arden and Tomlinson LJJ agreed that the conduct was cheating. Sharp LJ dissented, holding that cheating required the statutory offence and dishonesty as explained in R v Ghosh [1982] QB 1053.
Lord Hughes, giving the unanimous judgment, held that cheating has the same meaning for the implied term and for section 42, although the standard of proof differs. Section 42 does not exhaustively define cheating. It recognises that cheating may consist of deception or interference with the game, but those examples do not limit the concept, and what is cheating in one game may be legitimate in another.
Dishonesty is not a necessary additional element. The old common law offence of cheating was a different, largely abolished offence. In games, cheating already carries its own stamp of wrongfulness. Most cheating will also be described as dishonest, but not all of it: tripping a rival, or deliberately slowing a horse, is cheating even if it would not ordinarily be called dishonest. Some deception, such as a misleading lead at bridge, is legitimate play rather than cheating. A further legal requirement of dishonesty would either add nothing or would treat illegitimate conduct as legitimate. Cheating normally involves a deliberate act designed to obtain an advantage that is objectively improper given the nature, parameters and rules of the game. That is an objective question.
The judge’s conclusion was therefore unassailable. Mr Ivey arranged for the shoe to be sorted so that he alone knew the character of the next card, using the croupier while tricking her into thinking that the rotation did not matter. When the cards were to be changed, he covered his tracks and left. Simply noticing an existing difference might not have been cheating, but he took positive steps to fix the deck. In a game depending on the random delivery of unknown cards, that was inevitably cheating. His skill did not change the result. The facts also involved deception of the croupier, although deception was not required.
The test for dishonesty
The appeal did not require a finding of dishonesty, so this discussion was not essential to the outcome (obiter). The Court addressed the test because Mr Ivey relied on Ghosh. The second limb of Ghosh asks whether the defendant realised that ordinary honest people would regard the conduct as dishonest. Lord Hughes held that this limb was wrong. It can protect a person whose standards depart furthest from those of society; it is unnecessary in order to take account of the defendant’s actual knowledge; it confuses juries; and it creates an unjustified difference between civil and criminal law. It was not required by the earlier authorities or by the replacement of “fraudulently” with “dishonestly”.
The civil authorities had already adopted an objective standard once the defendant’s knowledge or belief about the facts was established. Dishonesty should not change its meaning according to the type of proceedings. The tribunal must first find the person’s actual knowledge or belief as to the facts. Whether a belief is reasonable may show whether it was genuinely held, but the belief need not be reasonable. The tribunal then applies the standards of ordinary decent people. The defendant need not appreciate that the conduct is dishonest by those standards.
Even if dishonesty had been required, it would have been established. A truthful belief that the conduct was not cheating is not a finding that the conduct was honest.
Outcome
The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed Mr Ivey’s appeal. His claim for the winnings failed because his conduct was cheating and breached the implied term. This was a civil claim for payment, not a criminal prosecution or an order to return winnings already received.
Source
Supreme Court: full judgment in Ivey v Genting Casinos [2017] UKSC 67, particularly paragraphs 2–27, 35–51 and 54–76.