Khorasandijan v Bush [1993] QB 727
Law of Nuisance – Interest – Licensee
Facts
The claimant, a young lady, was harassed by a man who, amongst other things, repeatedly made harassing, pestering, threatening and abusive phone calls to her. These phone calls were made to her parents’ house and to her grandparents’ house. She sought an injunction against him to prevent him making these phone calls to prevent the ongoing harassment through the tort of nuisance. The injunction was granted, but the defendant sought to have it set aside on the grounds that the claimant did not have any interest in the land subject to the nuisance in the form of the phone calls, and as such the claimant could have no cause of action following Malone v Laskey [1907] 2 KN 141.
Issues
Whether the claimant had a cause of action arising from nuisance. Whether the original judge had jurisdiction to grant an injunction over harassing, pestering or otherwise communicating as no known tort existed regarding these things.
Decision/Outcome
The appeal was dismissed. An individual could not be protected by law from deliberate harassment and pestering phone calls by the civil justice system only if they happened to have a proprietary interest in the premises where they received those phone calls. Applying Dyson Holdings Ltd v Fox [1976] 1 Q.B. 503. where the wife of the owner of the property was entitled to relief despite lacking a proprietary interest in the premises to which harassing phone calls were made, then there was no reason that this should not also apply to a child living at home with her parents.
Updated 19 March 2026
This article accurately summarises the decision in Khorasandijan v Bush [1993] QB 727. However, readers should be aware of two significant developments that materially affect the continuing authority of this case.
First, the House of Lords in Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] AC 655 expressly overruled Khorasandijan v Bush on the question of standing in private nuisance. The House of Lords confirmed that only a person with a legal interest in land (such as an owner or tenant) has standing to sue in private nuisance. A mere licensee, such as a child living in the family home, does not have a sufficient interest to found a claim. This directly reverses the central holding of this case on the nuisance point.
Second, the legislative landscape has changed substantially. The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 now provides both civil and criminal remedies for harassment, meaning that claimants in the position of the claimant in this case would today rely primarily on that statute rather than on private nuisance. The 1997 Act does not require any proprietary interest in land. As a result, while this case retains historical importance as an illustration of judicial creativity before the 1997 Act, its ratio on standing in nuisance is no longer good law.
