Legal Case Summary
Letang v Cooper [1964] EWCA Civ 5
Report citations: [1965] 1 QB 232; [1964] 3 WLR 573; [1964] 2 All ER 929; [1964] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 339. Court: Court of Appeal, 15 June 1964.
Intentional application of force, negligence and the personal injury time limit
Facts
In the summer of 1957, the claimant was sunbathing outside on a piece of land which ordinarily served as a car park. While she was sunbathing, the Defendant drove over her legs with his car, causing her injury. The defendant did not do it intentionally, however the claimant had the option of claiming in negligence. She did not, immediately, choose to do so. In February 1961 she brought claims in both negligence and trespass to the person. She accepted that the negligence claim was barred by the three-year personal injury limitation period under the Limitation Act 1939, as amended in 1954, but argued that trespass had a six-year period. The trial judge accepted that argument and awarded £575. The defendant appealed.
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Issues
The issue in this case was whether it was possible to make a claim under trespass to the person if the action was negligent rather than intentional as until then the tort of trespass to the person had been applied to both types of situation.
Decision/Outcome
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and entered judgment for the defendant. Lord Denning MR, with Danckwerts LJ agreeing, held that where injury was inflicted negligently rather than intentionally, the proper action was in negligence and not trespass to the person. The claimant could not escape the three-year time limit by framing her claim as trespass.
Diplock LJ reached the same result but treated negligence and unintentional trespass as alternative descriptions of the same factual cause of action. All three judges also held that the statutory words “breach of duty” were wide enough to cover the trespass claim, so it was time-barred on that basis too. In interpreting the limitation provision, the court agreed with the Australian decision in Kruber v Grzesiak [1963] VR 621.
Source: Court of Appeal judgment on BAILII.