Liability For Fire
AT COMMON LAW
A person will be liable for damage done by fire in three situations. That is, if the damage was caused:
- wilfully;
- by negligence; or
- by the escape, without negligence, of a fire which was brought into existence by some non-natural user of the land. This principle is not exactly that of Rylands v Fletcher.
The defendant will be liable if:
- he brought on to his land things likely to catch fire, and kept them there in such conditions that, if they did ignite, the fire would be likely to spread to the plaintiff’s land;
- he did so in the course of some non-natural use; and
- the thing ignited and the fire spread
UNDER STATUTE
Section 86 of the Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774 modifies the common law. It provides:
“And no action, suit or process whatever shall be had, maintained or prosecuted against any person in whose house, chamber, stable, barn or other building, or on whose estate any fire shall … accidentally begin, nor shall any recompence be made by such person for any damage suffered thereby, any law, usage or custom to the contrary notwithstanding; … “
However, s86 has been interpreted restrictively and a fire will not be.accidental if it was started negligently or due to a nuisance. Relevant cases include:
Musgrove v Pandellis [1919] 2 KB 43
Updated 19 March 2026
This article sets out the broad framework of fire liability at common law and under the Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774 accurately. The three-limb common law position (wilful act, negligence, and escape without negligence from a non-natural user) remains good law. The article is correct that the Rylands v Fletcher principle and the specific fire liability rule are related but distinct.
The article’s treatment of section 86 of the Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774 is accurate: the provision remains in force and has consistently been interpreted restrictively, so that fires started negligently or through nuisance do not attract statutory immunity. Musgrove v Pandellis [1919] 2 KB 43 remains a leading authority on this point.
However, readers should note that the article is incomplete: it references Musgrove v Pandellis as the start of a list of relevant cases but does not include further cases. Other significant authorities in this area include Goldman v Hargrave [1967] 1 AC 645 (liability for naturally occurring fires where the occupier failed to act reasonably), Stannard (t/a Wyvern Tyres) v Gore [2012] EWCA Civ 1248 (which clarified the relationship between Rylands v Fletcher and fire liability, and confirmed that simply accumulating something flammable is insufficient without the thing itself escaping), and Johnson v BJW Property Developments Ltd [2002] 3 All ER 574. The Court of Appeal’s decision in Stannard v Gore is particularly important for any detailed treatment of this area, as it significantly narrowed the scope of Rylands v Fletcher liability in fire cases. Students should ensure they consult up-to-date case law and textbooks to supplement this article.
