Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’ NHS Trust [2006] UKHL 34 established that an employer can be vicariously liable in damages for harassment committed by an employee in the course of employment. The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 did not exclude the ordinary rules of vicarious liability. The House of Lords allowed Mr Majrowski’s claim to proceed to trial; it did not decide that his allegations were proved or award damages.
The claim and its procedural history
William Majrowski worked for the Trust as a clinical auditor co-ordinator. He alleged that his departmental manager, Sandra Freeman, bullied and intimidated him, criticised him excessively, imposed unrealistic targets and isolated him. He said the treatment was motivated by homophobia. The Trust’s internal investigation upheld his harassment complaint, but that internal finding did not resolve the statutory claim before the courts.
Law Teacher writing support
Writing a law essay?
We choose a writer who is an expert in your area of law and qualified to at least the academic level you select. Most of our writers hold a master’s degree or PhD, have teaching experience, or both.
Send us your question and, if you wish, any marking criteria. We’ll write an essay to your instructions.
Mr Majrowski sued the Trust under section 3 of the 1997 Act for distress, anxiety and consequential loss. He did not sue the manager personally or claim that the Trust had been negligent or breached his employment contract. His case depended entirely on the Trust’s responsibility for the manager’s alleged wrongdoing.
The County Court struck the claim out, reasoning that the Act was not intended to create another layer of employment liability. The Court of Appeal, by a majority, restored it for trial. The Trust appealed to the House of Lords. The question was therefore whether this kind of claim was legally available, rather than whether harassment had actually occurred.
Why a statutory wrong can attract vicarious liability
Lord Nicholls explained vicarious liability as secondary liability for another person’s wrong. The employee is primarily responsible for the misconduct; the employer can be liable even without personal fault. This differs from alleging that the employer itself failed to take reasonable care.
The policy reasons included allocating risks arising from an enterprise’s activities to that enterprise, giving injured people access to a defendant better able to compensate them, spreading losses and encouraging good practice. Those reasons were not confined to common-law torts. They also applied to breaches of statutory obligations giving rise to damages, unless the legislation expressly or impliedly excluded the ordinary rule.
The connection with employment remained essential. The wrongful conduct had to be sufficiently closely connected with the employee’s authorised activities to be fairly and properly regarded as occurring in the course of employment. Merely showing that two people worked for the same employer did not establish that requirement.
The harassment provisions
Section 1 prohibited a course of conduct amounting to harassment which the person knew, or ought to have known, amounted to harassment. Section 3 supplied civil remedies, including damages for anxiety and resulting financial loss, and an injunction against an actual or anticipated breach.
The Trust argued that the legislation chiefly addressed stalking and public-order problems, rather than workplace relations. The House rejected that limitation. The Act protected people against harassment in different settings, including bullying at work. Nor did the availability of criminal proceedings against a perpetrator prevent civil responsibility from arising against an employer.
The Trust also relied on the wording that damages “may” be awarded. Lord Nicholls held that this did not make compensation merely discretionary. Section 3 created a civil wrong carrying ordinary remedies, subject to principles such as causation and mitigation. Its wording clarified that recoverable loss could include anxiety.
The significance of the Scottish provisions
The Act’s provisions for Scotland supplied particularly strong evidence of Parliament’s intention. Section 10 inserted section 18B into the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973. That provision addressed when a claimant became aware of the person responsible for harassment, or that person’s employer or principal.
Lord Hope explained that this wording contemplated a claim based on an employer’s vicarious liability. It could not satisfactorily be explained as referring only to employers who had themselves encouraged the harassment. The House found no intended substantive difference on this point between Scotland and England and Wales.
The five Law Lords agreed in the result but did not place identical weight on every argument. Several considered the policy arguments finely balanced, or thought they might otherwise favour excluding employer liability. For them, the Scottish wording was decisive. Their task was to interpret the legislation, even where competing policy considerations had force.
Limits on the ruling
The Trust warned of speculative claims by disgruntled employees and liability for anxiety falling short of recognised psychiatric injury. Lord Nicholls accepted that the concern was real, but it did not justify denying a remedy where serious harassment occurred in the course of employment.
The decision did not turn every unpleasant workplace interaction into actionable harassment. The Court emphasised the distinction between ordinary irritation or unreasonable behaviour and conduct sufficiently oppressive and unacceptable to sustain criminal liability under section 2. Courts also had to apply the close-connection requirement.
The House considered the overlap with later discrimination legislation, which allowed an employer a defence based on taking reasonably practicable preventive steps. It acknowledged an unsatisfactory overlap but did not import that defence into the 1997 Act. A workplace policy or grievance procedure therefore did not, by itself, answer a claim based on vicarious liability under that Act.
Outcome
The House of Lords unanimously dismissed the Trust’s appeal on 12 July 2006. The claim could proceed to trial, where the alleged harassment and its connection with the manager’s employment remained to be established. No damages were assessed.
The central distinction is between recognising a legal basis for liability and finding liability on the facts. Majrowski established the former. It confirmed that a statutory harassment claim could engage ordinary employer responsibility without deciding the factual merits of this claimant’s case.
Judgment source
Full House of Lords judgment. The neutral citation is [2006] UKHL 34; reported citations include [2007] 1 AC 224, [2006] 3 WLR 125 and [2006] ICR 1199.