Legal Case Summary
Oscar Chess v Williams [1957] 1 WLR 370
The steps to be taken in identifying a warranty
Facts
The defendants sold a Morris car to the claimants, who were motor traders, for £290. The defendants provided a copy of the vehicles first registration indicating that the car was first registered in 1948. Some eight months later the claimants became aware that the car had actually been registered in 1939 and was therefore only worth £175. The defendant honestly believed that the car was a 1948 model. The claimants claimed damages for breach of contract.
Issues
The issue in this context was whether the statements given by the defendants constituted a warranty as to the age of the car.
Decision/Outcome
The Court of Appeal found that the defendants’ comments did not constitute a warranty. More importantly, the court set out a number of considerations that should be made when assessing whether a statement is a warranty. (1) Where an assumption is fundamental to a contract, it does not mean that it is a term of the contract. (2) The term warranty means a binding promise as well as a subsidiary, non-essential, term of a contract. (3) A warranty must be distinguished from an innocent misrepresentation. (4) Whether a warranty is intended must, judged objectively, be based on the parties’ words and behaviour. (5) Where one party makes a statement, which should be within his own knowledge, but not the knowledge of the other, it is easy to infer a warranty. If the party states that it is not within his knowledge and is information passed from another, a warranty is less easily inferred. (6) An oral representation repeated in writing suggests a warranty, but the issue is not conclusive. Neither is the fact that it is not stated in writing.
Updated 20 March 2026
This article accurately summarises the Court of Appeal’s decision in Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams [1957] 1 WLR 370, a foundational case in English contract law on the distinction between contractual terms (warranties) and mere representations. The legal principles described remain good law and continue to be cited in academic and judicial contexts when determining the contractual status of pre-contractual statements.
Readers should note that the broader legal landscape in which this case operates has developed significantly since 1957. In particular, the Misrepresentation Act 1967 introduced a statutory remedy in damages for negligent misrepresentation (s.2(1)), which is now the primary route for claimants in situations similar to Oscar Chess where a representation does not amount to a contractual term. This statutory development does not alter the principles set out in the case itself, but it substantially affects how such disputes are approached in practice today. The case remains highly relevant for understanding the pre-1967 common law framework and the underlying principles for distinguishing terms from representations, which continue to apply alongside the 1967 Act.
