Page v Smith [1995] UKHL 7; [1996] AC 155
The House of Lords held, by a majority of three to two, that a person directly involved in an accident and exposed to foreseeable physical injury did not also have to establish that psychiatric injury was foreseeable. Page succeeded on that legal issue, but whether the accident had caused his illness still had to be determined by the Court of Appeal.
Facts
On 24 July 1987, Smith drove across the path of Page’s car while turning into a side road. The cars collided. Page suffered no bodily injury and was able to drive home, but about three hours later he became exhausted.
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Page, a schoolteacher, had previously suffered episodes of an illness described as myalgic encephalomyelitis or chronic fatigue syndrome. He said that the accident caused a relapse which became chronic and permanent, preventing him from working. The trial judge, Otton J, accepted his claim and awarded £162,153.
The Court of Appeal reversed that decision. It held that Page had to show that psychiatric injury was reasonably foreseeable in a person of normal fortitude, and that this requirement was not satisfied. Ralph Gibson LJ also rejected the trial judge’s finding on causation; the other two appeal judges did not decide that issue.
The question before the House of Lords
Physical injury to Page was plainly foreseeable. The issue was whether his escape from bodily injury meant that he nevertheless had to prove foreseeability of psychiatric injury as a separate kind of harm. This concerned someone personally involved in the collision, rather than a witness distressed by injury to somebody else.
The majority’s reasoning
Lord Lloyd distinguished primary victims, directly involved in an accident and within the range of foreseeable physical injury, from secondary victims affected by what happened to others. Page was a primary victim. Smith already owed him a duty to take reasonable care to avoid personal injury.
For that purpose, the majority did not treat physical and psychiatric injury as separate kinds of personal injury. It would be artificial to apply a different test simply because Page happened to escape the bodily injuries which the negligent driving could foreseeably have caused. Lord Ackner and Lord Browne-Wilkinson agreed with Lord Lloyd’s conclusion.
The distinction mattered because secondary-victim claims involved additional controls, including foreseeability of psychiatric injury in a person of normal fortitude. Lord Lloyd considered those controls unnecessary for Page: the risk of physical injury already limited the people to whom the driver owed the relevant duty.
Once that duty was established, Smith had to take Page as he found him. A pre-existing susceptibility, or an unusually serious reaction, did not itself defeat the claim. This was the application of the principle sometimes described as the “eggshell skull” rule to an unusually vulnerable claimant.
The judgment did not allow compensation for ordinary fear or distress alone. A genuine recognised illness and a causal connection with the accident still had to be established. Nor did the majority suggest that every minor collision would satisfy its test: foreseeable physical injury remained important to Page’s position as a primary victim.
Why two judges disagreed
Lords Keith and Jauncey would have dismissed the appeal. They considered that foreseeability of injury by nervous shock was required even for a participant in an accident. In their view, psychiatric illness in a person of normal fortitude was not reasonably foreseeable from this collision. They did not accept the majority’s distinction between participants and witnesses as a reason to dispense with that requirement.
Outcome
The appeal was allowed. The trial judge’s order was restored except on causation and costs. Causation was remitted to the Court of Appeal because only one of its judges had addressed Smith’s challenge to the finding that the accident caused Page’s relapse.
Smith was ordered to pay Page’s costs in the House of Lords. Costs in the lower courts were left for the Court of Appeal. The decision therefore established the applicable duty-of-care test without finally resolving Page’s entitlement to damages.
Judgment: House of Lords, 11 May 1995. Read the full judgment on BAILII.