Parmiter v Coupland and another [1840] 6 M & W 105
Libel; jury
(261 words)
Facts
The claimant was the late mayor of Winchester. A series of libels were published of him in a local newspaper between November 1938 and March 1939, implying that he was corrupt and ignored his duties as mayor and justice of the peace for his borough. The defendants pleaded not guilty.
Issues
At trial, the judge directed the jury as to the difference between censures on public and on private person. He said that the character of public officials was public property to an extent and as such, their actions can be criticised more openly than that of private persons. Furthermore, he provided a definition of libel to the jury and then left it to them to decide whether the statements in question were intended to injure the claimant’s character. It was claimed that the jury was misdirected.
Decision/Outcome
In libel cases, the judge is not legally obliged to state to the jury whether the statement complained of is a libel or not – however, he must define what libel is in law and then leave it to the jury to decide whether the statement in question falls into that definition and, incidentally, whether the statement was intended to injure the claimant’s character. Secondly, while there are differences as to what might count as libel against a private or a public person, allegations of corruption will be libellous in either case. Thirdly, libel will be established whenever a statement, intended to injure the reputation of a person by exposing him/her to ridicule, hatred or contempt, is published without justification or lawful excuse.
Updated 20 March 2026
This article accurately summarises the 1840 decision in Parmiter v Coupland (1840) 6 M & W 105, which remains a recognised authority for the classic common law definition of defamation — that a defamatory statement is one calculated to expose a person to hatred, ridicule or contempt. The case continues to be cited in defamation textbooks and judgments as an early formulation of that test.
However, readers should note several important developments. The Defamation Act 2013 significantly reformed English defamation law. Under section 1, a statement is not defamatory unless its publication has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to the claimant’s reputation (or, for bodies trading for profit, serious financial loss). This statutory threshold substantially modifies the common law position and means that the Parmiter definition, while historically significant, must now be read alongside the 2013 Act. The role of the jury in defamation cases has also changed markedly: under section 11 of the Defamation Act 2013, jury trial is no longer the default in defamation proceedings in England and Wales, reversing the position that this case helped to illustrate. Additionally, the article contains a minor factual error in the dates given for the libels (stated as November 1938 to March 1939, which is plainly incorrect for an 1840 case), though this does not affect the legal principles described. Overall, the case remains good law as a historical statement of the common law definition, but students must apply it in the context of the Defamation Act 2013 framework.
