Legal Case Summary
R v Bree [2007] EWCA Crim 804
Facts
The defendant, Bree (B), visited his brother at University and went for an evening out with him and others, including the complainant (C). Both B and C consumed considerable quantities of alcohol, before returning to B’s brother’s home. Whilst C’s memory from this point is poor, she recalls vomiting and having B and his brother help wash the vomit from her hair. Her next memory is of her and B having sexual intercourse. C contended that, although she had not specifically said ‘no’ to intercourse, she had not consented. B contended that he had reasonably believed she was consenting as she had undressed herself, appeared willing and been conscious throughout the event.
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History of the Case
At first instance, B was convicted by the Court of rape under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.1, on the grounds that C had not consented to sexual intercourse. Notably, at first instance, the Crown initially contended that C had been unable to consent as she was unconscious for much of the event. However, following the delivery of evidence at trial, the prosecution’s approach changed to submit that C did have the capacity to consent, and had made it as clear as possible, given her inebriated state, that she did not consent to sexual intercourse with B.
The Court of Appeal allowed Bree’s appeal and quashed the conviction.
Issue
The issue of appeal, as brought by B, was that at first instance the Court had not clarified to the jury that a person may still be capable of consenting, even where voluntarily heavily intoxicated. Rather, B viewed that the Court had implied heavy intoxication sufficed to remove one’s capacity to consent, regardless of other factors. This would be contrary to the law on consent in the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
Held
The Court of Appeal upheld B’s appeal, making two main points.
First, the Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.74 defines consent as where a person:
“… agrees by choice, and has the freedom and capacity to make that choice”
– (Sexual Offences Act 2003, s.74).
The court distinguished actual agreement from capacity to agree. A person who has lost the capacity to choose through intoxication cannot consent, and capacity may be lost before unconsciousness. A person who retains capacity may still choose whether to agree. The jury must decide what occurred on the facts of the case.
Secondly, that the Court at first instance had failed to properly direct the jury as to the legal matters relevant to this case. Specifically, little or no guidance had been given on how consent is examined in the context of voluntary heavy intoxication, despite this being crucial to delivering a verdict. Further, little or no guidance had been given on dealing with the Crown Prosecution’s significant change in approach, as occurred during the case. Subsequently, it was unclear whether the jury still believed C to be unconscious at the time of the sexual activity. The Court of Appeal was critical of the earlier Court for failing to establish that alcohol may alter someone’s behavior, and heavy intoxication does not automatically mean a person cannot consent. R v Olugboja [1982] QB 320 ought to have been applied, and the central issues regarding consent mentioned and summarised for the jury’s benefit.
Reported citations [2008] QB 131, [2007] 3 WLR 600, [2007] 2 All ER 676