Law Case Summary
R v Dawson (1985) 81 Cr App R 150
Unlawful Act Manslaughter – Dangerousness – Egg-Shell Skull Rule – Causation
Facts
The defendant approached a petrol station manned by a 50 year old male. The defendants attempted a robbery with an imitation gun and a pick-axe handle. The defendants demanded money but did not touch the attendant who pressed the alarm button and the defendants ran away without obtaining any cash. The petrol station attendant, who unknown to the defendants had a pre-existing heart condition suffered a heart attack and died. The defendant was charged with and convicted of unlawful act manslaughter and appealed.
Issues
Was the defendant’s act foreseeably dangerous so as to constitute the second element of unlawful act manslaughter? Did the defendants realise that their acts would be likely to cause physical harm? Did the defendants have to have knowledge of the victims medical condition for them to realise that their act was likely to be dangerous?
Decision / Outcome
The defendant’s appeal was allowed. The trial judge’s direction to the jury was a misdirection. The question that the jury should have been asked was whether a reasonable person would have realised that their actions were likely to create the risk of physical injury. An unlawful act must also be dangerous and the defendant’s must have reasonably foreseen that this would be dangerous. If the defendant’s had knowledge that the victim had a heart condition then they may have been cognisant of the fact that their actions were likely to create a risk of physical harm. As they did not, a reasonable person would not judge that the act was in itself dangerous.
Updated 20 March 2026
This case summary accurately reflects the decision in R v Dawson (1985) 81 Cr App R 150 as it stands. The case remains good law and continues to be cited as authority for the dangerousness requirement in unlawful act manslaughter: namely, that dangerousness is assessed objectively by reference to what a sober and reasonable person would have appreciated at the time of the unlawful act, and that such a person is taken to possess only the knowledge an ordinary bystander would have had (not the defendant’s actual knowledge of the victim’s particular vulnerability).
However, readers should note that the dangerousness test was refined in the subsequent case of R v Watson [1989] 1 WLR 684, where the Court of Appeal confirmed that the reasonable person can be attributed with knowledge acquired during the course of the unlawful act itself. Additionally, R v Carey [2006] EWCA Crim 17 further explored the boundaries of the dangerousness requirement in the context of victims with pre-existing conditions, holding that the relevant question is whether the unlawful act was dangerous in the sense of being likely to cause some physical harm to some person — not necessarily the particular harm that in fact resulted. These developments do not undermine the core principle established in Dawson but provide important qualification and context that students should be aware of.
The summary’s suggestion that the defendants would have been liable had they known of the victim’s heart condition is consistent with the reasoning in Watson and represents the current legal position. Overall, the article remains broadly accurate but should be read alongside Watson and Carey for a complete picture of the law.
