Legal Case Summary
R v G and another [2003] UKHL 50
Introduction
Recklessness in criminal law has resulted in conflicting opinions as to whether a subjective test should be applied or an objective test. Under the Criminal Damage Act 1971 s1 a person acts recklessly when they are aware of a risk that a circumstance exists or will exist, or that a result will occur, and it is unreasonable to take that risk in the circumstances known to them. The House of Lords’ decision in R v G reconsidered the meaning of recklessness in section 1 of the 1971 Act.
Case law prior to R v G
Prior to the case of R v G, there were two main approaches to recklessness. The first was derived from the case of R v Cunningham where the interpretation of recklessness was when the defendant foresees the risk of harm yet does the act anyway. The term malicious was replaced with recklessness and supported by statute as noted in the Criminal Damage Act 1971. This definition of recklessness was clarified in numerous cases that followed Cunningham such as Parker, Briggs and Stephenson. The foresight of some damage was all that was needed and knowledge or appreciation of risk must have entered the defendant’s mind.
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A criticism of the subjective test is that a defendant may deny foreseeing a risk which ought to have been obvious. Lord Bingham rejected the suggestion that this required an objective test: the jury could infer actual awareness from all the evidence and did not have to accept an implausible denial. Deliberately closing one’s mind to an appreciated risk was also culpable.
The second approach followed the case of MPC v Caldwell which interpreted recklessness in an objective way. Lord Diplock stated that a defendant would be considered reckless if he did an act creating an obvious risk of damage to property and either gave no thought to the risk or recognised some risk but nevertheless went on to act. The decision in Caldwell has faced wide criticism as it criminalised defendants who genuinely did not foresee a risk of harm. This is echoed by Ibbetson who has suggested Caldwell was a terrible decision due to there being an unprincipled distinction between criminal damage and offences against the person which in turn led to unjust results especially in cases where the defendant was a child or uneducated. Whilst this assertion may be true, the decision in Caldwell aimed to address problems that existed in criminal law in the 1970’s.
The facts in R v G
The defendants were aged 11 and 12 years old at the time of the offence. They went camping against their parents’ permission and set fire to newspapers at the back of a shop. Prior to leaving the scene, they threw the newspapers underneath a wheelie bin and the fire spread to the shop and the surrounding buildings causing £1 million worth of damage. It was accepted at trial that the defendants did not appreciate the risks of the fire spreading and did not intend to burn down the building, but the risk would have been obvious to a reasonable person. The jury was directed under the objective test contained in Caldwell that failure to give thought to an obvious risk was sufficient mens rea for the offence and the jury convicted the defendants.
Issues and outcome
The question raised by the CA in R v G was whether a defendant could be convicted under CDA 1971 s1 when he gave no thought to a risk and, because of his age or personal characteristics, it would not have been obvious to him even if he had thought about it. The CA upheld the convictions because it was bound by Caldwell. The House of Lords unanimously allowed the appeal and quashed the convictions, overruling Caldwell’s interpretation of recklessness under section 1.
Lord Bingham stated that the rules in Caldwell led to obvious unfairness, especially when the defendant’s capacity to appreciate risk is inferior to others. The HL overruled Caldwell and restored the interpretation intended by Parliament in 1971, in line with the Cunningham approach, whereby a person will be “reckless” only if he or she foresees a risk and none the less goes on to take the risk unreasonably. The test for recklessness used by the HL reverts back to the draft criminal code which has a number of differences from the subjective test originally used by Cunningham. Firstly Cunningham only refers to the taking of risks as to the results and does not mention the circumstance. The test also requires the taking of the risk to be unreasonable in the circumstances known to the defendant. This was not wholly new: the earlier Stephenson decision had already required an unreasonable risk. Awareness is assessed subjectively; whether taking the known risk was unreasonable is a separate question.
The law following R v G
R v G did not remove the separate rules on self-induced intoxication: Lord Bingham expressly preserved the principle in R v Majewski. In the later case of Booth v CPS [2006] EWHC 192 (Admin), the court upheld a criminal damage conviction after the defendant ran into the path of a car, causing £517 of damage. Although he had consumed alcohol and cannabis, the magistrates found that he actually appreciated the risk of collision and damage to property and deliberately disregarded it. The Divisional Court held that this applied the subjective test correctly; it did not uphold the conviction merely because a sober reasonable person would have foreseen the risk.
Conclusion
There are still issues that arise from the application of recklessness within the criminal law. One concern is that a subjective approach may allow people who cause damage to avoid liability, although the House rejected the suggestion that juries would have to accept unconvincing denials of awareness. However if the test is too objective it can also lead to injustice. The HL decision in R v G has prompted the question, why was the Caldwell rule not modified instead of merely being departed from? Lord Bingham addressed this by saying that if the rules were modified for children it would also need to be modified for defendants with mental disabilities which would cause problems for a jury. Lord Bingham rejected both a comparison with a reasonable child and a test asking whether the risk would have been obvious to the particular defendant if considered. Neither reflected Parliament’s intended meaning, and the latter added a speculative task for the jury. The decision required actual awareness of risk rather than a modified reasonable-person comparison.
Bibliography
Cases
Booth v CPS [2006] EWHC 192 (Admin), [2006] ALL ER (D) 225 (Jan)
R v Briggs (Note) [1977] 1 WLR 605
R v Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396
R v G and Another [2004] 1 AC 1034
MPC v Caldwell [1982] AC 341
R v Parker (Daryl) [1977] 1 WLR 600
R v Stephenson [1979] QB 695
Legislation
Criminal Damage Act 1971 section 1
Articles
Crosby C, “Recklessness – the continuing search for a definition” JCL 2008 72 (313).
Elliot C, “Recklessness: Caldwell test abolished” J.Crim.L.2004, 68 (1) 31-33
Ibbetson D, “Recklessness restored” C.L.J. 2004, 63 (1).
Kibel D, “Inadvertent recklessness in criminal law” LQR 2004 (120) Oct, 548-554.
Stark F, “It’s only words: On meaning and mens rea” CLJ 2013 72 (1) 155-177
Books
Smith and Hogan, Text, cases and material on Criminal Law (11th edition, Oxford university press 2014) 902
Full judgment. Parallel citations: [2004] 1 AC 1034; [2003] 3 WLR 1060; [2003] 4 All ER 765; [2004] 1 Cr App R 21; (2003) 167 JP 621.