R v Galliano (1996) Unreported
Murder – Equal Liability for principal offender and secondary parties
Facts
G was charged with the murder of his wife, A. There was evidence that either G killed A himself, or that a killer carried out the murder on behalf of G. G was convicted under the principle that there is equal liability for murder whether G was in fact the principle offender or was the secondary party who solicited another for the murder. Principle of equal liability for secondary parties as for the principle offender. G appealed.
Issues
The issue in question was whether, for the conviction of G for murder, it must be established whether G was the principal offender in murdering his wife, or whether he was the secondary offender who hired another to kill on his behalf.
Decision/Outcome
Following R v. Craig and Bentley (1952) The Times, 10 December, the principle in law that there will be equal punishment for both the principal offender and for the accomplice still stands. The application of the principle of equal liability for secondary parties as for the principle offender follows that the prosecution is not required to establish which of the two the accused was, so long as it is proven that the accused was one or the other. The appeal was dismissed.
Updated 20 March 2026
This case note remains broadly accurate as a statement of the law on equal liability for principal offenders and secondary parties in murder. The principle that a conviction is safe where it is proven the defendant was either the principal or the secondary party, without the prosecution needing to establish which, continues to reflect English law.
However, readers should be aware of a significant subsequent development affecting secondary liability more broadly. In R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8, the Supreme Court restated the law on joint enterprise and secondary liability, overruling the doctrine of parasitic accessory liability as it had developed since Chan Wing-Siu [1985]. The Court held that mere foresight of what a principal might do is not sufficient to establish the mens rea of a secondary party; instead, an intention to assist or encourage the principal in committing the offence is required. While Jogee does not directly concern the specific procedural point in Galliano — namely, whether the prosecution must prove which role the defendant played — it significantly affects the wider law of secondary liability in murder and should be read alongside this case note. Students should consult Jogee when considering any question touching on accessorial liability for murder.
Additionally, the article refers to the Craig and Bentley case. It should be noted that Derek Bentley received a posthumous royal pardon in 1993 and his conviction was quashed by the Court of Appeal in R v Bentley (Deceased) [2001] 1 Cr App R 307, which has some historical significance when that case is cited in this context, though it does not affect the substantive legal principle applied in Galliano.
