R v Jheeta [2007] 2 Cr App R 477
Definition of ‘relevant act’ in s.76 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003
Facts
The defendant and the victim were in a consensual sexual relationship. The defendant began sending anonymous threatening messages to the victim, and promised to protect her when she confided in him. She later tried to end her relationship with the defendant, to which he responded by sending messages pretending to be a police officer telling her she should sleep with him or be criminally liable.
Issues
The offence of rape under s.1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 requires an absence of consent on the part of the victim, and the absence of a reasonable belief in consent on the part of the defendant. s.76 imposes a conclusive presumption of the absence of consent and the absence of a reasonable belief in consent in circumstances where the defendant intentionally deceived the complainant as to the nature or purpose of the relevant act. The issue in this case was the identity of the ‘relevant act’ to which the deception had to relate.
Decision/Outcome
The Court of Appeal held that the ‘relevant act’ to which s.76 referred to was the act of vaginal, anal or oral penetration. As such, for s.76 to apply, the victim had to be deceived as to the nature and purpose of the sex itself, and not merely deceived as to extraneous circumstances. For this reason, it was held that the application of s.76 would be rare, and it did not apply in this case.
However, as the defendant had admitted that the victim was not truly consenting to many of their sexual encounters, the rape convictions were held to be safe regardless of whether the s.76 presumption applied. The convictions were therefore upheld.
Updated 20 March 2026
This case summary remains accurate as of 2025. R v Jheeta [2007] EWCA Crim 1699 is still the leading authority on the narrow scope of the conclusive presumption under s.76 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, confirming that the deception must relate to the nature or purpose of the sexual act itself rather than surrounding circumstances. The Sexual Offences Act 2003 remains in force and s.76 has not been amended in any way that affects the principles described. Subsequent cases, including R v Assange [2011] EWHC 2849 (Admin) and R v McNally [2013] EWCA Crim 1051, have confirmed and built upon the restrictive approach to s.76 endorsed in Jheeta, reinforcing that deception as to gender (in McNally) was addressed under s.74 rather than s.76. Readers should note that the general consent provisions in s.74 often do the practical work in deception cases where s.76 does not apply, as illustrated by Jheeta itself.
