R v Jones (Terence) (1986) 83 Cr App R 375 concerned injuries caused during alleged horseplay. The Court of Appeal held that the jury should have been allowed to consider consent, including the defendants’ genuine belief in consent. It quashed the convictions because the defendants had pleaded guilty following a ruling that wrongly excluded that defence.
Facts and proceedings
Two schoolboys, aged 14 and 15, were thrown into the air and allowed to fall to the ground, suffering serious injuries. The defendants faced proceedings for inflicting grievous bodily harm under section 20 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861.
The defendants’ evidence was that they regarded what happened as a joke. There was also evidence that the injured boys regarded the activity that way. The defence sought a direction that the jury should acquit if the defendants had been engaging in rough play without intending harm and genuinely believed that the boys consented.
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The trial judge refused to give that direction. He proposed to tell the jury that causing injury in the course of the activity was unlawful. Following that ruling, the defendants changed their pleas to guilty and then appealed against their convictions.
Consent and belief in consent
McCowan J, giving the Court of Appeal’s judgment, accepted that consent could provide a defence in the particular setting of rough play without an intention to cause injury. The court drew on R v Donovan, which recognised an exception for rough sport or play involving neither anger nor an intention to cause bodily harm.
The court also accepted two further propositions: an honest belief that the other person consented could provide a defence even where consent was actually absent; and the belief did not have to be reasonable, provided it was genuinely held.
The prosecution relied on the omission of horseplay from the examples given in Attorney-General’s Reference (No 6 of 1980). The court rejected the suggestion that those examples were exhaustive. The omission therefore did not justify withdrawing the defence from the jury.
Decision
The convictions were quashed and the appeal allowed. The guilty pleas had resulted from the judge’s ruling, so the error was decisive.
This was not a finding that the complainants had consented, or that the defendants’ account had to be accepted. The court expressly recognised that a jury might readily have rejected the defence. The defendants were nevertheless entitled to have the jury consider it.
The distinction matters: the decision concerned whether consent or a genuine belief in consent could make the alleged horseplay lawful. It did not establish that the absence of an intention to cause serious injury, by itself, answered every allegation under section 20.
Citation: (1986) 83 Cr App R 375.