R v Marangwanda [2009] EWCA Crim 60
Whether the reckless transmission of STIs to others in the course of ordinary contact, particularly children, merits a charge of grievous bodily harm and the issuing of a sexual offences prevention order.
Facts
The defendant was responsible for assisting in caring for two young children, as he was engaged in a romantic relationship with their mother. The defendant had already been diagnosed with gonorrhoea, and received the relevant treatment. A month later, both children were also diagnosed with gonorrhoea. The defendant was thus charged with two counts of sexual activity with a child, in violation of s. 9 of the 2003 Sexual Offences Act, however these charges were unsuccessful due to lack of evidence. The primary focus of the instance case was whether the defendant could be separately convicted of GBH under s. 20 of the 1861 Offences Against the Person Act, for having recklessly transmitted gonorrhoea to the two child victims by ordinary contact as a result of bad personal hygiene.
Issues
Could an individual who acted recklessly in failing to prevent the reasonably foreseeable transmission of a sexually transmitted infection to children be subject to a sexual offences prevention order.
Decision/Outcome
The Court partially allowed the defendant’s appeal against his initial conviction, reducing his sentence, which subsequently invalidated the order which would have prevented him from working with children again. However, the Court found that despite this, the defendant’s actions still amounted to serious sexual harm, and so a charge of GBH remained applicable and a sexual offences prevention order could thus still be appropriately issued.
Words: 265
Updated 20 March 2026
This case summary is broadly accurate in its description of R v Marangwanda [2009] EWCA Crim 60. However, readers should be aware of two important legal developments affecting the wider context of the article.
First, Sexual Offences Prevention Orders (SOPOs), as discussed in this case, were abolished and replaced by Sexual Harm Prevention Orders (SHPOs) under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, which came into force in March 2015. The legal framework governing such orders has therefore changed, though the underlying purpose of protecting the public from sexual harm remains similar.
Second, the article’s description of the s.20 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 charge for reckless transmission of an STI remains consistent with the line of authority running from R v Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103 and R v Konzani [2005] EWCA Crim 706, and no subsequent statutory change has altered the applicability of s.20 to reckless disease transmission. That aspect of the law remains as stated.
Readers should note that the summary’s description of the outcome is somewhat compressed. The Court of Appeal quashed the SOPO on the basis that it had been made by reference to the original sentence, but confirmed that a properly constructed order addressing sexual harm could still be made. The core legal principles discussed remain good law, subject to the replacement of SOPOs by SHPOs noted above.
