R v Millward [1994] Crim LR 527
Procurement – Causing death by reckless driving; whether accessory could be liable where principal lacked mens rea
Facts
H, employed by B, was driving a tractor when a trailer became detached from the tractor due to a poorly-maintained tow-hitch, hit a car and killed a passenger. B, the employer, was convicted of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring H to cause death by reckless driving due to B’s instructions to H to drive the tractor with the poorly-maintained tow-hitch on the highway and which resulted in the death. H was acquitted. B appealed against his conviction.
Issues
The issue in question was whether B, charged as the accessory, could be liable where the principal, H, lacked mens rea. B claimed that the procurer cannot be convicted after the principal had been acquitted, and that the word “reckless” had to be read as a requirement for a mental element into the offence’s actus reus , and the acquittal implied this was therefore not committed.
Decision/Outcome
An accessory can be liable where the principal commits the actus reus of the offence, even if the principal lacks the necessary mens rea to be convicted himself. Procuring does not require a joint intention between accessory and principal. In this case the actus reus was the taking of the vehicle in its defective condition on the road so as to cause the death, which was procured by B. The appeal was dismissed. Today, under section 2A(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 it is expressly provided that the new offence of dangerous driving is committed where it is obvious to a competent and careful driver that driving the vehicle in its current state would be dangerous; therefore where such a driver is not, and could not be expected to be, aware of the defects, he could not commit the actus reus of the offence and procurement of the offence would not be possible.
Updated 20 March 2026
This article remains broadly accurate as a summary of R v Millward [1994] Crim LR 527 and the legal principles it established regarding accessorial liability and procuring. The core holding — that an accessory can be liable where the principal commits the actus reus without the necessary mens rea — continues to represent good law and has been cited and applied in subsequent cases, including by the Court of Appeal in R v Robert Millward and discussed in the context of the doctrine of innocent agency.
The article’s reference to section 2A(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 is correct: that provision, inserted by the Road Traffic Act 1991, defines dangerous driving by reference to what would be obvious to a competent and careful driver, and remains in force in its current form as of the date of this review (see legislation.gov.uk). The article’s concluding observation about the implications for procurement in cases where the driver is unaware of a defect reflects a reasonable reading of the statutory framework.
Students should note that the broader law on secondary liability has been subject to significant development following the Supreme Court’s decision in R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8, which overruled the doctrine of parasitic accessory liability established in Chan Wing-Siu. However, Jogee is concerned with joint enterprise and foresight, and does not directly alter the specific principle in Millward regarding procuring and the sufficiency of the principal’s actus reus. Students should nonetheless be aware of Jogee when studying accessorial liability more broadly.
