R v Moys [1984] 79 Cr App R 72
Handling stolen goods contrary to section 22(1) Theft Act 1968, mens rea, subjective test.
Facts
A black and white mare worth between £600-£700 was stolen from her livery stables. The defendant sold her the next day for £480 and she was subsequently recognised by her owner. The defendant was convicted of handling stolen goods contrary to section 22(1) Theft Act 1968 and he appealed against his conviction on the basis that the trial judge had misdirected the jury as to the requisite mental element for the offence.
Issues
To be convicted of the offence of handling stolen goods under section 22(1) Theft Act 1968, the jury must be satisfied that the defendant knew or believed the goods in question had been stolen, and that he acted dishonestly. The trial judge directed the jury that a strong suspicion on the part of a defendant together with a wilful shutting of the eyes to the facts amounts to the requisite belief in this context. This was a misdirection. The test as to whether a defendant knew or believed the goods to be stolen is subjective, and a mere suspicion that the goods were stolen even with a deliberate shutting of the eyes to the circumstances are insufficient to amount to a belief, although they may be taken into consideration by a jury when considering whether the defendant had the requisite knowledge or belief.
Decision/Outcome
The defendant’s convicted was quashed. The trial judge’s direction to the jury that a suspicion coupled with a deliberate shutting of the eyes amounted to a belief was a material misdirection. To handle stolen goods, a defendant must subjectively be aware of the theft or believe the goods to be stolen.
Updated 20 March 2026
This article accurately states the law on the mental element for handling stolen goods under section 22(1) of the Theft Act 1968. The decision in R v Moys (1984) 79 Cr App R 72 remains good law. The principle that mere suspicion, even coupled with a deliberate closing of the eyes to the circumstances, is insufficient to constitute knowledge or belief for the purposes of section 22(1), and that the test is subjective, continues to be applied by the courts. The leading authority on the distinction between suspicion and belief in this context, R v Hall (1985) 81 Cr App R 260, is consistent with the approach described here. Section 22(1) of the Theft Act 1968 has not been amended in any way that affects the principles discussed. The article remains accurate and up to date.
