R v Richardson [1998] 2 Cr App 200
OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON – CONSENT – FRAUD
Facts
The appellant, a registered dentist, had her licence to practice suspended by the General Dental Council in 1996 but continued to treat patients, whom she did not inform of the suspension. On this basis, the appellant was charged with six counts of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The judge at trial ruled against the defence submission that the patients treated by the appellant after her disqualification had consented to their respective procedures, noting that the fraud as to her credentials vitiated any such consent.
Issues
On appeal it was argued by counsel for the appellant that the judge at trial had erred in striking out the submission of the defence, in that not all deceptions amounted to fraud of a type that could vitiate consent; only those which spoke to the nature of the act itself or the identity of the person perpetrating the fraud were capable of doing so. It thus fell to be determined by the Court of Appeal whether a deception as to a person’s attributes, in this case their qualifications, would suffice to negative the consent of the deceived party.
Decision/Outcome
The Court of Appeal confirmed, allowing the appeal, that fraud only negatived consent in circumstances where the victim was deceived as to either the nature of the act performed or the identity of those performing it. It was noted that lesser forms of deception might suffice for a claim to damages in tort, however. Importantly, the Court held that the phrase ‘identity of the person’ did not extend to that person’s qualifications or attributes.
Updated 20 March 2026
This case summary accurately reflects the decision in R v Richardson [1998] 2 Cr App R 200. The legal principle described — that fraud only vitiates consent in criminal law where the deception goes to the nature of the act or the identity of the person, and not merely to their qualifications or attributes — remains an established part of English criminal law on consent.
Readers should note, however, that the law on consent in offences against the person has continued to develop since 1998. In particular, R v Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103 and R v Konzani [2005] EWCA Crim 706 explored the boundaries of consent where deception relates to risk of harm, and the Supreme Court’s decision in R v McNally [2013] EWCA Crim 1051 (Court of Appeal) considered whether deception as to gender could vitiate consent to sexual touching. The Sexual Offences Act 2003 also introduced a separate statutory framework for consent in sexual offences (ss.74–76), which operates differently from the common law principles discussed in this case. Richardson remains good law in its own context, but students should be aware that the broader law on consent and deception is more nuanced than this case alone suggests.
