R v Ruffel [1991] 13 Cr App R
Public Nuisance – Common Law Offence
Facts
The defendant had thrown an ‘acid house’ party which had attracted thousands of people. The party involved very loud music that continued overnight for some 12 hours. The party had caused traffic to block a road leading to the site and the woodlands had been littered with human excrement. The defendant was accused of the common offence of public nuisance and was convicted. He was sentenced to a suspended sentence of 12 months and had been fined £7,000. The defendant appealed against his sentence.
Issues
Whether the defendant was acting as a public nuisance or not. Whether the party which only lasted for just over 12 hours could constitute a public nuisance. Whether the defendant’s sentence was unfair or manifestly unjust.
Decision/Outcome
The defendant had been acting as a public nuisance. Following Attorney General v PYA Quarries [1957] 2 QB 169 a public nuisance must be capable of indiscriminately effecting a class of people within a neighbourhood. This was the case as a result of the very loud music of the party, the littering and fouling of the nearby woodlands, and because of the extremely heavy traffic that had been caused as a result of the party blocking the road to the area. These elements were enough to have affected a cross section of a class of Her Majesty’s subjects within the area, and it was reasonable to expect them to have to take action to prevent it. Whilst the defendants suspended sentence was upheld, his fine was quashed because he had no means to pay it.
Updated 20 March 2026
This article remains broadly accurate as a summary of R v Ruffel [1991] 13 Cr App R (S) 204 and the common law principles it applied. The reliance on Attorney General v PYA Quarries [1957] 2 QB 169 as the leading authority on the definition of public nuisance remains valid.
However, readers should be aware of a significant subsequent development: the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 codified public nuisance as a statutory offence under section 78, replacing the common law offence for conduct occurring after the Act’s commencement. The statutory offence broadly reflects the common law definition but carries a maximum sentence of ten years’ imprisonment. The common law offence was abolished for England and Wales by section 78(6) of that Act. Older cases such as Ruffel and PYA Quarries remain relevant to understanding the background and elements of the offence, but any new prosecution would be brought under the 2022 Act rather than at common law.
