Legal Case Summary
R v Stone and Dobinson [1977] 1 QB 354
OMISSION – NEGLIGENCE – DUTY OF CARE
Facts
The defendants, S and D, were a couple who took in the victim, S’s sister, as a lodger. S had severe disabilities, being partially deaf and blind. D had learning difficulties. Whilst staying with the defendants, the victim became unable to care for herself, having long struggled with mental health issues and obsession about her weight. D made some efforts to care for her, bringing her food and washing her with the held of a neighbour. However, her attempts were not sustained and inadequate, and the victim passed away. The defendants were charged with manslaughter.
Issues
The issue was the jury were entitled to find that the defendants owed a duty of care to the victim. Additionally, the definition of ‘gross negligence’ for the purpose of a manslaughter conviction was in issue.
Decision/Outcome
The jury were entitled to find that a duty of care was owed on the grounds that the victim was not only a lodger in the home of the defendants but also had closer ties to each. In Stone’s case, a duty of care was owed on the basis that she was a blood relative, whilst Dobinson had undertaken a duty of care by washing her and providing food.
Regarding the issue of negligence, the Court of Appeal held that in order to ground a conviction for manslaughter the defendants must have been ‘grossly negligent’ in respect of their breach of duty. Geoffrey Lane LJ suggested that such gross negligence required the defendants to have been either ‘indifferent’ to the risk of injury, or have foreseen the risk and run it nevertheless.
The conviction of gross negligence manslaughter was upheld.
Updated 20 March 2026
This case summary accurately reflects the decision in R v Stone and Dobinson [1977] QB 354. The core principles remain good law: criminal liability for omissions can arise where a duty of care exists, and that duty may be established through a familial relationship or by voluntary assumption of care.
However, readers should note that the test for gross negligence manslaughter was significantly refined by the House of Lords in R v Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171, which is now the leading authority. Lord Mackay confirmed that the correct test asks whether the defendant’s conduct was so bad that it should be judged criminal, assessed by reference to the risk of death (not merely injury). Geoffrey Lane LJ’s formulation in Stone and Dobinson — referring to indifference to the risk of injury or foresight of risk — should therefore be read alongside and subject to Adomako. In particular, the emphasis in modern law is on the risk of death, not merely injury, and the ultimately jury-assessed question of whether the negligence was criminal in nature. The article’s reference to ‘risk of injury’ as the relevant standard is therefore a material limitation in light of subsequent case law.
The duty of care principles from Stone and Dobinson continue to be cited and applied in gross negligence manslaughter cases, including in the Supreme Court’s consideration of the offence in R v Sellu and related proceedings. The case remains a standard authority on omissions liability and voluntary assumption of duty in criminal law.