Legal Case Summary
R v Wilson [1996] 2 Cr. App. R. 241
Criminal –Consent – Consensual bodily harm between husband and wife
Facts of R v Wilson
Alan Wilson was charged under s 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 for assault. He branded his initials into his wife’s buttocks with a hot knife.
Issues in R v Wilson
The first issue was whether R v Brown (1993) 97 Cr. App. R. 44, is an authority for the proposition that consent is not a defence to assault occasioning actual bodily harm to a person, under s 47 of the Act. Further, when criminal investigation or conviction is required where consensual activity between a couple occurs in the privacy of their own home. Where consensual activity has taken place in the privacy of one’s home, and is has not serious or extreme in nature, a defence of consent is valid against s 47 of the Act and it is not a proper matter for criminal investigation.
Decision/Outcome of R v Wilson
The court distinguished the case of R v Brown holding that the engagement of the defendants in sadomasochism which led to the decision to convict the defendant under s 47 of the Act was extreme, with a serious risk of injury occurring. There was no factual comparison to be made between the actions of Wilson and the facts presented in R vBrown and there was no aggressive intent on the part of Wilson. It was further held that consensual activity between a husband and wife in the privacy of their own home was not a matter for criminal investigation or conviction. Therefore, consent was a valid defence to s 47. The appeal was allowed and the conviction was quashed.
Updated 20 March 2026
This summary accurately reflects the decision in R v Wilson [1996] 2 Cr App R 241 and its distinction from R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212. The core legal principles described remain good law. However, readers should be aware of subsequent developments in this area. In R v BM [2018] EWCA Crim 560, the Court of Appeal confirmed that consent is not a defence to wounding or the causing of grievous bodily harm under ss 18 and 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 in the context of extreme body modification procedures carried out by a third party, and it declined to extend the recognised exceptions to the Brown principle. BM does not overturn Wilson but illustrates the continued restrictive approach of the courts to the consent defence where serious injury is inflicted. The article’s suggestion that the privacy of the marital home was a significant factor in Wilson should be read with some caution: subsequent commentary and case law suggest the ratio is narrower than a general domestic privacy principle, and the absence of aggressive intent and the analogy to tattooing were equally if not more important to the court’s reasoning. The underlying statutory provisions (s 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861) remain in force and unamended in this respect.
