Re Farnol Eades Irvine & Co Ltd; Carpenter v The Company [1915] 1 Ch 22
High Court, Chancery Division, 30 October 1914
A debenture-holder could begin proceedings to enforce her security and seek the appointment of a receiver and manager without first applying under the Courts (Emergency Powers) Act 1914. Warrington J distinguished those steps from the enforcement measures restricted by the Act.
Facts
The plaintiff acted on behalf of herself and the company’s other debenture-holders. Her claim sought a declaration of their charge over the company’s undertaking and assets, accounts and inquiries, payment, foreclosure or sale, and the appointment of a receiver and manager. The company carried on printing and associated businesses.
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The writ was issued on 2 October 1914. When the plaintiff moved for a receiver and manager, the company objected that she had not first obtained permission under the emergency legislation.
Issues
Section 1 restricted specified steps to enforce payment or recover money unless an application was first made to the court. Those steps included execution on a judgment, taking possession and foreclosure. The legislation allowed the court to grant time where inability to pay resulted from circumstances attributable to the war.
The company argued that both the writ and the motion fell within the restrictions. It also relied on the rule requiring applications under the Act to be dealt with in chambers, arguing that this protected debtors from damaging publicity and preserved their opportunity to seek delay.
Decision and reasoning
Warrington J rejected the objection. The restriction on enforcing a money judgment did not prevent proceedings from being started to obtain one. Indeed, the Act contemplated judgments made after it came into force.
He distinguished foreclosure itself from the preliminary steps in a foreclosure action. In its strict legal sense, foreclosure extinguishes an existing equity of redemption by court order. An initial order directing accounts and providing for foreclosure if payment is not made is not yet foreclosure absolute; a further order is required.
The judge did not decide precisely what the statutory prohibition on foreclosure meant. He held that it did not prevent a claimant from issuing proceedings and putting herself in a position to obtain a foreclosure order.
A receiver presented a further distinction. Possession was taken by the court through its officer, for the benefit of all parties, rather than by a creditor entering into possession by way of execution. The court retained control over whether to appoint a receiver and the conditions on which possession would be taken. The Act did not prevent such an appointment in a proper case to preserve the property.
Outcome
The company’s objection failed, and the court made the usual order appointing a receiver and manager. The ruling permitted those protective proceedings without a prior application under the Act; it did not grant final foreclosure or decide that every later enforcement step fell outside the legislation.
Source: Original report, [1915] 1 Ch 22–25.