Legal Case Summary
Re McArdle [1951] Ch 669
Past consideration is no consideration.
Facts
William McArdle left a house to his five children in equal shares, subject to a life interest for his widow. The wife of one of these sons, Mrs Marjorie McArdle, carried out improvements to the house amounting to £488. She also bore the cost of these repairs. After the repairs had been carried out, she got all the five children of McArdle to sign a document in which they promised to repay Mrs McArdle the £488 out of the estate when it was eventually distributed. After the testator’s widow died, Mrs McArdle asked for payment. However, the other four sons refused to pay her. She tried to enforce her interest in the property in court.
Issues
Ms McArdle argued that the document was an equitable assignment of a portion of each of the five sons’ interest in the property amounting to £488 out of the testator’s estate. However, the other sons argued that the promise was merely a gift, as Mrs McArdle had provided no consideration for it. As she was a mere volunteer, the equitable maxim ‘Equity will not assist a volunteer’ applied and, therefore, the promise to pay could not be enforced.
Decision/Outcome
The Court of Appeal held that the transaction had not been completed and was imperfect. Therefore, it was only a promise to pay and not a gift. Mrs McArdle had already performed the work before she asked for payment. Her consideration was in the past. Past consideration is not good consideration. Therefore, the agreement was unenforceable.
Updated 20 March 2026
This case summary remains accurate as a statement of established English contract law. Re McArdle [1951] Ch 669 is a leading Court of Appeal authority on the doctrine of past consideration, and the rule that past consideration is no consideration remains good law. No statutory change or subsequent case has displaced this principle. Students should note that the doctrine of past consideration has recognised exceptions, most notably the rule in Lampleigh v Brathwait (1615) and as restated in Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [1980] AC 614, where an act done at the promisor’s request, with an understanding that payment would follow, may constitute valid consideration even if the promise to pay came later. These exceptions are not addressed in this summary but are important for a complete understanding of the area.
