Renals v Cowlishaw (1879) 11 Ch D 866
Court of Appeal — 1 July 1879
Facts
Trustees owned the Mill Hill residential estate and adjoining land. In 1845, they sold two adjoining parcels to Francis Shaw. Shaw covenanted with the trustees and their heirs, executors, administrators and assigns to observe restrictions on building and use. These included requirements about the position and character of buildings and a prohibition on using them for trade or business rather than as private houses.
The trustees later sold the Mill Hill estate, which eventually passed to the plaintiffs. The conveyances in that chain of ownership did not refer to Shaw’s restrictive covenants. There was also no contract or representation that the purchasers were to receive their benefit.
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The defendants acquired land derived from Shaw with notice of the restrictions. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ industrial activities and buildings, including a chimney emitting black smoke, breached the covenants and harmed the residential estate. They sought an injunction to enforce the restrictions.
Procedural history
Hall VC dismissed the action. His decision was reported as Renals v Cowlishaw (1878) 9 Ch D 125. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that their ownership of the retained estate entitled them to enforce the covenants made with the original vendors and their assigns.
Issue
Had the plaintiffs acquired the benefit of the restrictive covenants so that they could enforce them against the defendants? The dispute concerned the plaintiffs’ right to enforce restrictions on the defendants’ land, rather than restrictions being imposed on the plaintiffs’ own use of their property.
Decision
The Court of Appeal upheld Hall VC’s decision. James, Baggallay and Thesiger LJJ agreed that the plaintiffs were not entitled to enforce the covenants. Their succession to ownership of the residential estate did not, on these conveyances and transactions, establish that they had acquired the benefit.
Reasoning: identifying who receives the benefit
James LJ emphasised that the deed needed to identify the property for whose benefit the restrictive covenants had been entered into. Here, he could not determine what land the parties intended to protect or the limits of that land. Referring to the covenantees’ “assigns” did not resolve that problem.
All three judges adopted Hall VC’s reasoning. He had distinguished ownership of land from entitlement to enforce a covenant. A purchaser might receive the benefit through a mutual building arrangement or through a transaction showing that the vendor had agreed to confer it. Such an agreement did not necessarily have to be express; it could be inferred from the sale and purchase.
In this case, however, the plaintiffs had not bought all the land retained by the original covenantees. Nor did the relevant conveyances show that the covenant’s benefit was attached to their particular property or formed part of what they had purchased. The absence of any reference to the covenants in the later conveyances was significant in that setting.
The point illustrated
The defendants’ notice of the restrictions did not itself give the plaintiffs a right to enforce them. The plaintiffs also had to establish their own entitlement to the benefit. The decision concerned that missing entitlement; it did not hold that restrictive covenants could never benefit successors in title.