Rialas v Mitchell
[1984] 128 SJ 704;
PERSONAL INJURY, DAMAGES, CARE, COSTS, CARE OF THE INJURED PLAINTIFF, REASONABLENESS, FUTURE COST
Facts
The infant plaintiff, aged 6 and a half, was crossing the road when he was struck by a van driven by a van driven by the defendant. The defendant admitted liability for the accident. As a result of the accident, the child sustained a severe brain damage. He could not sit or stand without support, he suffered severe spasms and was unable to speak. The child could answer with ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ by moving his eyes to the left and right. The plaintiff was totally dependant on others and must be looked after day and night. The family of the plaintiff was determined to look after him, despite the fact that it was actually cheaper to have him looked after in a private institution. The plaintiff was awarded £350,965 in damages, out of which £143,552 for future care and attention. The defendant appealed his liability for the future costs of care given that it was cheaper to have the child looked after in a private institution.
Issues
Is the defendant liable for the costs of care of the injured child by his parents, given that there is a cheaper option?
Decision/Outcome
The appeal was dismissed.
(1) The defendant will be liable for the cost of home care of the injured child, if it is reasonable for the plaintiff to be looked after at home, despite the fact that there is a cheaper option.
(2) It is up for the plaintiff to show that it is reasonable that he is looked after at home.
Updated 20 March 2026
This case summary accurately reflects the decision in Rialas v Mitchell [1984] 128 SJ 704. The core legal principles stated remain good law. The proposition that a defendant is liable for the reasonable cost of home care, even where institutional care would be cheaper, continues to be applied in personal injury litigation. This principle has been consistently affirmed in subsequent authorities, including Woodrup v Nicol [1993] PIQR Q104 and more broadly in the approach taken by courts when assessing damages for future care needs. The burden on the claimant to demonstrate that home care is a reasonable choice, rather than merely a preferred one, also remains established practice. There are no statutory changes that affect the principles described. Readers should note that specific damages figures cited are historical and reflect the value of money and care costs in 1984; modern awards for comparable injuries will be substantially higher. Practitioners should also be aware that the assessment of future care costs is an area where expert evidence and periodical payments orders (under the Courts Act 2003) may now be highly relevant in practice, though these procedural developments do not affect the underlying principles this case establishes.
